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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that study various interactions between the
housing market, mortgage choice, and public policy. The first chapter studies how changes to the
collateral value of real estate assets affect homeowner borrowing. While previous research has
documented a positive relationship between house prices and home-equity based borrowing, a key
empirical challenge has been to disentangle the role of collateral constraints from that of wealth effects
in generating this relationship. To isolate the role of collateral constraints, I exploit the fully anticipated
expiration of resale price controls created through an inclusionary zoning regulation in Montgomery
County, Maryland. I estimate that the marginal propensity to borrow out of increases in housing collateral
is between $0.04 and $0.13. The magnitude of this effect is correlated with a homeowner's initial leverage
and additional analysis of residential investment and ex-post loan performance further suggests that
borrowers used some portion of the extracted funds to finance current consumption and investment
expenditures. These results highlight the importance of collateral constraints for homeowner borrowing
and suggest a potentially important role for house price growth in driving aggregate consumption.
The second chapter, co-authored with Andrew Paciorek, provides novel estimates of the interest rate
elasticity of mortgage demand by measuring the extent to which households "bunch" at a discrete jump in
interest rates generated by the conforming loan limit. Our estimates imply that a 1 percentage point
increase in the rate on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage reduces first mortgage demand by between 2 and 3
percent. One-third of this response is driven by borrowers who take out second mortgages, which implies
that total mortgage debt only declines by 1.5 to 2 percent.
The third chapter, co-authored with Joseph Gyourko, Fernando Ferreira, and Wenjie Ding, uses extensive
micro data to investigate whether contagion was an important factor in the last housing cycle. Our
estimates provide evidence of contagion during the housing boom, but not during the bust. We also find
that contagion effects are greater when transmitted from a larger to a smaller market, and are more
important for the most elastically-supplied markets. Local fundamentals and expectations of future
fundamentals have limited ability to account for our estimated effect.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Applied Economics

First Advisor
Joseph Gyourko

Second Advisor
Fernando Ferreira

Subject Categories
Economics
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1039

ESSAYS ON MORTGAGE CHOICE AND HOUSING ECONOMICS
Anthony A. DeFusco
A DISSERTATION
in
Applied Economics
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2015
Supervisor of Dissertation

Co-Supervisor of Dissertation

Joseph Gyourko
Professor of Real Estate, Finance, and
Business Economics & Public Policy

Fernando Ferreira
Associate Professor of Real Estate and
Business Economics & Public Policy

Graduate Group Chairperson

Eric Bradlow, Professor of Marketing, Statistics, and Education

Dissertation Committee
Joseph Gyourko, Professor of Real Estate, Finance, and Business Economics & Public Policy
Fernando Ferreira, Associate Professor of Real Estate and Business Economics & Public Policy
Gilles Duranton, Professor of Real Estate
Todd Sinai, Professor of Real Estate and Business Economics & Public Policy
Nikolai Roussanov, Associate Professor of Finance

ESSAYS ON MORTGAGE CHOICE AND HOUSING ECONOMICS
© COPYRIGHT
2015
Anthony Alden DeFusco

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support, guidance, and encouragement of many people. First among them are the members of my dissertation committee, Gilles
Duranton, Fernando Ferreira, Joe Gyourko, Todd Sinai, and Nick Roussanov. Joe’s wisdom, Fernando’s patience, Gilles’ thoroughness, Todd’s insight, and Nick’s support have all played a crucial
role in getting me to where I am today. I am especially thankful to my primary advisors Joe and
Fernando who, despite having seen in perhaps too much detail how “the sausage is made,” never
wavered in their support for me and my work and were always generous with their time, energy,
and resources.
I have also benefited enormously from interactions with my peers at Wharton. My graduate school
experience would not have been the same without the camaraderie of Hessam Bavafa, William
Mann, Anita Mukherjee, and Dan Sacks—who were there to celebrate and commiserate with me
from start to finish—as well as Andrew Paciorek and Mike Punzalan—who were there for the early
years. My many conversations with Dan and working relationship with Andrew were particularly
helpful on a professional level. More than anyone though, Yiwei Zhang had the largest impact on
my experience in graduate school. Her infinite patience, unwavering love, and remarkable intellect
are evidenced on every page of this dissertation, which she has read more times and with more
diligence than anyone else, and to whom I owe tremendous thanks for always being the other half
of my team.
Finally, I would be completely remiss to not mention my Mom, Dad, brothers, and sister, who
have been supporting me longer than anyone else and without whom nothing I have done would be
possible. All along the way, I have been especially comforted by their prayers and in the knowledge
that they would love me regardless of whether I finished and be enormously proud of me when I
did. Thanks for everything Mom, Dad, Andrew, Kaylynn, and Matthew.

iii

ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MORTGAGE CHOICE AND HOUSING ECONOMICS
Anthony A. DeFusco
Joseph Gyourko
Fernando Ferreira
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that study various interactions between
the housing market, mortgage choice, and public policy. The first chapter studies how changes to
the collateral value of real estate assets affect homeowner borrowing. While previous research has
documented a positive relationship between house prices and home-equity based borrowing, a key
empirical challenge has been to disentangle the role of collateral constraints from that of wealth
effects in generating this relationship. To isolate the role of collateral constraints, I exploit the fully
anticipated expiration of resale price controls created through an inclusionary zoning regulation
in Montgomery County, Maryland. I estimate that the marginal propensity to borrow out of
increases in housing collateral is between $0.04 and $0.13. The magnitude of this effect is correlated
with a homeowner’s initial leverage and additional analysis of residential investment and ex-post
loan performance further suggests that borrowers used some portion of the extracted funds to
finance current consumption and investment expenditures. These results highlight the importance
of collateral constraints for homeowner borrowing and suggest a potentially important role for
house price growth in driving aggregate consumption.
The second chapter, co-authored with Andrew Paciorek, provides novel estimates of the interest
rate elasticity of mortgage demand by measuring the extent to which households “bunch” at a
discrete jump in interest rates generated by the conforming loan limit. Our estimates imply that
a 1 percentage point increase in the rate on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage reduces first mortgage
demand by between 2 and 3 percent. One-third of this response is driven by borrowers who take
out second mortgages, which implies that total mortgage debt only declines by 1.5 to 2 percent.
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The third chapter, co-authored with Joseph Gyourko, Fernando Ferreira, and Wenjie Ding, uses
extensive micro data to investigate whether contagion was an important factor in the last housing
cycle. Our estimates provide evidence of contagion during the housing boom, but not during the
bust. We also find that contagion effects are greater when transmitted from a larger to a smaller
market, and are more important for the most elastically-supplied markets. Local fundamentals
and expectations of future fundamentals have limited ability to account for our estimated effect.
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CHAPTER 1 : Homeowner Borrowing and Housing Collateral: New Evidence from
Expiring Price Controls
1.1. Introduction
By some accounts, over half of the mortgage debt accumulated in the U.S. during the run-up to
the Great Recession can be directly attributed to the effect of rapidly rising house prices on the
demand for home equity debt among existing homeowners (Mian and Sufi, 2011). This can be seen
clearly in Figure 1.1, which plots aggregate trends in house prices and home equity debt relative
to income over the period 1990–2014.1 The pattern is stark. At the same time that house prices
were rising, existing homeowners were taking out an increasingly large amount of debt against
their homes—debt that they quickly began to off-load as prices collapsed.
Why do homeowners respond to rising house prices in this way? In standard models, an increase
in house prices may lead homeowners to take on additional debt due to both a direct effect on
household wealth—rising prices make homeowners feel richer—and an indirect effect on collateralized borrowing capacity—rising prices relax previously binding borrowing constraints tied to
the value of the home. The goal of this paper is to isolate the empirical relevance of the latter
channel by studying how the borrowing behavior of individual homeowners responds to changes
in the collateral value of their homes.
Isolating the independent effect of collateral constraints from that of wealth effects is important
from the perspective of macroeconomic policy because the two mechanisms have markedly different implications for the way in which house price changes spill over into aggregate economic
activity. By propagating the effects of small shocks throughout the economy, increases in homeowner borrowing driven by the relaxation of binding collateral constraints have the potential to
generate large swings in aggregate consumption (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997; Iacoviello, 2005). In contrast, increases in homeowner borrowing driven by wealth effects
1

Greenspan and Kennedy (2005, 2008) present similar time-series evidence using a broader measure of home equity
withdrawal that includes the proceeds from cash-out refinances and home sales. The measure used in this figure includes
only equity extraction occurring through home mortgages secured by junior liens and home equity lines of credit.

1

are likely to have a limited impact since they will typically be offset by decreases among renters,
for whom higher house prices represent a negative wealth shock (Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Buiter, 2008). Therefore, knowing whether and to what extent collateral
constraints drive individual homeowner borrowing behavior is central to our understanding of
how house price changes affect the real economy and to the debate over how monetary policy
should respond to such changes in prices.
Existing empirical research, however, has struggled to provide direct estimates of the effect of collateral values on homeowner borrowing. Two key challenges have hindered progress. First, it
is difficult to identify situations in which changes to the collateral value of a house occur independently from changes to the owner’s housing wealth. As a result, most analyses have focused
primarily on the overall effect of house prices on borrowing while attempting to infer the role of
collateral constraints through the use of indirect proxies—proxies that in many cases conflate credit
demand with credit supply (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2007).2 Second, as in most
empirical analysis, omitted variables and simultaneity biases loom large. Aggregate shocks to joint
determinants of house prices and homeowner borrowing, such as interest rates and expected future
income, make it exceedingly difficult to draw causal inferences from naturally occurring changes
in house prices, even when one is only interested in the overall relationship between prices and
borrowing.3
In this paper, I make use of an alternative approach to contribute new empirical estimates of the
2

Recent papers using this approach to study various determinants of equity extraction include Hurst and Stafford
(2004); Yamashita (2007); Disney and Gathergood (2011); Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014); Cooper (2013) and Bhutta and
Keys (2014). There are also a host of studies using this approach to study consumption responses to house price changes,
many of which are reviewed in Bostic et al. (2009). Three important exceptions are Leth-Petersen (2010), Abdallah and
Lastrapes (2012), and Agarwal and Qian (2014) who study explicit policy-induced changes in collateral constraints
similar to the one studied in this paper. However, as discussed in more detail below, these studies use national and
state-level policy variation, making it difficult to separately identify aggregate trends from household-specific changes
to collateral constraints.
3
A frequently proposed solution to this problem is to instrument for local house prices using Saiz’s (2010) estimates
of cross-city variation in physical constraints to building (Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2014; Aladangady, 2013; Mian et al.,
2013). However, as cautioned by Saiz (2010) and further emphasized by Davidoff (2011, 2014), physical supply constraints are highly correlated with a host of other demand factors that might be expected to directly affect both house
prices and homeowner borrowing. Moreover, as Davidoff (2014) demonstrates, physical building constraints were not
correlated with changes in the size of the housing stock during the 2000s, suggesting that the correlation between house
prices and building constraints was not necessarily operating through the constraints themselves during that period.

2

causal effect of housing collateral on home equity-based borrowing. To isolate the effect of collateral values from generalized wealth effects, I exploit a unique feature of local land use policy in
Montgomery County, Maryland that drives a wedge between the value of a house as collateral and
its value as a component of homeowner wealth. Since 1974, housing developers in Montgomery
County have been subject to an inclusionary zoning regulation known as the Moderately Priced
Dwelling Unit (MPDU) program. This policy requires developers to set aside at least 12.5 percent
of all housing units in new developments to be made available at controlled prices to moderateincome households.4 These housing units are subject to deed restrictions that cap their resale
prices for a period of time ranging between 5 to 30 years. During this period, owners are not permitted to refinance or take on home equity debt for an amount that exceeds the controlled resale
price. Once the price controls expire, however, owners are able to pledge the full market value of
the home as collateral. Since the duration and stringency of the price controls are set by formula
and known in advance at the time of purchase, their expiration has no effect on the owner’s total
expected lifetime wealth. However, expiring price controls directly affect the collateral value of
the home through the relaxation of the borrowing restrictions. Leveraging this fact, I show within
the context of a stylized model of home equity-based borrowing that differential changes in the
propensity for MPDU homeowners to extract equity from their homes at the time the restriction is lifted contain explicit information regarding the effect of collateral values on homeowner
borrowing. I then use that information to provide new estimates of both the extensive margin
effect of relaxing collateral constraints on home equity extraction and the marginal propensity to
borrow against a $1 increase in collateral value.
To conduct my analysis, I assemble a unique dataset containing the precise geographic location
and detailed structural characteristics of every housing unit in Montgomery County as well as
the full history of transactions and loans secured against each property during the period 1997–
2012. I combine this information with administrative records from the Montgomery County
Department of Housing and Community Affairs, which identify the restricted housing units and
4

For a four-person household, the maximum income limit is set at 70 percent of the median family income for the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area as published annually by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. As of 2014, that limit is $75,000, which is roughly 17 percent higher than the national median family income.
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the dates for which the applicable price controls were in effect. This dataset allows me to identify
the effect of expiring price controls by comparing how the borrowing behavior and prices paid by
owners of controlled housing units changes following the expiration of the price control relative
to that of owners of nearby and observationally identical never-controlled units. It also allows me
to track the borrowing behavior of a given homeowner over time, permitting a within-ownership
spell comparison of equity extraction before and after the expiration of the price control. The
added degrees of freedom afforded by the fact that controlled units are dispersed relatively evenly
throughout the county and expire at different points during the sample period further allow me to
control flexibly for aggregate trends affecting borrowing behavior and for unobservable but fixed
differences across localities within the county.
I find compelling evidence that increases in collateral values lead homeowners to extract equity
from their homes. In housing developments containing controlled units, transaction prices for
the controlled units increase by roughly 40–65 percent relative to observationally identical noncontrolled units in the same development following the expiration of the price controls. In response to these price gains, owners of controlled units are roughly four percentage points more
likely to extract equity from their homes in a given year after the expiration of the price control
relative to owners of non-controlled units. This effect is large, representing an almost 100 percent
increase over the pre-expiration mean probability of equity extraction among owners of controlled
units. Both the price effect and the increase in equity extraction among owners of controlled units
are immediately present in the year the price control expires and almost perfectly offset the gap
that exists between owners of controlled and non-controlled units during the imposition of the
price control.
Using information on the size of individual loans, I convert these figures into an estimate of the
marginal propensity to borrow against an increase in housing collateral. On average, I find that
a $1 increase in collateral values leads homeowners to extract between $0.04–$0.13 in additional
home equity debt. To put this into context, estimates from the literature of the overall effect of
house prices on homeowner borrowing, which combine both collateral and wealth effects, range
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between $0.06–$0.25.5 Thus, my estimates imply that collateral constraints can explain a sizable
fraction of the effect of house price increases on homeowner borrowing, even in the absence of
any changes in perceived wealth.
To provide additional evidence that collateral constraints are the dominant force leading owners
of price-controlled units to extract equity from their homes following the expiration of the price
control, I also investigate heterogeneity in the response across individuals. In particular, I show
that homeowners with high initial leverage (as measured by their loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at the
time of purchase) are far more likely to respond to expiring price controls by extracting equity than
homeowners with low initial leverage. I find no statistically or economically significant effects
for homeowners in the bottom portion of the initial leverage distribution (LTV ≤ 0.7), whereas
the effects for the most highly levered households (LTV > 0.95) are both statistically significant
and roughly twice as large as the overall average effect. These results suggest that the increase in
collateral values induced by the expiring price controls only affects borrowing behavior among
the subset of homeowners for whom collateral constraints were likely to have bound prior to
expiration.
My empirical strategy identifies the effect of collateral values on equity extraction under the assumption that borrowing behavior would have evolved similarly for owners of both controlled
and uncontrolled units in the absence of the expiring price control. To probe the validity of this
assumption, I conduct a range of different robustness checks. Most importantly, I provide direct graphical evidence showing that the trends in outcomes for controlled and uncontrolled units
move together in the period prior to expiration and only begin to diverge once the price controls
expire. To more formally assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I also conduct a
series of placebo tests in which I randomly assign price control expiration dates to the controlled
units and re-estimate the main specifications. The results of this exercise suggest that the effects
I find are unlikely to have been generated by spurious correlation alone. The estimated effects
are also robust to the inclusion of both ownership spell fixed-effects and subdivision-specific time
5
See Haurin and Rosenthal (2006); Disney and Gathergood (2011); Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014), and Bhutta and Keys
(2014).
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trends, implying that any time-varying omitted factors driving the results must be present at both
the level of the individual homeowner and the particular housing subdivision in which her home
is located. Finally, to further address potential concerns regarding the comparability of controlled
and never-controlled units, I also replicate the main analysis using a semi-parametric propensity
score matching estimator.
While my results provide clear evidence that homeowners respond to increases in housing collateral by borrowing against their homes, the real effects of such borrowing depend on how the
money is used. In particular, if homeowners simply reinvest the proceeds into more-liquid assets
or use the funds to pay off other outstanding debt, then home equity-based borrowing induced by
rising collateral values should not be expected to affect current consumption or investment expenditures. Although limitations of the data prevent me from being able to provide a full account of
the uses of extracted funds, two pieces of evidence from the housing market suggest that at least
some fraction of the borrowed money was used to fund current expenditures. First, using administrative data on building and home improvement permits issued by the Montgomery County
Department of Permitting Services, I find that the annual likelihood of applying for a home improvement permit increases differentially by roughly 0.6–1 percentage points among owners of
price-controlled units following the expiration of the price control. This effect represents an increase of approximately 60–100 percent over the pre-expiration mean and suggests that borrowers
likely used some portion of the extracted equity to fund residential investment expenditures.6
Second, the deeds data used to conduct the main analysis also contains information on home foreclosures. Using this information, I show that the three-year foreclosure rate associated with equity
extractions secured against MPDU properties increases by roughly 1.5–2 percentage points rela6

An alternative interpretation of this result is that the expiration of the price control increases the owner’s incentives
to invest in the home, as was documented by Autor et al. (2014) in the context of rent control, and may therefore explain
both the increase in permitting activity and the increase in equity extraction even in the absence of any collateral effects.
This is unlikely in my context for three reasons. First, the formula used to determine the controlled resale price is
adjusted upward dollar-for-dollar to reflect documented home improvements and therefore generates little disincentive
for investment during the control period. Second, for owners who plan to stay in the home beyond the end of the
control period, the expected return from home improvements is determined based on the market price. For these
owners, the exact timing of the expiration therefore has no effect on investment incentives. Finally, if the only factor
driving the increase in equity extraction were changes to the demand for debt-financed home improvements, then one
would not necessarily expect the equity extraction effect to be concentrated only among the set of borrowers with high
initial leverage.
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tive to equity extractions secured against non-MPDU properties following the expiration of the
price control. This result is consistent with previous findings regarding the increased risks associated with house price-induced equity extraction and suggests that borrowers are unlikely to be
reinvesting all of the proceeds into more-liquid assets, as their risk of foreclosure would presumably remain unchanged if that were the case (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Bhutta and Keys, 2014; Laufer,
2014).
Related Literature
My findings build on a large empirical literature studying the effect of house prices on household
consumption, savings, and borrowing behavior. The most directly related strand of this literature has focused explicitly on the effect of house prices on home equity-based borrowing and has
found consistent evidence that homeowners respond to increases in house prices by extracting
equity from their homes (see, for example, Dynan and Kohn, 2007; Yamashita, 2007; Cooper,
2010, 2013; Disney and Gathergood, 2011; Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2014; Bhutta and Keys, 2014).7
A different but closely related branch of this literature has also found consistently positive consumption responses to changes in house prices (see, for example, Skinner, 1989, 1996; Engelhardt,
1996; Lehnert, 2004; Benjamin et al., 2004; Case et al., 2005, 2013; Haurin and Rosenthal, 2006;
Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Bostic et al., 2009; Gan, 2010; Carroll et al., 2011; Carroll and Zhou,
2012; Browning et al., 2013; Calormiris et al., 2013; Mian et al., 2013). Many studies have attempted to infer the role that collateral constraints play in generating these relationships through
the use of indirect proxies for constraints. For example, a common approach has been to explore
how households with different credit histories and incomes or at different points in the life cycle
respond to similar changes in house prices.8 While the results from these analyses are generally
7

A related literature studies non-house price determinants of the demand for home equity debt, including income
shocks (Hurst and Stafford, 2004) and various other sources of macroeconomic uncertainty (Chen et al., 2013). There
is also an extensive literature studying the financial incentive to refinance an existing mortgage without taking on
additional home equity debt in response to falling interest rates from an option theoretic point of view (see, for example,
Agarwal et al., 2013; Keys et al., 2014, and references therein.)
8
This approach is motivated by similar strategies that have been used to study the role of liquidity constraints in
the vast empirical literature estimating consumption and borrowing responses to various forms of income receipt (see,
for example, Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli, 1990; Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995; Jappelli et al., 1998; Parker, 1999; Souleles, 1999;
Browning and Collado, 2001; Johnson et al., 2006; Agarwal et al., 2007; Stephens, 2008; Aaronson et al., 2012; Parker
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suggestive of an important role for collateral constraints, the indirect nature of the proxy measures employed has left open the possibility that such estimates may be confounding differences
in collateral constraints with differences in preferences.
In response to this limitation, an alternative approach has been to explore how borrowing and
spending behavior responds to explicit policy-induced relaxation or tightening of collateral constraints.9 Three recent papers taking this approach and which are closely related to this paper
bear mentioning. Leth-Petersen (2010) and Agarwal and Qian (2014) provide evidence that homeowners’ spending and borrowing behavior responds to national changes in the ability to use home
equity debt for consumption purposes in Denmark and to the amount of time homeowners must
live in their residences before being able to access home equity through cash-out refinances in Singapore, respectively. However, since both of these studies examine national policy changes that
do not vary at the individual level, the authors again must rely on indirect proxy measures to
determine which households would be most affected by changes in the ability to borrow against
home equity. Moreover, the policy changes studied in these papers occur at the same time for all
households, making it difficult to separate the effect of changing collateral constraints from other
aggregate trends affecting borrowing behavior. In a similar analysis, Abdallah and Lastrapes (2012)
study how retail spending at the county level in Texas responded to a statewide relaxation of a ban
on the ability to use home mortgage debt for non-housing consumption. While this policy provides a clear control group, namely counties outside of Texas, the fact the policy change occurred
at the same time for all households makes it difficult to control for aggregate trends, which may
have driven part of the observed response. The current paper improves upon these studies in two
dimensions. First, because the variation in collateral values used in this paper is specific to the
individual housing unit and because the identity and location of price-controlled units are clearly
demarcated in the data, I am able to avoid having to rely on proxy measures to identify the “treated”
and “control” households. Instead, my approach directly compares borrowing outcomes for obet al., 2013; Baker, 2014; Zhang, 2014 and many others as reviewed by Browning and Lusardi (1996), Browning and
Crossley (2001), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), and Zinman (2015)).
9
This approach is motivated by the work of Gross and Souleles (2002) and Alessie et al. (2005), both of which study
the effects of supply side changes in access to credit in the consumer credit card market.
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servationally identical housing units in the same housing development, some of which experience
a relaxation of collateral constraints and some of which do not. Second, because the price control expiration dates that I study occur at various points throughout the business cycle, I am able
to directly control for potentially confounding aggregate trends, something which is not possible
when studying a single policy change that occurs at the same time for all households.
Finally, this paper also relates to a much broader literature studying the role of collateral in the
macroeconomy. An important theoretical literature in macroeconomics emphasizes the role that
collateral constraints can play in amplifying business cycle fluctuations through the effect of changes
in asset prices on the borrowing capacity of both firms and households (see, for example, Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Iacoviello, 2005). Given that real estate is such a
large source of collateral for many households and businesses, a particular point of focus in the
empirical literature studying the microeconomic foundations underlying this “financial accelerator” mechanism has been to examine how households and businesses respond to changes in the
collateral value of their real estate assets.10 This paper contributes new empirical evidence on the
household side by documenting a strong positive relationship between housing collateral values
and home equity-based borrowing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides institutional background
on the Montgomery County Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program. Section 1.3 discusses
how MPDU price control expirations can be used to identify collateral effects in the context of a
stylized model of home equity extraction. The data sources and method used to measure equity
extraction are discussed in Section 3.3. Section 1.5 outlines the empirical research design. Sec10

For example, several recent papers have provided empirical evidence on the firm side by documenting a sizable
effect of real estate prices on corporate investment, capital structure, and credit terms (Benmelech et al., 2005; Gan,
2007; Chaney et al., 2012; Cvijanovic̀, 2014), although Deng et al. (2013) find no evidence of a real estate collateral
channel on firm investment in China. A related set of empirical papers has studied the relationship between house
prices and entrepreneurship to test whether access to collateralized debt through home mortgages is an important
determinate of small business formation and employment (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Schmalz et al., 2013; Adelino et
al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2014). Similarly, on the household side, Caplin et al. (1997) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2010) provide empirical evidence for a link between falling house prices, collateral constraints, and the consumption
responses to regional income shocks in the U.S., while Almeida et al. (2006) present cross-country evidence suggesting
that both house prices and the demand for mortgage debt are more sensitive to income shocks in countries with more
generous collateral constraints.
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tion 1.6 presents the main estimates of the effect of expiring price controls on collateral values and
borrowing behavior and discusses heterogeneity in the borrowing response across borrowers with
differing initial leverage. Evidence on the uses of extracted funds is presented in Section 1.7, and
Section 3.6 concludes.

1.2. The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program
Established in 1974, the Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) Program in Montgomery
County, Maryland is one of the oldest and most well-known inclusionary zoning policies in the
United States. Inclusionary zoning policies are local land use regulations that either require or
incentivize housing developers to set aside a fraction of their new developments to be sold or
rented to low- and moderate-income households at below-market prices. Historically, these policies have been particularly popular in high-cost suburban areas; however, in response to rising
house prices and concerns over increasing spatial segregation on the basis of income, inclusionary
zoning policies have grown in popularity over the last 15 to 20 years and now exist in roughly
500 municipalities across 27 states, including several large urban centers such as New York, San
Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Chicago (Hickey et al., 2014).
1.2.1. Developer Requirements
The MPDU program requires that any developer wishing to build a residential development within
the county containing more than 20 housing units must set aside a minimum of 12.5 percent of
those units to be sold or rented to income-eligible households at controlled prices.11 Except in rare
cases, the affordable units must be provided on-site and are subject to minimum quality standards
and planning guidelines that encourage the developer to scatter MPDUs among market-rate units
in the same development. Figure 1.2 provides an example of the spatial distribution of MPDUs in
two representative subdivisions.12 In general, MPDU units tend to be distributed throughout the
subdivision though design standards can lead to some clustering in large subdivisions since MPDUs
11
If the developer agrees to provide more than the required 12.5 percent of affordable units, they are also granted
density bonuses that allow for the construction of more market-rate units than would otherwise be permitted under
the pre-existing zoning code. In practice, developers rarely take this option.
12
The data used to determine the location of the price-controlled units is described in detail in Section 3.3.
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are typically smaller than many of the market-rate units and are therefore often placed alongside
each other. While MPDUs are permitted to be smaller in terms of interior square-footage and the
construction standards provide some allowances for lower quality interior finishes (e.g. countertops and bathroom fixtures), both the planning guidelines and the private incentives of developers
encourage the exterior design of MPDUs to reflect that of the nearby market-rate units. This can
be seen in Appendix Figure A.1, which provides pictures of several example MPDUs and nearby
market-rate units. Since its inception, the program has resulted in the creation of roughly 14,000
housing units that were price-controlled at some point in their history.13 As of the 2010 Census,
these units represented roughly 3.7 percent of the total stock of housing units in the county.14
Approximately 70 percent of the MPDUs were originally offered for sale as owner-occupied units
while the remainder were marketed as rentals. In this paper, I restrict attention to the owneroccupied portion of the program.
1.2.2. Income Limits and Eligibility
Eligibility to purchase an MPDU is restricted to first-time homebuyers who qualify for a mortgage and whose annual gross household income falls within specified ranges published annually
by the Montgomery County Department of Housing and Community Affairs (DHCA). In the
frequent case in which more than one eligible buyer is interested in purchasing an MPDU, the
right to purchase is allocated by lottery.15 Minimum income limits are set at the same level for all
households and are meant to reflect the minimum income required to qualify for a typical mortgage on an MPDU home. Maximum income limits are pegged to the median family income for
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area as published by the U.S. Department of Housing and
13

This figure is based on aggregate counts published by the Montgomery County Department of Housing
and Community Affairs (DHCA) at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/DHCA/housing/singlefamily/mpdu/
produced.html. The aggregate counts disagree slightly with the number of units for which I was able to obtain microdata. This is likely due to changes in administrative record keeping that led some of the older units to drop out of the
DHCA database from which my data are derived.
14
This figure is less than the mandated 12.5 percent due primarily to the durability of the housing stock. According to
the 2012 American Community Survey, the median housing unit in Montgomery County was built in 1977, implying
that roughly half of the housing units in the county were built before the law went into effect. The remaining gap is
likely made up by housing units in smaller subdivisions to which the law does not apply.
15
The lottery gives preference to those living or working in the county and to those who have been on the waiting
list for multiple drawings.
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Urban Development (HUD). For a four-person household, the maximum income limit is set at
70 percent of the area median income for a household of the same size. That limit is then scaled
by an adjustment factor to determine the income limits for households of other sizes. The income
limits for 2014 are shown in Appendix Table A.1. In general, the income limits are quite high,
reflecting both the relative affluence of the D.C. metropolitan area and the fact that the MPDU
program is meant to specifically target moderate-income households. For example, the maximum
income limit of $75,000 for a four-person household is roughly 17 percent higher than the 2014
national median income for a household of the same size. As will be discussed in the data section
below, this leads purchasers of MPDU homes to look relatively similar to the typical homebuyer
in the U.S., at least in terms of household income.
1.2.3. Price Controls and Borrowing Restrictions
The initial purchase price for an MPDU is set by the DHCA according to a schedule that is meant
to reflect construction costs associated with housing units of various types and sizes. Adjustments
are made on a square footage basis for unit sizes deviating from those specified in the schedule and
various “soft cost” adjustments are made in order to take into account developer financing costs,
overhead, and other miscellaneous fixed costs of construction.
Owners of MPDUs are permitted to resell their homes. However, if the sale occurs before the
end of the “control period” (a span of time ranging between 5 and 30 years depending on the
initial purchase date), then the resale price is capped at the original price plus an allowance for
inflation and a dollar-for-dollar adjustment that takes into account any documented major home
improvements. The resale restrictions are enforced through deed covenants that are tied to the land
and are released upon the first sale after the end of the control period (see Appendix Figure A.2
for an example deed covenant). Owners who sell before the end of the control period must sell
their home either directly to the DHCA or to another income-eligible household on the waiting
list. The first owner to sell the home after the end of the control period is permitted to sell to any
buyer at the market price but is required to split any capital gains over the controlled price equally
with the DHCA.
12

Appendix Table A.2 shows the history of rules governing the length of the control period. Prior
to 2002, the control period was set as a fixed period of time from the date of the initial sale by the
developer. Beginning in March 2002, the program was changed so that the control period now
resets if the unit is sold at any time prior to expiration. The length of the control period was also
extended from 10 years to 30 years in April 2005. These changes to the law are reflected in Figure 1.3, which plots the number of MPDU properties whose price controls expired or will expire
in each year since the inception of the program. The shaded grey area marks the period of time
during which I am able to observe transactions and loans.16 The 1980s construction boom shows
up as an increase in the number expiring price controls in the 1990s while the boom associated
with the most recent cycle will not show up until approximately 2035.
Importantly, the owner’s ability to borrow against the home is also restricted during the control
period. In particular, MPDU owners are prohibited from refinancing their mortgages or taking on
home equity debt for an amount that exceeds the controlled resale price. Thus, while the appraised
market value of the home may be substantially higher than the controlled price, the owner is
prohibited from pledging that equity as collateral until the expiration of the price control. This
requirement is enforced by both the DHCA and by lenders themselves, who typically run title
searches as part of the underwriting process, which would reveal any deed restrictions placed on
the property. After the price controls have expired, MPDU owners are no longer restricted from
borrowing more than the controlled price and, due to the shared profit agreement, are typically
able to pledge up to half of the difference between the controlled price and the full market value
as additional collateral.17 As discussed in detail in Section 1.6, I estimate that the average discount
for an MPDU home during the control period is between $66,000–$106,000, implying an increase
in collateralized borrowing capacity of roughly $33,000–$53,000. Expiring price controls thus
generally lead to a large increase in the collateral value of an MPDU owner’s home, which, as the
next section discusses, can be used to provide estimates of the effect of changes in housing collateral
16
The transaction and loan data as well as the data used to determine the number of expiring price controls in each
year is discussed in detail in Section 3.3
17
This is because lenders are aware of the owner’s obligation to the county and are thus often reluctant to extend
credit for an amount beyond what the owner would receive in the event of sale.
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on home equity-based borrowing.

1.3. Conceptual Framework
To illustrate how expiring price controls can be used to identify the effect of housing collateral
on homeowner borrowing, this section presents a stylized model of a homeowner’s equity extraction decision. I begin by considering a baseline model in which there are no price controls
in order to highlight the difficulties associated with disentangling collateral effects from wealth
effects using natural variation in house prices. I then show how the borrowing restrictions associated with MPDU price controls can be used to address these difficulties. The basic structure
of this model draws heavily on Bhutta and Keys (2014), who use the same framework to study
the effect of interest rates on equity extraction. To keep the model simple and focus the discussion on distinguishing collateral from wealth effects, I abstract from several issues that might be
present in a more fully-specified life-cycle model but would otherwise not permit an analytical
solution.18 Most importantly, I assume that house prices and income are known with certainty,
that households enter the world endowed with a house and a mortgage, and that they only live
for two periods during which they may use their home as a source of collateral and as a source of
wealth to fund consumption but from which they receive no direct utility.
1.3.1. Baseline Case: No Price Controls
Consider a household that lives for two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}, and is endowed with a house of value H
and outstanding mortgage debt M0 in the first period. The household has log preferences defined
over non-housing consumption in each period, u t (c t ) = l o g (c t ), receives per-period income, y t ,
and may extract equity by borrowing against the home in the first period, b0 , at the going mortgage
interest rate, r , and up to an exogenous collateral constraint λH − M0 , λ ∈ [0, 1]. The household
chooses consumption in each period to maximize total lifetime utility
max U (c0 , c1 ) = l o g (c0 ) + βl o g (c1 ),
c0 ,c1

(1.1)

18
For examples of fully specified life-cycle models that incorporate the home equity extraction decision, see Hurst
and Stafford (2004) or Chen et al. (2013).
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subject to constraints which are given in the baseline case by
c0 = y0 + b0

(1.2)

c1 = y1 − (1 + r )(M0 + b0 ) + ωH

(1.3)

0 ≤ b0 ≤ λH − M0 ,

(1.4)

where β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor and ω ∈ [0, 1] captures, in a reduced form way, the household’s desire to consume out of housing wealth.
Differences in the parameter ω across households can arise from various sources. For example, in a
life-cycle model with finitely lived households, ω will vary according to age. Younger households
who plan to continue living in the same house for a longer period of time likely have lower values
relative to older households who may choose to downsize in the near future (Campbell and Cocco,
2007). Similarly, ω may vary within age group due to differences in bequest motives, which lead
households who wish to leave more to the next generation to consume less of their housing wealth
before death. Or, as in Sinai and Souleles (2005), ω may vary by expected tenure length and by the
correlation in house prices across markets to which a household is likely to move in the future.
Modeling the housing wealth effect in this way, while somewhat ad hoc, greatly simplifies the
discussion and is meant to capture these sources of heterogeneity without needing to specify a
particular mechanism through which the wealth effect arises. The important point is that for
some households who plan to consume part of their housing wealth before death, increases in
house prices will lead to a desire to smooth consumption across periods.
Substituting the per-period budget constraints (1.2) and (1.3) into the objective function (2.5) and
solving for the optimal level of equity extraction yields the solution

y + ωH − (1 + r )(M0 + βy0 )

 b∗ ≡ 1
∗
(1 + r )(1 + β)
b0 =

 λH − M
0

b ∗ < λH − M0

(1.5a)

b ∗ ≥ λH − M0

(1.5b)

where b ∗ denotes the optimal level of borrowing in the absence of the collateral constraint. This
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expression highlights the empirical difficulties associated with using natural variation in house
prices to disentangle collateral effects from wealth effects. To see this, consider the effect of an
exogenous increase in house prices on equity extraction. For unconstrained borrowers, this effect
is given by the partial derivative of (1.5a) with respect to H and is a pure wealth effect, whereas for
constrained borrowers, it is equal to the partial derivative of (1.5b) and operates entirely through
the collateral constraint. The empirically observable change in borrowing is therefore given by:
∂ b0∗
∂H

=




ω
(1 + r )(1 + β)

 λ

b ∗ < λH − M0

(1.6a)

b ∗ ≥ λH − M0 ,

(1.6b)

where (1.6a) is the wealth effect for unconstrained borrowers and (1.6b) is the collateral effect for
constrained borrowers. Without prior knowledge of b ∗ , it is impossible to know which of these
two conditions applies for a given household and therefore impossible to know how much of the
observed average change in borrowing in response to a change in house prices is due to wealth
effects or collateral constraints.
The typical approach to solving this problem has been to infer the role of collateral constraints by
examining how the magnitude of the borrowing response varies across different populations for
whom one might expect either (1.6a) or (1.6b) to be the more relevant condition. For example,
we might expect that not only are younger households more likely to have values of ω close to
zero, but they are also more likely to have larger values of b ∗ as a result of steeply sloped life-cycle
wage profiles that generate a gap between current and future income (y1 > y0 ). Thus, if younger
homeowners are observed to increase borrowing more than older homeowners in response to
similar increases in house prices, this could be taken as evidence for the importance of collateral
constraints. However, as noted by Jappelli (1990), younger households might also be expected
to be less constrained than older households if the rate of time preference is low relative to the
real interest rate and consumption profiles are increasing in age. This ambiguity highlights the
difficulty of using indirect proxy measures such as age to infer the role of collateral constraints and
may explain why studies that do so have found mixed evidence (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Mian
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and Sufi, 2011; Bhutta and Keys, 2014).19
Another common approach is to examine heterogeneity in responsiveness across borrowers with
M

different levels of prior debt utilization (M0 ) or loan-to-value ratios ( H0 ), which shift the righthand side of the inequality determining whether (1.6a) or (1.6b) applies. In this case, a finding
that borrowers with higher loan-to-value ratios or prior debt utilization rates are more responsive to changes in prices is often taken as evidence in favor of collateral constraints (Disney and
Gathergood, 2011; Mian and Sufi, 2011; Mian et al., 2013).20 Similarly, several authors have investigated heterogeneity based on differences in income, liquid assets, or credit scores, with highincome, more-liquid, and high-credit score households expected to be less affected by collateral
constraints (Yamashita, 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2014; Cooper, 2013; Bhutta and Keys, 2014).
While these proxies, and loan-to-value ratios in particular, are more direct measures of collateral
constraints than a homeowner’s age, such proxies are nonetheless limited by their reliance on relatively strong a priori assumptions that are required in order to identify the set of potentially constrained households—assumptions that in many cases conflate credit demand with credit supply
(Gross and Souleles, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2007). For instance, it is unclear whether homeowners
with higher initial LTVs or fewer liquid assets borrow more in response to house price increases
because they were unable to borrow prior to the change in prices (collateral constraints) or simply
because they have stronger consumption smoothing motives that led them to carry more debt in
the first place (wealth effects). More generally, as these examples illustrate, indirect proxy measures are inherently limited in their ability to distinguish differences in collateral constraints from
other potential sources of heterogeneity, thus highlighting the need for estimates that are based on
a more direct approach.
19

Appealing to similar reasoning, Cooper (2013) finds larger consumption responses among households who experience higher realized future income growth and argues that this is evidence in favor of the role of collateral constraints.
20
In related work, Hurst and Stafford (2004) also use loan-to-value ratios as a proxy for collateral constraints in
studying how equity extraction responds to changes in interest rates.
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1.3.2. Identifying Collateral Effects Using MPDU Expiration Dates
The borrowing restrictions associated with MPDU price controls drive a wedge between the value
of a home as collateral and its value as a component of homeowner wealth that allows for a direct
test of the role of collateral constraints. To see this, note that during the control period, an MPDU
owner is prohibited from borrowing against the full market value of the property and therefore
faces a more stringent collateral constraint so that equation (1.4) becomes
0 ≤ b0 ≤ λ(H − η) − M0 ,

(1.7)

where η ≥ 0 denotes the MPDU price discount. For an MPDU owner who plans to stay in the
home beyond the end of the control period, the eventual resale value of the home in the second
period, H , remains unchanged and the optimal level of borrowing can be found by replacing equation (1.4) with equation (1.7) and resolving the utility maximization problem:21

y + ωH − (1 + r )(M0 + βy0 )

 b∗ ≡ 1
(1 + r )(1 + β)
b0∗ =

 λ(H − η) − M
0

b ∗ < λ(H − η) − M0

(1.8a)

b ∗ ≥ λ(H − η) − M0 .

(1.8b)

In this framework, an expiring price control is equivalent to lowering the value of η to zero in the
first period while leaving the eventual resale price of the home in the second period, H , unchanged.
To see how this affects borrowing, note that the effect of a decrease in η on b0∗ is given by:

−

∂ b0∗
∂η

(
=

0

b ∗ < λ(H − η) − M0

(1.9a)

λ

b ∗ ≥ λ(H − η) − M0 .

(1.9b)

This expression makes immediately clear that borrowing should only respond to an expiring price
control through the behavior of households who were collateral constrained prior to expiration.
Comparing (1.9a) with (1.6a), we can see that there is no longer any role for wealth effects. Thus,
21

Here, H should be thought of as the owner’s expected proceeds from selling the home, net of the profit sharing
agreement with the county. While the price control affects the amount of profit sharing, the key point is that for owners
who plan to stay in the home beyond the end of the control period, that effect is fully anticipated so that the actual
timing of the price control expiration has no effect on the expected proceeds from selling the home.
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any observed changes in borrowing behavior at the time the price control is lifted can be entirely
attributed to the effect of relaxing collateral constraints. This is the key insight underlying the
empirical analysis. In the following sections, I provide empirical estimates of the magnitude of
this response by studying how the borrowing behavior of MPDU owners changes around the
time the price control expires relative to that of owners of observationally identical market-rate
units in the same housing development for whom there is no corresponding change in collateral
values.

1.4. Data and Measurement
To conduct the empirical analysis, I merge data at the property, transaction, and loan level using
information from tax assessments, deeds records, and administrative data from the MPDU program. This section provides a brief overview of the data sources, variable construction, and sample
selection procedures. Further details are available in Appendix A.2.
1.4.1. Data Sources
Property-Level Data
The basic structure of my dataset is organized around the 2011 Montgomery County property
tax assessment file, which provides a single snapshot of all taxable properties in the county as of
2011. This file was purchased from DataQuick, a private vendor that collects and standardizes
publicly available tax assessment and deeds records from municipalities across the U.S. The tax
assessment file includes detailed information on the physical characteristics (e.g. square footage,
number of bathrooms, number of stories, year built), use type (e.g. residential, commercial, singlefamily, condo), and street address for every property in the county. From this file, I drop all nonresidential and multi-family properties as well as any properties with missing characteristics.22
This leaves a “universe” of 286,484 single-family residential properties from which I select my anal22
The assessment data in Montgomery County is of unusually high quality. Only 3,702 out of 290,186 single-family
residential properties are dropped due to having missing characteristics. In 3,258 of these cases, it is the year built that
is missing while other characteristics, such as square footage and number of bathrooms, are coded as zero, suggesting
that many of these properties were vacant land at the time of assessment.
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ysis sample. Each of these properties is geocoded and assigned a subdivision ID based on whether
the geographic coordinates for the property fall within the boundaries of a particular subdivision,
as delineated by the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT).23
To identify MPDU homes, I match the property assessment file with a list of MPDUs scraped from
a publicly available online search portal hosted by the DHCA.24 This data provides me with the
street addresses for all MPDU properties in the DHCA administrative database as well as the price
control expiration dates for those properties. MPDU properties were matched to the assessment
file using a combination of exact physical location (geographic coordinates) and street address as
described in Appendix A.2.1. Of the roughly 8,300 MPDUs in the DHCA database, I am able to
match approximately 90 percent to a property in the assessment file.25 Figure 1.4 maps the location
of these properties as well as census tract-level population density for Montgomery County in
2010. In general, MPDU properties are evenly distributed across the non-rural regions of the
county. One exception is the southern region of the county immediately bordering Washington,
D.C., where MPDUs are underrepresented. This region contains the cities of Bethesda and Silver
Spring and was developed much earlier than the rest of the county.26 As a result, much of the
housing stock in that area was not subject to the MPDU regulations at the time of development.27
23

The subdivision boundary file was created using a parcel-level boundary file provided by the Montgomery County
Planning Department. In addition to the geographic boundaries, this file also contains the SDAT subdivision ID for
each parcel. The subdivision boundaries were constructed by dissolving the individual parcel boundaries into larger
polygons based on whether they shared the same subdivision ID.
24
The search portal can be accessed at http://www6.montgomerycountymd.gov/apps/DHCA/pdm_online/
pdmfull.asp and was scraped using a script that exhaustively searched through and returned all possible MPDU addresses beginning with an alpha-numeric character.
25
The match rate is lower than 100 percent largely due to poor quality record keeping in the DHCA database for
some of the older MPDU properties. For example, when matching on street address, I require an exact match on the
street number. Some of the older MPDU properties are missing street numbers and are therefore not included in the
set of matches.
26
This can be seen in Appendix Figure A.3, which replicates Figure 1.4 replacing population density with property
age.
27
Another reason for the underrepresentation of MPDUs in this region is that a larger fraction of the housing stock
in the most densely populated areas (i.e. central cities) is composed of rental properties, which are not included in the
MPDU data that I use.
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Transaction and Loan-Level Data
To analyze how expiring price controls affect collateral values and homeowner borrowing, I merge
the property-level file with two additional datasets from DataQuick. Both datasets are sourced
from local deeds records and can be linked to properties in the assessment file using a unique property ID. The first dataset contains information on all housing transactions occurring in the county
during the period 1997–2012. For each transaction, this dataset records the purchase price, buyer,
seller, and lender names, as well as loan amounts on up to three loans used to finance the purchase.
The second dataset contains information on all non-purchase loans secured against a property during the same period. This dataset records the initial loan amount and borrower and lender name
for every refinance, junior lien, and home equity line of credit (HELOC) secured against a property. Together, these two datasets provide me with a highly granular and near complete picture of
all mortgage borrowing and housing purchases occurring in the county during this period. Each
dataset is cleaned as described in Appendix A.2.2 in order to ensure that the transactions represent
true ownership-changing arm’s length transactions and that the loan information is accurate and
consistent.
1.4.2. Measuring Equity Extraction
Since the non-purchase loans dataset contains a combination of loan types but does not distinguish
between them, several steps must be taken in order to construct an accurate measure of equity extraction. In particular, it is important to distinguish between three different types of non-purchase
loans: (1) regular refinances, which replace an existing loan without extracting any equity; (2) cashout refinances, which replace an existing loan with a larger loan, thereby extracting equity for the
amount of the difference; and (3) new non-purchase originations, which directly extract equity for
the amount of the new loan. In order to make this distinction, I construct a “debt history” for
every property that records an estimate of the current amount of outstanding debt secured against
the property at any point in time on up to two potential loans. Debt histories are constructed by
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amortizing prior loan balances using the average interest rate at the time the loan was originated.28
Given this history, when a new loan is observed, I am then able to determine whether that loan
represents a purchase loan, cash-out refinance, new non-purchase origination, or regular refinance
by comparing the size of the new loan to the estimated outstanding balance on the relevant existing
loan (see Appendix A.2.3 for the details of this procedure). When a new refinance or purchase loan
is observed, the old loan is replaced and the new loan serves as the basis for calculating remaining
debt going forward.
Having categorized loans in this way, I then construct an annual panel that records for each property whether the current owner extracted equity in a particular year and if so, how much equity
was extracted. I define total equity extraction in a given year as the sum of non-purchase originations and cash withdrawn through cash-out refinances during that year. Similarly, an owner is
defined as having extracted equity in a given year if total equity extracted is greater than zero. For
properties built prior to 1997, the panel covers the full sample period from 1997–2012; for properties built afterwards, the construction year is used as the first year of observation. Each observation is also uniquely associated with a particular “ownership-spell” for that property. Ownership
spells are defined to include all years between ownership-changing transactions, where the first
ownership spell starts in either 1997 or the year that the property was built. In Appendix A.2.3,
I provide details validating the accuracy of this equity extraction measure against two measures
provided at the aggregate level based on data from Equifax credit reports and the Freddie Mac
Quarterly Cash-Out Refinance report. In both cases, my measure of equity extraction is shown
to be highly correlated with national aggregates.
1.4.3. Sample Restrictions and Descriptive Statistics
Starting with the full sample of 286,484 properties, I impose several restrictions in order to arrive
at my primary analysis sample. I first drop any property that could not be matched to a housing
28

All loans are amortized using the average offered interest rate on a 30-year fixed rate mortgage in the month that
the loan was originated. Monthly average offered interest rates are taken from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage
Market Survey (PMMS). Since the DataQuick data do not distinguish between HELOCs and closed end liens, all loans
are treated as fully amortizing with an initial principal balance equal to the origination amount, which for HELOCs,
represents the maximum draw-down amount. See Appendix A.2.3 for the details of this procedure.
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subdivision. This eliminates 31,603 properties located primarily in rural and outlying areas of the
county where SDAT does not assign subdivision IDs. I further drop all properties located in subdivisions containing no MPDUs. This restriction eliminates 167,117 properties, many of which
were located in densely populated areas consisting mostly of rental housing or in older subdivisions to which the regulation did not apply. Among subdivisions containing MPDUs, I further
require that at least one MPDU expires during the DataQuick sample period. This eliminates
35,236 properties located in either older subdivisions containing only MPDUs that had already
expired as of 1997 or in more recently developed subdivisions containing only MPDUs that had
yet to expire as of 2012. Finally, I require that all MPDUs within a subdivision have non-missing
expiration dates and that at least 95 percent of the MPDUs were matched to their corresponding
DataQuick property ID in a way that required the property unit number to agree. The latter
requirement is imposed because MPDUs are typically townhomes or condominiums, which, in
addition to a standard street address, also have a unit number. The final sample contains 31,244
properties located in 69 subdivisions throughout the county.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for both the full sample of properties and the restricted
sample used in the analysis. For the analysis sample, summary statistics are presented pooling
across all properties as well as separately for non-MPDUs and MPDUs. In Panel A., the unit
of observation is the individual property; in Panel B., it is the transaction; and in Panel C., it
the property-year. All dollar amounts here and throughout the paper are converted to real 2012
dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). To limit the influence
of extreme outliers, transaction prices are winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles in the full
sample.
The differences between the full sample (columns 1–2) and the analysis sample (columns 3–4) are
largely what would be expected given the nature of the sample restrictions imposed. Properties in
the analysis sample are newer and larger than properties in the full sample, reflecting the fact that
the MPDU regulations only apply to subdivisions constructed after 1974. Despite being newer,
these properties transact at slightly lower prices than the average house in the county, again likely
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reflecting the fact that many of the properties in the oldest and most expensive region of the county
immediately bordering Washington, D.C. are located in subdivisions that do not contain MPDUs
and are thus not included in the analysis sample. With regard to borrowing behavior, the average
owner in the analysis sample is slightly more likely to extract equity in a given year relative to the
average owner in the county but, conditional on extracting, typically borrows less.
Within the analysis sample, the differences between market-rate units (columns 5–6) and MPDUs
(columns 7–8) are also largely in line with what would be expected given the nature of the MPDU
program. MPDUs are smaller and substantially cheaper than non-MPDUs. This price difference
is due to a combination of differences in housing characteristics and the price control itself, which
mechanically lowers prices for part of the sample period even holding characteristics constant.
Similarly, reflecting their lower incomes, owners of MPDUs are more likely to purchase their
homes with FHA-insured loans at higher initial loan-to-value ratios relative to owners of marketrate units. Owners of MPDUs are also less likely to extract equity in a given year and, conditional
on extracting, typically borrow less relative to owners of market-rate units. Some of the difference
in equity extraction behavior is due to intrinsic differences in the preferences and characteristics
of owners of different types of housing, while some of it is driven by the existence of the MPDU
borrowing restrictions. By comparing how these overall average differences change around the
time the price controls expire and controlling flexibly for aggregate trends and observable characteristics, my empirical strategy isolates the portion of the difference in prices and borrowing
behavior that is driven by the MPDU program itself.
Economic and Demographic Representativeness
Given the income limits and eligibility requirements associated with the MPDU program, it is also
interesting to compare how the economic and demographic characteristics of the homeowners in
my analysis sample (particularly those who purchase price-controlled homes) compare to a more
nationally representative sample. To that end, I match a subset of the transactions data to loan
application data made publicly available through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
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The HMDA data provide loan-level information on borrower income and race for nearly all home
mortgage applications filed in the United States and serve as a useful gauge of the national representativeness of my sample along these dimensions.
The details of the match and several figures comparing the national distributions of income and
race with the distributions for my analysis sample and the subset of transactions involving an
MPDU home are provided in Appendix A.2.5. As shown in Appendix Figure A.7, the incomes of
the households who purchase the price-controlled units are actually quite similar to the income of
the typical homebuyer in the U.S. during my sample period. The income distribution among buyers of price-controlled homes is roughly centered around the median of the national distribution
and spans a large portion of the interquartile range of that distribution. The racial breakdowns,
shown in Figure A.8, are less similar. Relative to the national average, Montgomery County has an
unusually high share of Asian households and slightly higher shares of Black and Hispanic households. The high Asian share likely reflects the industrial composition of the county, which is a
major hub for the biotech industry, while the higher Black and Hispanic shares are most likely a
result of the fact that the national sample contains many non-minority households located in the
Midwest and other less diverse regions of the country. To the extent that the propensity to extract
equity following a loosening of collateral constraints differs substantially by race, such differences
may affect the external validity of my results. However, given the similarity in the income distributions, these differences would have to persist even conditional on income in order for the estimates
derived from my sample to differ drastically from a more nationally representative sample.

1.5. Empirical Framework
1.5.1. Identification Strategy
I estimate the effect of expiring price controls on collateral values and borrowing behavior using
a difference-in-differences research design that compares outcomes among market-rate units (the
control group) and MPDUs (the treatment group) in the same housing development before and
after the expiration of the price control. The key identifying assumption is that in the absence
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of the expiring price control, the borrowing behavior and prices paid by owners of MPDUs and
owners of market-rate units in the same subdivision would have evolved in parallel.
In the results section below, I present direct evidence to support the validity of the parallel trends
assumption by showing that outcomes for MPDUs and non-MPDUs move together during the
period prior to the expiration of the price control and that their trends only begin to diverge
afterwards. This fact is both reassuring and perhaps unsurprising. While fixed differences in the
characteristics of MPDU properties and their owners from those of market-rate units may lead
to constant differences in prices and borrowing behavior, there is no particular reason to expect
that the evolution of prices and borrowing over time should vary greatly across these two groups.
Properties within the same subdivision are exposed to the same changes in local amenities, school
quality, and crime and frequently belong to a common homeowner’s association. As a result,
changes in the willingness to pay of the marginal neighborhood entrant, and thus market prices,
should evolve similarly for all properties in the development. Along the same lines, homeowners
within a given subdivision all face the same changes in aggregate determinants of equity extraction,
such as interest rates and credit standards, and should therefore be expected to display similar
changes in borrowing behavior. While MPDU owners may be more likely to be subject to income
shocks that could induce them to extract equity (Hurst and Stafford, 2004), the timing of such
shocks would have to be highly correlated both with the expiration of the price control and across
MPDU owners within a subdivision in order to generate systematic differences in trends.
1.5.2. Estimation
My baseline econometric model is a simple difference-in-differences regression fit at the individual
property level. Specifically, I estimate regressions of the following form:
yi s t = α s + δ t + Xi0t γ + β1 · M P D Ui + β2 · M P D Ui × P o s t s t + εi s t ,

(1.10)

where yi s t is an outcome for property i in subdivision s in year t , α s are subdivision fixed effects,
δ t are year fixed effects, Xi t is a vector of possibly time-varying property characteristics, and εi s t

26

is an error term assumed to be conditionally uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of yi s t .
The dummy variable M P D Ui is a treatment indicator that takes the value one if property i is an
MPDU, while the P o s t s t indicator takes the value one if year t falls on or after the year the first
price control in subdivision s expires. I define the treatment date in this way to take into account
both the fact that market-rate properties have no explicit expiration date and that controlled properties within the same subdivision may expire at different times as a result of construction lags
and differences in initial purchase dates. Using the first expiration date is conservative and should
only serve to attenuate the estimates since a small number of properties will be counted among
the “treated” group before their controls actually expire.29 The coefficient of interest is β2 , which
measures the differential change in the outcome for MPDUs relative to non-MPDUs following
the expiration of the price control, holding constant individual housing characteristics and aggregate differences in outcomes across subdivisions and over time. To account for serial correlation
and subdivision specific random shocks, I cluster the standard errors at the subdivision level in all
specifications.
One potential concern with this specification is that in addition to providing an increase in collateralized debt capacity, the expiration of the price control may also create an incentive for MPDU
owners to sell their homes. As a result, differences in prices and borrowing behavior following the
expiration of the price control may be driven by changes in the composition of MPDU properties
that transact or changes in the characteristics of owners of MPDU homes and not necessarily the
change in collateral values.30 I address this concern directly by estimating specifications that also
include property and ownership-spell fixed effects. Including property fixed effects in the price re29
Over half of all MPDUs in my sample expire within two years of the first MPDU in their subdivision and roughly
75 percent expire within five years. These differences are most likely due to normal construction lags. Differences
larger than five years likely come from one of two sources: (1) phased property development in larger subdivisions
which may be built out over longer periods of time, and (2) MPDU owners reselling during the control period in the
latter portion of the sample, when program rules dictated that price controls reset if the property is sold during the
control period.
30
In Appendix A.3.1, I present results showing that expiring price controls do in fact lead to an increase in housing
turnover for previously controlled units of roughly three to five percentage points per year. While a three to five
percentage point increase is not nearly large enough to lead to a total turnover of the MPDU housing stock during my
sample period, it nonetheless justifies the use of specifications that include property or owner fixed effects due to the
concern that part of the effect could be driven by differences in the transacted housing stock or changes to ownership
over time.
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gressions controls for changes to the set of houses that transact and identifies the effect of expiring
price controls by comparing within-property changes in prices between MPDUs and market-rate
units following the expiration of the price control. Similarly, including ownership-spell fixed effects in the equity extraction regressions controls for differences in the characteristics of owners
and identifies the effect of expiring price controls by comparing within-owner changes in borrowing behavior between owners of MPDUs and market-rate units. In all cases, results from these
specifications are not meaningfully different from those that do not include property or owner
fixed effects.
As a more flexible alternative to (1.10), I also estimate specifications that allow the effect of the
price control to differ by year relative to the first control period expiration. Specifically, let τ(s)
denote the year the first MPDU in subdivision s expires. To capture the full time path of the effect
of expiring price controls, I estimate specifications of the form
yi s t = α s + δ t + Xi0t γ + β1 · M P D Ui +

5 
X
ρ=−5


ηρ · 1 t −τ(s)=ρ + β2,ρ · M P D Ui × 1 t −τ(s)=ρ + εi s t ,
(1.11)

where 1 t −τ(s)=ρ is a relative year dummy taking the value one if the current year falls ρ years after
the expiration of the price control and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined.
The coefficients ηρ and β2,ρ measure the baseline trend in the outcome for non-MPDUs and the
differential trend for MPDUs, respectively, around the time the price control expires. I show
results for up to five years preceding and following the expiration of the price control, grouping all
years outside that window into the effects for relative years −5 and 5. Relative year −1 is always the
omitted category so that the coefficients should be interpreted relative to the year prior to the first
price control expiration within the subdivision. These coefficients are informative about both the
timing of the effect of price control expirations and the validity of the parallel trends assumption.
If MPDUs and non-MPDUs have common pre-trends, then the β2,ρ coefficients should be equal
to zero for any ρ < 0.
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1.6. Price Controls, Collateral Values, and Borrowing Behavior
This section presents the main estimates of the effect of expiring price controls on the transaction
prices (i.e. collateral values) of previously controlled MPDUs and borrowing behavior among
the owners of those properties. As an initial assessment of the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I begin by presenting simple graphical results for each of three main outcomes: (1) log
transaction prices, (2) the annual probability of extracting equity, and (3) total equity extracted per
year. In order to quantify the causal effects of interest, I then present a series of formal difference-indifferences estimates for each of the three outcomes. These estimates are subsequently combined
to yield estimates of the marginal propensity to borrow out of increases in housing collateral.
Finally, to provide additional evidence for the role of collateral constraints in governing the borrowing response to expiring price controls, I also examine heterogeneity in the response across the
distribution of initial leverage. Unless otherwise specified, all results pertain to the set of transactions and property-years contained in the analysis sample described in Section 3.3.
1.6.1. Graphical Evidence
As a point of departure for the empirical analysis, Figure 1.5 plots calendar year-adjusted means for
each of the three main outcomes. Means are plotted separately for MPDUs (blue circles) and nonMPDUs (orange squares) as a function of years relative to the first control period expiration within
the relevant subdivision. In each panel, relative year zero represents the year the first MPDU
within the subdivision expired. Means are shown for up to five years preceding and following the
expiration of the price control, grouping all years outside that window into the means for relative
years −5 and 5. The plotted means should be interpreted as the mean outcome among MPDUs
and non-MPDUs in a given relative year, adjusted for aggregate county-wide trends affecting all
properties.31 For visual reference, the dashed lines plot a linear trend for each outcome, derived
from the fitted values of a regression of the binned means on a linear term in relative year. For
31

The means are adjusted for calendar year in order to remove the effect of the housing cycle, which would otherwise
swamp the variation in the figure. Adjusted means were created by regressing the indicated outcome on a full set of
calendar year fixed effects and averaging the residuals from that regression separately for MPDUs and non-MPDUs
within relative year bins. To clarify the interpretation of the y-axis, the grand mean of each outcome was then added
back in to both series.
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MPDUs, only the pre-period means were used to construct the fitted values.
Consistent with the aggregate descriptive statistics presented in Table 1.1, in any given relative year,
MPDU properties transact at lower prices relative to non-MPDUs and their owners are less likely
to extract equity from their homes. However, for all three outcomes, the MPDU means diverge
significantly from their pre-period trend starting in the year the first MPDU price control expires.
There is no corresponding shift in the outcomes for non-MPDUs. As a result, a large portion of
the gap in outcomes that exists during the imposition of the price control disappears once the price
control expires. After 5 years, roughly half of the raw gap in prices and total equity extraction and
over three quarters of the gap in the annual probability of extracting equity are eliminated. The
remaining gaps reflect fixed differences in the characteristics of MPDU properties and their owners
that would presumably exist even in the absence of the price control (many of which are controlled
for in the analysis below). Importantly, the non-MPDU trend for each outcome is almost exactly
parallel to the pre-period MPDU trend, providing strong support for the validity of the parallel
trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences estimates that follow.
1.6.2. The Effect of Expiring Price Controls on Collateral Values
To more precisely quantify the effect of expiring price controls on the collateral value of MPDU
properties, Table 1.2 presents estimates from the pooled difference-in-differences specification
given by equation (1.10) using log transaction prices as the outcome. The first column reports
estimates from a baseline specification that includes only the MPDU main effect, the interaction
of that effect with the Post indicator, fixed effects for both the year of observation and the age of the
property in that year, and a series of time-invariant property characteristics. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number
of bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo
or townhome. Since MPDU homes are frequently built as condos and townhomes, I also fully
interact the condo indicator with the year fixed effects, age fixed effects, and other time-invariant
characteristics. This allows the aggregate trends, age profiles, and hedonic value of fixed property
characteristics to freely vary with property type. The coefficient estimate on the MPDU main ef30

fect implies that during the imposition of the price control, MPDU properties sell at a discount of
roughly 45 log points relative to observationally identical non-MPDU properties. This price gap
is then completely eliminated following the expiration of the price control, as evidenced by the
identical but opposite signed coefficient on the MPDU×Post indicator. The bottom panel also
reports the implied percentage change and absolute dollar change associated with the estimated
45 log point increase.32 Following the expiration of the price control, transaction prices at previously controlled MPDUs increase by roughly 57 percent. Applying that figure to the mean of the
pre-period transaction price (in levels) among MPDUs implies an increase of roughly $93,000.
The remaining columns of the table add a series of control variables which increasingly restrict the
nature of the comparison that is being used to identify the effect of the price control. In the second
column, I add a set of fixed effects for each of the 69 subdivisions. This specification removes the
influence of average differences in price levels across subdivisions and identifies the effect of the
price control by comparing prices for observationally identical MPDUs and non-MPDUs within
the same subdivision before and after the expiration of the price control. The third column not
only allows for average differences in price levels but also allows the aggregate trend in prices to vary
across subdivisions by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend. Finally,
to address concerns related to differential turnover at MPDU properties after the price control
expires, column four includes a full set of property fixed effects. In this specification, the timeinvariant property characteristics and MPDU main effect drop out, and the effect of the price
control is identified by comparing within-property changes in prices for properties that are and
are not MPDUs.
The estimated effects are all highly significant and relatively stable across specifications, implying
that expiring price controls lead to an increase in prices at previously controlled MPDUs that
ranges from 35 to 50 log points. Converting these estimates into dollars implies that expiring
price controls lead transaction prices to increase by roughly $66,000–$106,000. Due to the shared
Following Kennedy (1981), I calculateh the implied percentage

i increase associated with the coefficient estimate β̂2
1
and its standard error σ̂β2 as %∆ = 100 × exp β̂2 − 2 σ̂β2 − 1 .
32

2

31

profit agreement, half of that increase belongs to the county while the owner retains the other half
as equity. Assuming that banks are willing to lend against the full increase in equity, these estimates
imply that the average MPDU owner experiences an increase in collateralized borrowing capacity
of approximately $33,000–$53,000 upon the expiration of the price control.
To give a sense of the dynamics of the price effect, Figure 1.6 plots estimates from the more flexible
difference-in-differences specification given by equation (1.11). These estimates are obtained from
a regression that includes all of the same controls as the specification in column 3 of Table 1.2, but
which allows the effect of the price control to vary separately for MPDUs and non-MPDUs by
year relative to the first control period expiration. The series in orange squares plots the coefficient
estimates on the ten relative year main effects, while the series in blue circles plots the sum of the
relative year main effects and their interaction with the MPDU “treatment” dummy along with
the 95 percent confidence interval for that sum. In both cases, relative year −1 is the omitted
category, so that the two series can be interpreted as the trends for non-MPDUs (orange squares)
and MPDUs (blue circles) relative to their respective values in the year prior to when the first
MPDU in the subdivision went off of price control. Prices for MPDUs diverge sharply from
their pre-period trend starting precisely in the year that the first price control expires. In contrast,
the trend among market-rate units is completely flat. The price effect grows over time for MPDU
properties, reflecting the fact that some MPDUs had yet to actually expire as of the date the first
MPDU within their subdivision expired. Importantly, the trends are statistically indistinguishable
in the period prior to the expiration of the price control and only begin to diverge in the year of
expiration, thus lending further support to the validity of the parallel trends assumption required
for identification in the difference-in-differences research design.
1.6.3. The Borrowing Response to Increases in Housing Collateral
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that expiring price controls lead to large
increases in the resale value of previously controlled MPDU homes. Assuming MPDU owners
have the ability to borrow against up to half of that increase implies a similarly large increase
in collateralized borrowing capacity. In this section, I explore how the borrowing behavior of
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MPDU homeowners responds to the additional collateral released by expiring price controls.
Extensive Margin Borrowing Responses
I begin by considering the homeowners’ extensive margin choice of whether or not to extract
equity from their home. To do so, I turn to the annual property-level panel and estimate versions
of the pooled difference-in-differences regression given by equation (1.10) using as the outcome an
indicator for whether the property’s owner extracted equity in a particular year. Table 1.3 presents
the results from these regressions. In the first three columns, the control variables are the same as
those used for estimating the price effect in Table 1.2 and are introduced in the same order across
the columns. To account for the potential for differential turnover and changes in ownership
at MPDU properties following the expiration of the price control, the fourth column includes
fixed effects for each of the 57,333 unique ownership spells observed in the panel. These four
specifications are all estimated using simple linear probability models. To explore the sensitivity
of the results to alternative estimators, columns 5 and 6 report the marginal effects from probit
and logit models estimated using the same controls contained in column 3.
Across specifications, the estimates are extremely precise and highly stable. The baseline specification in column 1, which contains only the MPDU main effect, the MPDU×Post interaction, year
fixed effects, and property characteristics, indicates that during the imposition of the price control,
owners of MPDU properties are on average substantially less likely to extract equity from their
homes relative to owners of market-rate units but that the propensity to borrow increases differentially for MPDU owners following the expiration of the price control. The coefficient estimate
on the MPDU×Post interaction term implies that expiring price controls lead to a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability of extracting equity among owners of previously controlled
units. This effect is large and represents an approximate 100 percent increase over the pre-period
mean of 3.9 percentage points among MPDU owners reported in the bottom panel of the table.
Adding subdivision fixed effects and their interaction with a linear time trend in columns 2 and
3 hardly changes the coefficient. Comparing the MPDU main effect with the interaction term
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implies that expiring price controls close between 70–80 percent of the gap in equity extraction
probabilities that exists between owners of MPDUs and non-MPDUs during the period of price
control. Including ownership spell fixed effects in column 4, which restricts the comparison to
take place using only within-owner variation in equity extraction, reduces the coefficient on the
interaction term only slightly to 3.4 percentage points. Finally, estimating the marginal effects via
probit or logit specifications in columns 5 and 6 also does not meaningfully change the magnitude
of either the MPDU main effect or its interaction with the Post indicator. Taken together, the
results presented in Table 1.3 suggest that in response to the increase in collateral values induced
by the expiring price control, MPDU owners increase their annual probability of home equity extraction by roughly 4 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase of approximately 100
percent over their pre-period average propensity to borrow.
Figure 1.7A plots the dynamics of the effect of expiring price controls on the extensive margin
probability of extracting equity. This figure is directly analogous to Figure 1.6 and was constructed from the coefficient estimates on the relative year main effects and their interaction with
the MPDU “treatment” dummy as specified in equation (1.11). The regression from which these
coefficient estimates are generated included all the same controls as the specification in column 3
of Table 1.3. The series in orange squares shows the trend in equity extraction among owners of
non-MPDU properties, while the series in blue circles shows the trend and 95 percent confidence
intervals for MPDU owners. Starting in the year the first MPDU price control expires, the MPDU
trend diverges sharply from from its pre-period trend while the trend for non-MPDU owners remains smooth. Consistent with the parallel trends assumption, the equity extraction probabilities
among owners of MPDUs and non-MPDUs move together in the period prior to the expiration
of the price control and only diverge starting in the year of expiration. Furthermore, almost all
of the increase in equity extraction among MPDU owners occurs in the year the first price control expires. This suggests that MPDU owners are responding directly to the increase in access to
collateral induced by the expiring price control. The fact that the extraction probabilities remain
elevated relative to their pre-period level among MPDUs beyond the first year further suggests
that the removal of the price control provides owners of MPDUs with access to the same natural
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increases in collateral made available to owners of non-MPDU properties through normal house
price appreciation.
Combined Extensive and Intensive Margin Borrowing Responses
While the results in the previous subsection provide evidence that the likelihood of extracting
equity responds significantly to the expiration of the MPDU price controls, they say nothing with
respect to how the amount of equity extracted responds. Borrowers may respond to increases in
collateral both on the extensive margin and by increasing the amount they borrow conditional on
extracting equity. This section presents estimates of the combined effect of these two margins of
adjustment on the annual amount of equity extracted among owners of MPDU homes.
Table 1.4 presents results from estimating the pooled difference-in-differences regression using the
total amount of equity extracted in each year as the dependent variable instead of an indicator for
equity extraction as before. In years when homeowners do not extract equity, this variable is set
equal to zero; in years when they do extract equity, it set equal to the sum of all non-purchase originations and cash withdrawn through cash-out refinances during that year. The first four columns
of the table present results from OLS regressions that are directly analogous to those presented for
the extensive margin response. To take into account the fact that in many years homeowners do
not extract any equity, the fifth column presents results based on a tobit specification where the
equity extraction variable is treated as being censored from below at zero. This specification explicitly adjusts for the fact that the decision to extract equity may be made separately from the choice
of how much to extract by estimating separate equations for the “participation” and “amount” decisions. To make the interpretation of the estimates consistent across columns, in the fifth column
I report the marginal effects implied by the estimated tobit coefficients for the expected value of
the censored outcome.
As with the extensive margin, the estimated response of total equity extracted is positive, statistically significant, and relatively stable across all specifications. The coefficient estimates on the
MPDU×Post indicator from the OLS specifications in columns 1–4 imply that expiring price
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controls lead to an increase in the average amount of equity extracted per year of roughly $2,300–
$3,000. The tobit marginal effects are bigger and imply an increase of approximately $4,400. These
effects are large relative to the $2,600 pre-period mean amount of equity extracted among MPDU
owners. Comparing the MPDU×Post coefficient with the MPDU main effect suggests that expiring price controls close between 75–100 percent of the pre-period gap in equity extraction between
owners of MPDUs and non-MPDUs. The dynamics of the effect are also shown in Figure 1.7B
and mirror the results for the extensive margin reported in the same figure. The average amount
of equity extracted jumps sharply among MPDU owners in the year the price control expires and
remains high relative to its pre-period level for the remainder of the sample period. There is also
no evidence of differential trends for MPDUs and non-MPDUs during the pre-period. While the
estimates on the relative year effects for MPDU properties are less precise due to the additional
variation introduced by including the intensive margin response, the conclusion remains the same.
Expiring price controls lead to a substantial increase in home equity-based borrowing among owners of previously controlled units.
The Marginal Propensity to Borrow Out of Increases in Housing Collateral
A rough gauge of the economic magnitude of the borrowing responses I estimate can be provided
by combining the estimates of the increase in collateral values implied by the transaction price regressions reported in Table 1.2 and the results on total equity extraction just discussed in Table 1.4.
Specifically, the price results in Table 1.2 imply that expiring price controls lead to an increase in
transaction prices at previously controlled MPDUs that ranges between $66,000–$106,000. Assuming that MPDU owners are able to borrow against up to half of the price increase, this implies
an increase in pledgeable collateral of roughly $33,000–$53,000. The results in Table 1.4 imply
that following the expiration of the price control, borrowers increase the average amount of equity they extract from their homes by roughly $2,300–$4,400 per year. Applying those estimates
to the year the price control expires implies a marginal propensity to borrow out of increases in
housing collateral that ranges from $0.04–$0.13.
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As a point of reference, these figures can be compared to recent estimates from the literature on the
overall effect of house prices changes on homeowner borrowing, which combine both collateral
and wealth effects. For example, Haurin and Rosenthal (2006) estimate that a $1 increase in house
prices leads to an increase of roughly $0.13 to $0.16 in total household debt. Disney and Gathergood (2011) estimate a smaller effect on total debt that ranges between $0.06–$0.10 and is similar
to the results of Bhutta and Keys (2014), who focus explicitly on home-equity debt and provide
estimates that imply a marginal propensity to borrow of roughly $0.07. Two important outliers
are the estimates provided by Mian and Sufi (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2014), who focus exclusively
on the most recent housing cycle and estimate marginal propensities to borrow of $0.25 and $0.19,
respectively. While differences in methodology and estimation samples make it difficult to make
a direct comparison between the estimates provided in this paper and those just discussed, the
$0.04–$0.13 range provided above suggests that a significant portion of the effect of house prices
on home equity-based borrowing is driven by collateral values rather than wealth effects.
1.6.4. Heterogeneity in the Borrowing Response by Initial LTV
In this section, I provide further evidence that the increase in home equity extraction among owners of MPDUs following the expiration of the price control is driven by the relaxation of previously binding collateral constraints by examining heterogeneity in the magnitude of the borrowing
response across the distribution of initial leverage. If collateral constraints are driving the response,
then we might expect those whose borrowing capacity was most limited prior to the expiration of
the price control to respond more aggressively. While a borrower’s initial leverage is endogenous
and may be correlated with other unobservable factors determining equity extraction, it is also a
relatively direct measure of collateralized borrowing capacity. Thus, evidence that borrowers with
higher initial leverage respond more aggressively to the expiring price control would be consistent
with a role for binding collateral constraints.
To test whether borrowers with higher initial leverage are more responsive, I restrict attention
to the set of properties that are observed to transact at least once during the sample period and
to the set of ownership spells that begin with a transaction. This restriction is imposed so that I
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can accurately measure the initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV) associated with each ownership spell.
Ownership spells are then grouped into four categories based on their initial LTV: (1) less than
or equal to 70%, (2) between 70% and 80%, (3) between 80% and 95%, and (4) greater than 95%.
Using these groups, I estimate the following regression:
yi j s t = γ j + δ t + α s · t

+ Xi0t γ

+

4
X

βk · M P D Ui × P o s t s t × LT V j k + εi j s t ,

(1.12)

k=1

where yi j s t is an equity extraction outcome measured at time t and associated with ownership
spell j of property i located in subdivision s , γ j are ownership spell fixed effects, δ t are year
fixed effects, α s · t is a subdivision specific linear time trend, and Xi t is a vector of time varying
property characteristics. The primary variables of interest are the interaction terms involving the
LT V j k variables, which are a set of dummy variables indicating which of the four LTV groups
the ownership spell belongs to. Because the specification includes ownership spell fixed effects, all
time-invariant characteristics associated with either the property or the ownership spell drop out
so that the vector Xi t includes only property age and its interaction with the condo dummy and
there are no main effects for the MPDU dummy or the LTV group indicators.
The βk coefficients measure how the effect of the expiring price control varies across the distribution of initial leverage by comparing within-owner changes in borrowing behavior following
the expiration of the price control across borrowers with different initial LTVs. Figure 1.8 plots
these coefficient estimates along with their 95 percent confidence intervals for both the extensive
margin equity extraction indicator (shown in blue bars and measured along the right axis) and the
total amount of equity extracted per year (shown in orange bars and measured along the left axis).
In both cases, the estimated effects for the lowest LTV group are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero while the effects for the higher LTV groups are all statistically significant and
increase monotonically in initial leverage.33 That is, MPDU owners whose initial debt is high rel33
While the standard errors are relatively wide, one sided hypothesis tests for the difference between the highest LTV
group and the lowest LTV group fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effects are larger among those in the higher
group at the five percent level for both outcomes. Similarly, one sided test for whether the effects are larger among
those in the two highest groups relative to those in the two lowest groups also fails to reject the null at the ten percent
level for the extensive margin response and at the five percent level for the total equity extraction measure.
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ative to the controlled price and whose collateralized borrowing capacity is therefore most limited
during the imposition of the price control are precisely the set of borrowers who are most likely
to respond to its elimination by extracting equity from their homes.
1.6.5. Additional Robustness Checks
Placebo Tests
As a further test of the parallel trends assumption underlying the main difference-in-differences
estimates provided in Section 1.6.3, I also conduct a series of placebo tests for the effect of the
price control on borrowing behavior. Each placebo estimate is generated by randomly assigning
a false first MPDU expiration date to each of the 69 subdivisions. Using those false dates, I then
replicate the pooled difference-in-differences estimate for both the extensive margin probability
of equity extraction and the total amount of equity extracted per year using the specification that
includes all of the property characteristics as well as the subdivision fixed effects and their interaction with a linear time trend. To prevent the placebo estimate from being influenced by any
jump in the outcome at the true expiration date, I only use data from either the pre-period or
the post-period depending on whether the false date falls before or after the true first expiration
date for the relevant subdivision. This exercise is repeated 1,000 times and the distribution of the
resulting coefficients for each outcome is plotted in Figure 1.9. The true estimate is also shown in
the figure using a vertically dashed line. The true estimates are taken from column 3 of Table 1.3
for the extensive margin response and from column 3 of Table 1.4 for the total equity extraction
response. As is clear from the figure, the true estimates are far larger than any of the placebo estimates, and the distribution of placebo estimates for both outcomes is centered around zero. This
suggests that the results I find are unlikely to have been generated by pure chance and lends further
validity to the identifying assumption of parallel trends.
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Matching Estimates
Another potential concern with the main difference-in-differences estimates provided in Section 1.6.2
and Section 1.6.3 is that they rely on standard OLS estimation, which can be sensitive to differences in the distribution of covariates across “treatment” and “control” groups and relies heavily
on extrapolation in areas where the covariates do not overlap (Imbens, 2004). In Appendix A.3.2,
I report the results from an alternative approach to estimating the effect of the expiring price control using a semi-parametric propensity score matching estimator (cf. Heckman et al., 1997, 1998).
This approach, which is described in detail in the appendix, alleviates the concern over covariate
imbalance by restricting attention to a set of properties with overlapping characteristics and constructing the counterfactual outcome for each MPDU property using a locally weighted average
of the outcomes among the non-MPDU properties whose characteristics are most similar. The
results from this approach are reported in Appendix Table A.5 and yield estimates for the effect of
the expiring price control on transaction prices, the annual probability of equity extraction, and
the total amount of equity extracted per year that are all qualitatively similar to those reported
above.

1.7. Evidence on the Uses of Extracted Funds
The results in the previous section provide strong evidence that homeowners respond to increases
in the collateral value of their homes by extracting equity; however, the aggregate impact of this
behavior depends on how the borrowed money is used. In particular, if homeowners simply use
the extracted funds to pay off other existing debt or reinvest them into more liquid assets, then
the aggregate effects of rising collateral values would not be as large as if the money were used to
fund consumption or investment expenditures. While my data do not allow me to provide a full
account of the uses of extracted funds, in this section I present two pieces of evidence from the
housing market that suggest that at least some portion of the borrowed money is used to fund
consumption or home improvement expenditures.
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1.7.1. Evidence from Home Improvement Permits
Focusing first on home improvement expenditures, I show that expiring price controls are associated with a disproportionate increase in the likelihood of applying for home improvement permits
among owners of previously controlled units. Given the concomitant increase in equity extraction documented in the previous section, this suggests that at least some portion of the extracted
money was used to fund new residential investments. Of course, this result also raises the concern that the observed increase in equity extraction may not be driven by access to new collateral
but by the fact that expiring price controls could increase the owner’s incentives to invest in debtfinanced home improvements. While disincentives for residential investment have been shown
to be important in the context of rent control (Autor et al., 2014), I argue that they are unlikely
to be the driving force behind the increase in equity extraction in this context for three reasons.
First, the formula used to determine the controlled resale price takes into account any documented
home improvements and adjusts the resale price upward dollar-for-dollar on a cost basis. Because
of this, the MPDU price controls generate little disincentive for investment during the control
period. Second, for owners who plan to stay in the home beyond the end of the control period,
the expiration of the price control has no effect on the incentive to invest. These owners know at
the time they make the investment that they will eventually receive half of its full market value,
regardless of whether that investment is made before or after the price control expires. Finally, if
the only factor driving the observed increase in equity extraction was a change in the demand for
debt-financed home improvements, then such an effect should presumably manifest itself equally
across all MPDU owners. However, as shown in the previous section, the increase in equity extraction is concentrated primarily among the set of homeowners with high initial leverage, for whom
collateral constraints are presumably more important. For these reasons, it seems likely that the
direction of causality runs from equity extractions (induced by increased access to collateral) to
home improvements and not the other way around.
I use data from the Montgomery County Department of Permitting Services to estimate the effect
of expiring price controls on residential investment behavior. This data, which is described in
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further detail in Appendix A.2.6, contains address level information on all building and home
improvement permit applications filed since 2000 for all parts of the county except for the cities
of Gaithersburg and Rockville. I match the permit applications to the DataQuick property file
using the same approach used to match the list of MPDU addresses. Having matched the data, I
then construct an annual panel that records for each property located outside of Gaithersburg or
Rockville whether a permit application was filed for that property in a particular year. The permits
data includes applications for both new construction and improvements. To avoid confusing new
construction with home improvements, I only include property-year observations that are at least
two years after the year the property was built. The panel thus runs from 2000–2012, unless the
property was built during that time period, in which case the data beings in the second year after
the property was built.
Using this panel, I estimate versions of the pooled difference-in-differences regression given by
equation (1.10) where the outcome is now an indicator for whether a home improvement permit
application was filed for a property in a particular year. Table 1.5 reports the coefficient estimates
for the MPDU×Post interaction term, which measures the differential increase in the likelihood
of applying for permitted residential investment among owners of MPDU properties following
the expiration of the price control. Across the columns, the control variables and specifications
are the same as those used for estimating the extensive margin equity extraction response and are
introduced in the same order. While the smaller sample size leads to a modest loss of precision, all
of the estimated effects are positive and significant at the five percent level. For the OLS specifications, the point estimates imply that expiring price controls lead to an increase in the probability
of filing a home improvement permit application of roughly 1 percentage point while the probit
and logit specifications yield slightly lower estimates of roughly 0.6–0.7 percentage points. These
effects are large relative to the pre-period mean of 1 percentage point among MPDU owners reported in the bottom panel and suggest that borrowers likely used some portion of the equity they
extracted to fund new residential investment expenditures.

42

1.7.2. Evidence from Foreclosures
The second piece of evidence I provide regarding the uses of extracted funds draws inferences based
on the ex-post performance of the loan. If equity extraction is merely a means for portfolio diversification or paying off existing debt, then one would not necessarily expect that the act of extracting
equity itself would expose borrowers to additional risk or raise their probability of mortgage default and subsequent foreclosure. On the other hand, if borrowers use some of the extracted funds
to pay for current consumption and investment expenditures, then their total leverage would increase, potentially putting them at higher risk of default and foreclosure (Bhutta and Keys, 2014).
In this section, I provide evidence that equity extractions induced by the increase in collateral values at the time the price controls expire are more likely to end in foreclosure relative to equity
extractions driven by other motives, which suggests that they are also more likely to be used for
the purposes of funding current expenditures.
While the DataQuick data does not allow me to track the time at which a particular loan becomes
delinquent or enters foreclosure, it does contain an indicator for whether an ownership transfer
occurred as a result of a foreclosure sale or bank repossession. Using this information, I am able
to determine for every loan observed in the loan-level data whether that loan was followed by
a subsequent foreclosure. To measure differences in foreclosure rates associated with individual
instances of equity extraction, I restrict attention to loans in the non-purchase loans dataset that
are coded as equity extractions and estimate versions of the following regression specified at the
loan level
F o r e c l o s u r ei j s t = α s + δ t + Xi0j t γ + β1 · M P D Uj + β2 · M P D Uj × P o s t s t + εi j s t ,

(1.13)

where F o r e c l o s u r ei j s t is an indicator denoting whether equity extraction i associated with property j located in subdivision s and originated at time t was followed by a foreclosure within up to
three years after its origination. Since the focus is on three-year foreclosure rates, I only include
equity extractions that occur between 1997–2009 to ensure that I can observe up to three years
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of potential foreclosure information for every loan. In addition to the standard set of property
characteristics, the vector Xi j t also includes dummy variables indicating whether the loan was
FHA-insured or had an adjustable interest rate. The coefficient of interest is β2 , which measures
the differential increase in three-year foreclosure rates associated with equity extractions secured
against MPDU properties following the expiration of the price control relative to the change in
foreclosure rates associated with equity extractions secured against non-MPDU properties. A positive value for β2 suggests that equity extractions that occur in response to the increased collateral
made available by the expiring price control are at higher risk of foreclosure relative to equity
extractions motivated by other factors.
Table 1.6 reports estimates of this coefficient from various versions of equation (1.13). All specifications include the standard set of property characteristics as well as the dummies for FHA and
adjustable rate mortgages and fixed effects for the year of origination and the age of the property
in that year. The second column adds subdivision fixed effects, which are further interacted with a
linear time trend in column 3. Columns 4 and 5 report probit and logit marginal effects using the
same specification as in column 3. In all cases, the estimated effect on the MPDU×Post interaction
term is positive and precisely estimated. The estimates imply that the three-year foreclosure rate
associated with equity extractions secured against MPDU properties increased by roughly 1.5–2
percentage points relative to equity extractions secured against non-MPDU properties following
the expiration of the price control. This effect represents between 70–90 percent of the overall
average three-year foreclosure rate among equity extractions secured against MPDU properties.
Equity extractions induced by expiring price controls are thus substantially more risky than those
motivated by other reasons, which suggests that they are also more likely to have been used for the
purposes of funding current expenditures rather than simply paying off existing debt or portfolio
diversification.

1.8. Conclusion
For many households, houses are both the largest asset they own and the most readily available
source of pledgeable collateral against which they can borrow. Changes in the value of housing
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thus have the potential to lead to significant changes in the desire and ability of individual homeowners to borrow. The macroeconomic consequences of house price-induced changes in individual borrowing behavior depend crucially on whether those changes are driven by wealth effects,
which in aggregate may be offset by opposing changes among renters and others who are “short”
housing, or by the relaxation of binding collateral constraints, which do not have the same offsetting effects. Empirical analyses of the effect of house price fluctuations on homeowner borrowing
often struggle to distinguish between these two channels, as it is difficult to find instances in which
changes to the value of a home do not represent both a direct increase in a household’s net worth
and an indirect expansion of their collateralized borrowing capacity.
This paper addresses these challenges and isolates the role of collateral values by exploiting a unique
feature of an inclusionary zoning policy in Montgomery County, Maryland that imposes temporary price controls on owner-occupied housing units. Because the duration and stringency of these
price controls are set by formula and known in advance at the time of purchase, their expiration
has no effect on the owner’s expected lifetime wealth. Changes in borrowing behavior among
owners of controlled units at the time of expiration can thus be directly attributed to the effect
of the price control on the collateral value of the home. Using this fact, I show that changes in
the collateral value of housing have important effects on homeowner borrowing behavior. Specifically, following the expiration of the price controls, the probability of home equity extraction increases differentially among owners of previously controlled units by roughly 4 percentage points
relative to owners of observationally identical non-controlled units in the same housing development. Comparing the increase in equity extraction to the increase in available collateral implied
by the change in prices at the time of expiration yields an estimate of the marginal propensity to
borrow out of increases in housing collateral of approximately $0.04–$0.13. These estimates are
roughly within the range of existing estimates from the literature of the total effect of house price
increases on homeowner borrowing and suggest that collateral constraints are an important factor
driving that relationship. The magnitude of the borrowing response is also monotonically increasing in the homeowner’s initial leverage, providing further evidence that collateral constraints are
the dominant force leading owners of controlled units to respond to the expiration of the price
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control by borrowing against their homes. Finally, evidence from home improvement permit applications and subsequent loan performance suggests that at least some portion of the extracted
funds were used to finance current consumption or investment expenditures and not simply used
as a means for portfolio diversification or paying down existing debt. These results corroborate
existing evidence on the importance of collateral constraints based on indirect proxy measures
and have implications both for understanding the microeconomic mechanisms driving the relationship between house prices and homeowner borrowing and the macroeconomic consequences
of that relationship.
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FIG. 1.1.—House Prices and Home Equity Debt Relative to Disposable Personal Income. This figure plots aggregate trends in U.S. house prices and home equity debt relative to disposable personal income at a quarterly
frequency over the period 1990–2014. Aggregate data on home equity debt come from the Federal Reserve Flow
of Funds (Z.1 Release, Series FL893065125.Q). Disposable personal income data come from the National Income
and Product Accounts (BEA Account Code A067RC1). The home equity debt series is only available from the
Flow of Funds beginning in the fourth quarter of 1990. The house price index is normalized to 100 in the first
quarter of 1990, and the underlying data come from the S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index.
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FIG. 1.2.—Spatial Distribution of MPDU Properties in Two Example Subdivisions. This figure shows the location of several MPDU properties in two representative
subdivisions. MPDU properties are marked with an orange circle. All unmarked homes are market-rate units. The two shaded areas identify the subdivision
boundaries.

500

MPDUs Expiring

400
300
200
0

100

Number of MPDUs Expiring

DQ Sample Period

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

Year

FIG. 1.3.—Number of Expiring Price Controls by Year. This figure plots the trend in price control expiration
dates at a yearly frequency for all owner-occupied MPDU properties in the county. Each dot plots the number
of properties whose price controls expired or will expire in the indicated year. The shaded grey area marks the
period of time for which information on housing transactions and home equity-based borrowing is availble from
DataQuick.
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FIG. 1.4.—Geographic Distribution of MPDU Properties within Montgomery County, Maryland. This figure
shows the location of all MPDU properties that were successfully matched to a property in the DataQuick assesment file (N=7,404). MPDU properties are marked with an orange circle. Census tracts within Montgomery
County are shaded according to their population density as reported in the 2010 American Community Survey.
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FIG. 1.5.—Assessing the Parallel Trends Assumption. This figure plots calendar year-adjusted means for each of
the three primary outcomes—log transaction prices, the annual probability of extracting equity, and total equity
extracted per year—separately for MPDUs (blue circles) and non-MPDUs (orange squares) as a function of years
relative to the first control period expiration within the relevant subdivision. Relative year zero represents the year
the first MPDU within the subdivision expired. Means are shown for up to five years preceding and following the
expiration of the price control, grouping all years outside that window into the means for relative years −5 and
5. Adjusted means were created by regressing the indicated outcome on a full set of calendar year fixed effects and
averaging the residuals from that regression separately for MPDUs and non-MPDUs within relative year bins. To
clarify the interpretation of the y-axis, the grand mean of the outcome was then added back in to both series. The
dashed lines plot the fit from a regression of the binned means on a linear term in relative year. For MPDUs, only
the pre-period means were used to construct the fitted values.
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FIG. 1.6.—Dynamic Effects of Expiring Price Controls on Transaction Prices of MPDU Properties. This
figure reports estimates of the effect of expiring price controls on the transaction prices of MPDU properties
derived from a flexible difference-in-differences regression that allows the effect to vary by year relative to the
expiration of the price control. Estimates were constructed by regressing the log of the transaction price on an
indicator for whether the associated property is an MPDU and the interaction of the MPDU indicator with a
series of dummy variables indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured
from the year the first MPDU in the relevant subdivision expired. Relative year zero denotes the year the
first price control in the subdivision expired. Relative year −1 is the omitted category so that all estimates
should be interpreted as relative to the year prior to expiration. Results are shown for five years preceding
and following the expiration of the price control, with all years outside that window grouped into the effects
for relative years −5 and 5. The series in orange squares plots the coefficient estimates on the relative year
main effects, which represent the trend in log prices among non-MPDU properties. The series in blue circles
plots the estimate and 95 percent confidence interval for the sum of the relative year main effects and the
interaction of those effects with the MPDU indicator, representing the trend among MPDU properties. The
95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors which were clustered at the subdivision level.
The regression also included year fixed effects, subdivision fixed effects and their interaction with a linear time
trend and a set of property characteristics. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior
square footage of the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms, stories, and property age, as well as an
indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome and the interaction of that indicator with the
year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics.
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FIG. 1.7.—Dynamic Effects of Expiring Price Controls on the Borrowing Behavior of MPDU Homeowners. This figure reports estimates of the effect of expiring
price controls on the borrowing behavior of MPDU homeowners derived from a flexible difference-in-differences regression that allows the effect to vary by year
relative to the expiration of the price control. Estimates were constructed by regressing an indicator for whether the homeowner extracted equity in a particular
year (Panel A.) and the total amount of equity extracted per year (Panel B.) on an indicator for whether the associated property is an MPDU and the interaction
of the MPDU indicator with a series of dummy variables indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured from the year the
first MPDU in the relevant subdivision expired. Relative year zero denotes the year the first price control in the subdivision expired. Relative year −1 is the
omitted category so that all estimates should be interpreted as relative to the year prior to expiration. Results are shown for five years preceding and following
the expiration of the price control, with all years outside that window grouped into the effects for relative years −5 and 5. The series in orange squares plots the
coefficient estimates on the relative year main effects, which represent the trend in annual equity extraction probabilities (Panel A.) and average equity extracted per
year (Panel B.) among non-MPDU properties. The series in blue circles plots the estimate and 95 percent confidence interval for the sum of the relative year main
effects and the interaction of those effects with the MPDU indicator, representing the trend among MPDU properties. The 95 percent confidence intervals are
based on standard errors that were clustered at the subdivision level. The regressions also included year fixed effects, subdivision fixed effects and their interaction
with a linear time trend and a set of property characteristics. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies
for the number of bathrooms, stories, and property age, as well as an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome and the interaction of that
indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics.
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FIG. 1.8.—Heterogeneity Across the Distribution of Initial Leverage in the Effect of Expiring Price Controls
on the Borrowing Behavior of MPDU Homeowners. This figure reports estimates of the effect of expiring
price controls on the borrowing behavior of MPDU homeowners derived from a difference-in-differences regression that allows the effect to vary according the the homeowner’s initial LTV. Estimates for the extensive
margin probability of extracting equity are shown in blue bars and measured along the right axis while estimates for the total amount of equity extracted per year are shown in orange bars and measured along the left
axis. The 95 percent confidence intervals for each estimate are also shown and are based on standard errors
that were clustered at the subdivision level. The height of each bar corresponds to the coefficient estimate
on the triple interaction term between an indicator for whether the property is an MPDU, an indicator for
whether the year of observation falls on or after the year the first price control in the relevant subdivision
expired, and an indicator for whether the initial LTV for the ownership spell fell with in the range indicated
on the x-axis. The regressions also included fixed effects for the ownership spell, the year of observation,
and the age of the property in that year, as well as subdivision specific linear time trends and the interaction
between the age fixed effects and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome. To be able
to accurately measure initial leverage, the sample was restricted to the set of properties that were observed to
transact at least once and to the set of ownership spells that began with a transaction (N=211,249).
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FIG. 1.9.—Placebo Tests of the Effect of Expiring Price Controls on the Borrowing Behavior of MPDU Homeowners. This figure reports results from a series of
placebo tests of the effect of expiring price controls on the probability of extracting equity (Panel A.) and the total amount of equity extracted per year (Panel B.)
among owners of MPDU properties. Each panel plots the distribution of 1,000 placebo estimates for the indicated outcome. The vertically dashed lines show the
true estimates, which were taken from column 3 of Table 1.3 for Panel A. and column 3 of Table 1.4 for Panel B. Each placebo estimate was created by randomly
assigning a false first MPDU expiration date to each of the 69 subdivisions and generating a difference-in-differences estimate using that false date. To prevent the
placebo estimate from being influenced by any jump in the outcome at the true expiration date, only data from either the pre-period or the post-period was used
depending on whether the false date fell before or after the true first expiration date within the relevant subdivision. In addition to the MPDU main effect and its
interaction with the Post indicator, the regressions used to generate the placebo estimates include year fixed effects, subdivision fixed effects and their interaction
with a linear time trend and a set of property characteristics. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies
for the number of bathrooms, stories, and property age, as well as an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome and the interaction of that
indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics.

TABLE 1.1
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PROPERTIES, TRANSACTIONS, AND ANNUAL MEASURES OF EQUITY EXTRACTION
Full Sample
All Properties

Analysis Sample
All Properties

Non-MPDUs

MPDUs

Panel A. Property Characteristics
Square Footage (1000’s)
Number of Bathrooms
Number of Stories
Age (Years)
Number of Properties

1.90
2.62
1.65
37.80

(4.50)
(1.17)
(0.53)
(20.28)

286,484

1.98
3.00
1.86
24.73

(1.01)
(1.05)
(0.42)
(9.86)

31,244

2.07
3.08
1.85
25.10

(1.02)
(1.04)
(0.41)
(10.13)

28,278

1.18
2.26
1.95
21.18

(0.22)
(0.77)
(0.53)
(5.66)

2,966

Panel B. Transaction/Buyer Characteristics
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Transaction Price ($1000’s)
Loan Amount ($1000’s)
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Fraction FHA Insured
Number of Properties
Number of Transactions

444.09
351.18
0.85
0.14

(330.85)
(673.69)
(0.57)
—

156,206
233,879

418.09
330.10
0.86
0.16

(290.70)
(200.84)
(0.61)
—

19,152
30,209

432.81
339.53
0.85
0.15

(294.80)
(202.00)
(0.58)
—

17,719
27,934

237.37
210.58
0.94
0.27

(140.34)
(137.71)
(0.90)
—

1,433
2,275

Panel C. Equity Extraction Measures
Amount Extracted ($1000’s)
Amount Extracted | > 0 ($1000’s)
Probability of Extracting Equity
Number of Properties
Number of Ownership Spells
Number of Property-Years

7.63
101.08
0.08
286,484
493,386
4,383,768

(40.97)
(113.07)
—

8.45
92.48
0.09
31,244
57,333
483,805

(40.75)
(101.96)
—

8.85
94.14
0.09
28,278
52,390
437,977

(42.08)
(103.91)
—

4.63
69.93
0.07

(24.37)
(66.31)
—

2,966
4,943
45,828

NOTE.—This table presents descriptive statistics for both the full sample of single-family residential properties with non-missing housing characteristics contained in the
DataQuick assessment file (columns 1–2) and the restricted sample used in the analysis (columns 3–8). All table entries represent sample means or, in parentheses, standard deviations. For the analysis sample, summary statistics are presented pooling across all properties as well as separately for non-MPDUs and MPDUs. In Panel A., the unit of analysis
is the individual property; in Panel B., it is the transaction; and in Panel C., it the property-year. All dollar amounts are converted to real 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Transaction prices are winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles in the full sample.

TABLE 1.2
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON
THE T RANSACTION P RICES OF MPDU P ROPERTIES

(1)
MPDU
MPDU × Post

(2)

-0.455***
(0.070)
0.455***
(0.077)

Property Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend
Property FEs

X
X

Implied %∆
Implied $∆ (1,000s)
R-squared
Number of Observations

57%
$93
0.76
30,209

-0.616***
(0.067)
0.499***
(0.084)
X
X
X

64%
$104
0.81
30,209

(3)
-0.620***
(0.067)
0.505***
(0.083)
X
X
X
X
65%
$106
0.81
30,209

(4)

0.349**
(0.139)
X
X
X
40%
$66
0.94
30,209

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price
controls on transaction prices for MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression
estimated at the transaction level where the dependent variable is the log of the transaction price.
Coefficients are reported for the “treatment” dummy, denoting whether the property is an MPDU,
and the interaction of that dummy with an indicator for whether the year of observation falls on
or after the year the first price control within the relevant subdivision expired. All specifications
include fixed effects for both the year of observation and the age of the property in that year. The
property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies
for the number of bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property
is a condo or townhome as well as the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and
all of the other property characteristics including property age. Subdivision trends are estimated
by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend. The first row of the bottom
panel reports the implied percentage increase in prices associated with the coefficient estimate on
the MPDU×Post indicator reported in the second row of the table. The implied dollar increase is
calculated by applying that percentage increase to the mean price (in levels) among MPDU properties in the period prior to the expiration of the price control. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by
*, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 1.3
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON THE ANNUAL
PROBABILITY OF EXTRACTING EQUITY AMONG OWNERS OF MPDU PROPERTIES
OLS
(1)
MPDU
MPDU × Post
Property Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend
Ownership Spell FEs
Pre-Expiration MPDU Mean
Number of Observations

-0.057***
(0.007)
0.041***
(0.008)
X
X

0.039
483,805

(2)
-0.050***
(0.008)
0.040***
(0.008)
X
X
X

0.039
483,805

(3)
-0.050***
(0.008)
0.041***
(0.008)
X
X
X
X
0.039
483,805

(4)

0.034***
(0.008)
X
X
X
0.039
483,805

Probit

Logit

(5)

(6)

-0.053***
(0.006)
0.044***
(0.007)

-0.054***
(0.006)
0.042***
(0.007)

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

0.039
483,805

0.039
483,805

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price controls on the annual probability of extracting equity among owners of MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression estimated at the propertyyear level where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the property owner extracted equity from the home in a particular year. Coefficients are reported for the “treatment” dummy, denoting whether the property is an MPDU, and the interaction
of that dummy with an indicator for whether the year of observation falls on or after the year the first price control within the
relevant subdivision expired. All specifications include fixed effects for both the year of observation and the age of the property
in that year. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number
of bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well as the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics including property age. Subdivision
trends are estimated by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend. Columns 1–4 report coefficient estimates
from linear probability models, while columns 5–6 report marginal effects from probit and logit specifications. The mean of the
dependent variable among MPDU properties in the period prior to the first price control expiration is reported in the second to
last row. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1%
are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 1.4
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON TOTAL EQUITY
EXTRACTED PER YEAR (IN $1,000S) AMONG OWNERS OF MPDU PROPERTIES
OLS
(1)
MPDU
MPDU × Post
Property Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend
Ownership Spell FEs
Pre-Expiration MPDU Mean
Number of Observations

-2.572***
(0.755)
2.319***
(0.715)

(2)
-3.514***
(0.664)
2.926***
(0.664)

X
X

2.662
483,805

X
X
X

2.662
483,805

Tobit
(3)
-3.607***
(0.693)
3.037***
(0.700)
X
X
X
X

2.662
483,805

(4)

2.794***
(0.880)
X
X
X
2.662
483,805

(5)
-5.939***
(0.632)
4.407***
(0.667)
X
X
X
X
2.662
483,805

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price controls on the
annual amount of equity extracted among owners of MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression estimated at the property-year level where the dependent variable is the amount of equity (in $1,000s) that the
property owner extracted from the home in a particular year. Coefficients are reported for the “treatment” dummy,
denoting whether the property is an MPDU, and the interaction of that dummy with an indicator for whether the
year of observation falls on or after the year the first price control within the relevant subdivision expired. All
specifications include fixed effects for both the year of observation and the age of the property in that year. The
property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number of
bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well
as the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics including
property age. Subdivision trends are estimated by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend.
Columns 1–4 report coefficient estimates from OLS regressions, while column 5 reports the marginal effects for
the expected amount of equity extraction (censored and uncensored, treating censored as zero) from a tobit specification. The mean of the dependent variable among MPDU properties in the period prior to the first price control
expiration is reported in the second to last row. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 1.5
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON THE ANNUAL PROBABILITY
OF P ERMITTED R ESIDENTIAL I NVESTMENT A MONG OWNERS OF MPDU P ROPERTIES
OLS
(1)
MPDU × Post
Property Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend
Ownership Spell FEs
Pre-Expiration MPDU Mean
Number of Observations

0.0089**
(0.0034)
X
X

0.0106
385,192

(2)
0.0086**
(0.0037)
X
X
X

0.0106
385,192

(3)
0.0092**
(0.0037)
X
X
X
X
0.0106
385,192

(4)
0.0136**
(0.0055)
X
X
X
0.0106
385,192

Probit

Logit

(5)

(6)

0.0071**
(0.0031)

0.0063**
(0.0031)

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

0.0106
385,192

0.0106
385,192

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price controls on the annual probability of permitted residential investment among owners of MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression estimated at the property-year level where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the property owner filed an application
for a home improvement permit in a particular year. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction term between the “treatment” dummy, denoting whether the property is an MPDU, and an indicator for whether the year of observation falls on or after
the year the first price control within the relevant subdivision expired. All specifications include fixed effects for both the year of
observation and the age of the property in that year. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage
of the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a
condo or townhome as well as the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics including property age. Subdivision trends are estimated by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend.
Columns 1–4 report coefficient estimates from linear probability models, while columns 5–6 report marginal effects from probit
and logit specifications. The mean of the dependent variable among MPDU properties in the period prior to the first price control
expiration is reported in the second to last row. The sample excludes properties located in the cities of Gaithersburg and Rockville,
where permit application data is not available, and property-year observations occurring prior to 2000, the first year that permit
applications are observed. To avoid mistaking new construction for home improvements, it also excludes any property-year observations occurring less than two years after the property was built. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at the subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

60

TABLE 1.6
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON THE THREE-YEAR
FORECLOSURE RATE AMONG EQUITY EXTRACTIONS SECURED AGAINST MPDU PROPERTIES
OLS
(1)
MPDU × Post

0.017***
(0.005)

(2)
0.015***
(0.006)

(3)
0.015***
(0.005)

Probit

Logit

(4)

(5)

0.020***
(0.005)

0.020***
(0.005)

Property Characteristics
Loan Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Dep. Var. MPDU Mean
Number of Observations

0.022
45,719

0.022
45,719

0.022
45,719

0.022
45,719

0.022
45,719

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price controls on the threeyear foreclosure rate among equity extractions secured against MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression estimated at the loan level where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the loan was followed by a foreclosure within three years of origination. The sample includes only non-purchase loans coded as equity extractions that
were originated during the period 1997–2009. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction term between the “treatment” dummy, denoting whether the property is an MPDU, and an indicator for whether the year of origination falls on
or after the year the first price control within the relevant subdivision expired. All specifications include fixed effects for
both the year of origination and the age of the property in that year as well as property and loan characteristics. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms
and the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well as the interaction
of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics including property age. The loan
characteristics include an indicator for whether the loan was FHA-insured and whether it had an adjustable interest rate.
Subdivision trends are estimated by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend. Columns 1–3 report
coefficient estimates from linear probability models, while columns 4–5 report marginal effects from probit and logit specifications. The mean of the dependent variable among MPDU properties is reported in the second to last row. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Interest Rate Elasticity of Mortgage Demand: Evidence from
Bunching at the Conforming Loan Limit
2.1. Introduction
Buyers face a bewildering array of financing options when purchasing a home. Should they pay
cash or take out a mortgage? If the latter, should it have a fixed rate or an adjustable rate? How
large a down payment should they make? Given that housing makes up the lion’s share of most
owners’ portfolios, these and related questions are fundamental to their financial well-being. Yet
there is little research that credibly identifies how households respond to changes in the many
parameters of this problem. In this paper, we focus on one element of the problem—the choice
of how much debt to incur—in order to provide novel and credible estimates of the interest rate
elasticity of mortgage demand.
The magnitude of this elasticity has important implications for policy-relevant questions in several areas of economics. For example, given that mortgages constitute the majority of total household debt, the elasticity plays a significant role in governing the degree to which monetary policy
affects aggregate consumption and savings behavior (Hall, 1988; Mishkin, 1995; Browning and
Lusardi, 1996). In public finance, the elasticity is also important for understanding the effect of
the home mortgage interest deduction on both government tax revenue and household consumption (Poterba, 1984; Poterba and Sinai, 2008, 2011). Similarly, the elasticity also has implications
for the effects of government intervention in the secondary mortgage market, where federal policy directly influences mortgage rates through the purchase activity of the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Sherlund, 2008; Adelino et al., 2012; Kaufman,
2012). This final consideration has become particularly salient recently in light of the ongoing
debate over the future of the GSEs in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Despite these potentially important policy implications, there are essentially no existing causal
estimates of the extent to which individual loan sizes respond to changes in interest rates.1 This
1

One exception is in recent work by Fuster and Zafar (2014), who survey households about their mortgage choices
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is due in large part to data limitations and lack of plausibly exogenous variation in interest rates,
which which have led prior research in this area to focus on other aspects of mortgage choice. The
literature estimating interest rate elasticities of other smaller components of consumer credit—
such as credit card, auto, and micro-finance debt—has been more fruitful, thanks to the availability
of detailed microdata and variation in interest rates arising from either direct randomization or
quasi-experimental policy changes (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Alessie et al., 2005; Attanasio et al.,
2008; Karlan and Zinman, 2008, 2014).2 In the spirit of these studies, we estimate the interest rate
elasticity of mortgage demand using microdata on over 2.7 million mortgages and an identification
strategy that leverages “bunching” at nonlinearities in household budget constraints.
We identify the effect of interest rates on borrower behavior by exploiting a regulatory requirement imposed on the GSEs that generates exogenous variation in the relationship between loan
size and interest rates. Specifically, the GSEs are only allowed to purchase loans for dollar amounts
that fall below the conforming loan limit (CLL), a nominal cap set by their regulator each year.
Because loans purchased by the GSEs are backed by an implicit government guarantee, interest
rates on loans above this limit (“jumbo loans”) are typically higher than rates on comparable loans
just below the limit.
While identifying the precise magnitude of this interest rate differential is challenging due to borrower sorting around the limit, some insight can still be gleaned from examining the raw data.3
For example, Figure 2.1A plots the interest rate as a function of the difference between the loan
amount and the conforming limit for all fixed-rate mortgages in our analysis sample that were
originated in 2006.4 There is a clear discontinuity precisely at the limit, with average interest rates
under randomized hypothetical interest rate scenarios and find results similar to what we report below. In other related
work, Martins and Villanueva (2006) estimate how the extensive margin probability of obtaining a mortgage responds
to an interest rate subsidy for low-income households in Portugal but do not report direct estimates of the effects on
loan size. Similarly, several others including Follain and Dunsky (1997), Ling and McGill (1998), Dunsky and Follain
(2000), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) have estimated how mortgage debt responds to changes in the rate at which
interest expenses can be deducted from personal income but do not focus explicitly on effective interest rates themselves.
2
See Zinman (2015) for a review of the empirical literature on demand elasticities in consumer credit markets.
3
Many papers have attempted to overcome this challenge using a variety of empirical methods. See, for example,
Hendershott and Shilling (1989), Passmore et al. (2002), Passmore et al. (2005), Sherlund (2008) and Kaufman (2012).
We address these issues in detail below in Section 2.4.
4
Each dot is the average interest rate within a given $5,000 bin relative to the limit. The dashed red lines are the
predicted values from a regression fit using the binned data, allowing for changes in the slope and intercept at the limit.
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on loans just above the limit being approximately 20 basis points higher than those on loans just
below.
The difference in interest rates between jumbo and conforming loans creates a substantial “notch”
in the intertemporal budget constraint of households deciding how much mortgage debt to incur.
This notch induces some borrowers who would otherwise take out loans above the conforming
limit to instead bunch right at the limit. This behavior is confirmed by Figure 2.1B, which shows
the fraction of all loans in our analysis sample which fall into any given $5,000 bin relative to the
conforming limit in effect at the date of origination.5 Consistent with the notion that borrowers
bunch at the conforming limit, the figure shows a sharp spike in the fraction of loans originated
in the bin immediately below the limit, which is accompanied by a sizable region of missing mass
immediately to the right of the limit.
The intuition behind our empirical strategy is to combine reasonable estimates of the jumboconforming spread with a measure of the excess mass of individuals who bunch at the conforming
limit to back out estimates of the interest rate (semi-)elasticity of demand for mortgage debt. Recent papers in public finance have developed methods for estimating behavioral responses to nonlinear incentives in similar settings (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013).6
We adapt these methods to the case of mortgage choice in the face of a notched interest rate schedule. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first application of these methods to the mortgage
market or to a consumer credit market of any kind.
Our preferred specifications indicate that the average size of a borrower’s first (fixed-rate) mortgage
declines by between 2 and 3 percent for each 1 percentage point rise in the first mortgage rate,
holding constant all prices and interest rates that do not change at the conforming limit. Because
both the bunching estimates and the jumbo-conforming spread estimates vary depending on the
See Section 2.3 for details on sample construction. The year 2006 is chosen for illustrative purposes only. We estimate
the jumbo spread using all available loans below in Section 2.4.
5
During our sample period the conforming limit varied from around $215,000 in 1997 to it’s peak in 2006 and 2007
of approximately $420,000. Appendix Figure A.11 shows the full path of the limit in real an nominal terms during this
period.
6
Other recent applications of these and similar methods include Sallee and Slemrod (2010); Manoli and Weber (2011);
Best and Kleven (2015); Chetty et al. (2013); Gelber et al. (2013) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014).
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assumptions used in estimation, we also provide alternative estimates under a range of different
scenarios. These estimates imply a decline of between 1.5 and 5 percent for a 1 percentage point
increase in the mortgage rate.
While the mortgage demand elasticity is of innate interest, its interpretation depends in part on
the channels through which borrowers adjust their first mortgage balance. Our second main contribution is to provide suggestive evidence on this margin. Borrowers can reduce the initial balance
of their first mortgage in at least three ways. First, they can make a larger down payment on the
same house at the same price. Second, they can take out a second mortgage to cover the loan
balance in excess of the conforming limit. Third, they can lower the price of the house they buy,
either by negotiating with the seller or by choosing a less expensive house. We show that about
one-third of bunching borrowers take out second mortgages, which suggests that the reduction in
total mortgage debt in response to a 1 percentage point rise in the first mortgage interest rate is
between 1.5 and 2 percent.
To gauge the economic magnitude of the effects we estimate, we apply them to recently proposed
increases to the fee that the GSEs charge lenders to cover the costs associated with guaranteeing
investor returns on their mortgage-backed securities. We estimate that the proposed fee increases
would reduce the total dollar volume of fixed-rate conforming mortgage originations by approximately one-fifth of one percent. When we apply our elasticity to similar increases in fees that have
occurred in the recent past, we estimate an effect on the order of one-half of one percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents our conceptual framework. In Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, we discuss our data and empirical research design. We then
present our main results in Section 2.5-Section 2.6. Section 2.7 applies these results to changes in
the GSE guarantee fees, and Section 2.8 concludes by discussing avenues for future research.
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2.2. Theoretical Framework
We begin by considering a simple two-period model of mortgage choice.7 Although highly stylized, this model highlights the most relevant features of our empirical environment and generates
useful predictions for household behavior in the presence of a nonlinear mortgage interest rate
schedule. The model is similar in spirit to those in the recent literature in public finance studying
behavioral responses to nonlinear incentives in other contexts. For example, Saez (2010), Chetty et
al. (2011), Chetty et al. (2013), and Gelber et al. (2013) study labor supply and earnings responses to
kinked income tax and social security benefit schedules. Similar models have also been developed
to study behavioral responses in applications more analogous to ours, where the budget constraint
features a notch as opposed to a kink. Our analysis draws heavily on the framework developed by
Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Best and Kleven (2015) who study behavioral responses to notched
income and real estate transfer tax schedules, respectively. Kopczuk and Munroe (2014) have also
used this framework to study real estate transfer taxes and others have used it to study fuel economy regulation (Sallee and Slemrod, 2010) and retirement incentives (Manoli and Weber, 2011).
Ours is the first application to the mortgage market or to a credit market of any kind.
2.2.1. Baseline Case: Linear Interest Rate Schedule
Households live for two periods. Since our primary focus is on the intensive margin choice of how
much debt to incur conditional on purchasing a home, we shut down housing choice by assuming
that each household must purchase one unit of housing services in the first period at an exogenous
per-unit price of p.8 Households can finance their housing purchase with a mortgage, m, which
may not exceed the total value of the house. The baseline interest rate on the mortgage is given by
r and does not depend on the mortgage amount. In the second period, housing is liquidated, the
mortgage is paid off, and households consume all of their remaining wealth.
The household’s problem is to maximize lifetime utility by choosing consumption in each period,
7

The underlying theory is similar to that in Brueckner (1994), among other papers.
In the appendix, we relax the assumption that households cannot choose the quantity of housing services to consume. While the intuition is the same, extending the model in this way prevents us from deriving a closed-form solution,
which makes it less useful for motivating the empirical work.
8
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denoted by c1 and c2 .9 In general, the household solves:
max{U (c1 , c2 ) = u(c1 ) + δ u(c2 )}

(2.1)

s.t. c1 + p = y + m

(2.2)

c1 ,c2

c2 = p − (1 + r ) m

(2.3)

0 ≤ m ≤ p,

(2.4)

where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and y is first period income. Solving equation (2.2) for c1 and
substituting this, along with equation (2.3), into equation (2.1) allows us to rewrite the household’s
problem in terms of mortgage debt,
V = max{u(y + m − p) + δ u( p − (1 + r ) m)},
m

(2.5)

subject now only to the borrowing constraint (2.4).
To proceed, we make several simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that household preferences
are given by the constant elasticity function u(c) =

1
c 1−ξ .10
1−ξ

Second, heterogeneity in the model

is driven by the discount factor, which is assumed to be distributed smoothly in the population
according to the density function f (δ). For illustrative purposes, we assume that y, p, and ξ are
constant across households; however, this assumption is not crucial and we discuss below how
relaxing it affects the interpretation of our results.11 Finally, we assume that households end up
at an interior solution with a positive mortgage amount and a loan-to-value ratio of less that 100
percent—that is, constraint (2.4) does not bind.
9

Since we impose the exogenous requirement that households consume one unit of housing services, we suppress the
argument for housing consumption and express the household’s problem as a choice over non-housing consumption
only.
10
This functional form allows us to derive a closed-form solution, but all of the basic results hold with more general
utility functions.
11
We model heterogeneity primarily through the discount factor in order to facilitate the graphical discussion of
bunching behavior below. While household income and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are also potentially
important sources of heterogeneity in our model, these factors only affect mortgage choice through shifts in the lifetime
budget constraint and through differences in the curvature of indifference curves. Differences in discount factors, on
the other hand, affect mortgage choice by linearly shifting indifference curves along the lifetime budget constraint. This
allows us to graphically represent how a notched interest rate schedule induces bunching behavior in a simple budget
constraint diagram.
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Under these assumptions, we can solve explicitly for mortgage demand:
m∗ =

p − (δ (1 + r ))1/ξ (y − p)
(δ (1 + r ))1/ξ + (1 + r )

.

(2.6)

Because ξ , y, and p are assumed to be constant across households, this relationship provides a oneto-one mapping between a household’s value of δ, and its optimal mortgage choice when faced
with the baseline interest rate schedule.12 Given the assumption of a smooth distribution for δ,
this mapping will induce a smooth baseline distribution of mortgage amounts, which we denote
using the density function g0 (m).
2.2.2. Notched Interest Rate Schedule
We now consider the effect of introducing a notch in the baseline interest rate schedule at the
conforming loan amount m̄. Loans above this limit are subject to a higher interest rate, leading to
the new schedule r (m) = r +∆r · 1 (m > m̄).13 Here, ∆r is the difference in interest rates between
jumbo and conforming loans and

1 (m > m̄) is an indicator for jumbo loan status. Combining

equations (2.2) and (2.3) yields the lifetime budget constraint
C = y − m · [r + ∆r · 1 (m > m̄)] ,

(2.7)

where C = c1 + c2 is lifetime consumption. This budget constraint is plotted in Figure 2.2A along
with indifference curves for two representative households.
The notch in the budget constraint induces some households to bunch at the conforming loan
limit. In Figure 2.2A, household L is the household with the lowest baseline mortgage amount—
the largest δ—who locates at the conforming limit in the presence of a notch. This household is
unaffected by the change in rates and takes out a loan of size m̄ regardless of whether the notch
exists. Household H is the household with the highest pre-notch mortgage amount—the smallest
r

Technically, for this mapping to be one-to-one it must be true that y > 1+r p. If this condition holds then m ∗ is
strictly decreasing in δ. This is likely to be the case for any reasonable values of r and p.
13
The institutional details of the conforming loan limit and the channels through which it leads to higher interest
rates on jumbo loans are provided in the appendix.
12
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δ—that locates at the conforming limit when the notch exists. When faced with a linear interest
rate schedule, this household would choose a mortgage of size m̄ +∆ m̄. With the notch, however,
the household is indifferent between locating at m̄ and the best interior point beyond the conforming limit, m I . Any household with a baseline mortgage amount in the interval ( m̄, m̄ + ∆ m̄] will
bunch at the conforming loan amount, m̄. Furthermore, no household will choose to locate between m̄ and m I in the notch scenario.
The density when a notch exists, g1 (m), will therefore be characterized by both a mass of households locating precisely at the conforming limit as well as a missing mass of households immediately to the right of the limit. The effect of the notch on the mortgage size distribution is shown
in the density diagram in Figure 2.2B. The solid black line shows the density of loan amounts
in the presence of the notch and the heavy dashed red line to the right of the notch shows the
counterfactual density that would exist in the absence of the conforming loan limit.
Because households can be uniquely indexed by their position in the pre-notch mortgage size distribution, the number of households bunching at the conforming limit is given by:
B=

Z

m̄+∆ m̄
m̄

g0 (m)d m ≈ g0 ( m̄)∆ m̄,

(2.8)

where the approximation assumes that the counterfactual no-notch distribution is constant on the
bunching interval ( m̄, m̄ + ∆ m̄].14
The expression in equation (2.8) is the primary motivation for our empirical strategy. Given estimates of the amount of bunching, B̂, and the counterfactual density at the conforming loan limit,
gˆ0 ( m̄), we can solve for ∆ m̄, the behavioral response to the interest rate difference generated by the
conforming limit. This behavioral response represents the reduction in loan size of the marginal
bunching individual. Scaling this response by an appropriate measure of the change in the effective
interest rate yields an estimate of the interest rate elasticity of mortgage demand.15
14

This approximation merely simplifies the discussion. In the empirical application we allow for curvature in the
counterfactual distribution.
15
Much of the structure in the model above is not needed for this result to hold. All we require is that households can
be uniquely indexed by their choice of mortgage size in the pre-notch scenario and that the counterfactual distribution
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2.2.3. Heterogeneous Intertemporal Elasticities, Incomes, and Prices
The derivation of equation (2.8) rests upon the assumption that ξ , y, and p are constant across
households. In that case, it is possible to back out the exact change in mortgage amount for the
marginal bunching individual. When intertemporal elasticities, incomes, and prices are allowed to
vary across households, the amount of bunching instead identifies the average response among the
marginal bunching individuals associated with each intertemporal elasticity, income, and price
level. To see this, let the joint density of discount factors, intertemporal elasticities, incomes,
and prices be given by f¯(δ, ξ , y, p), where y ∈ (0, ȳ], ξ ∈ (0, ξ¯], and p ∈ (0, p̄] for some upper
bounds, ȳ, ξ¯, and p̄. For a fixed (ξ , y, p) triple, the bunching interval is determined in exactly
the same way as in the baseline model. Denote this interval ( m̄, m̄ + ∆ m̄ξ ,y, p ), where ∆ m̄ξ ,y, p
is the behavioral response of the marginal bunching individual among those with intertemporal
elasticity 1/ξ , income y, and who face price p. Further, let ḡ0 (m, ξ , y, p) denote the joint density
of mortgage sizes, intertemporal elasticities, incomes, and prices in the pre-notch scenario and
R R R
g0 (m) ≡ ξ y p ḡ0 (m, ξ , y, p) d p d y d ξ the unconditional mortgage size density. The amount
of bunching can then be expressed as
B=

Z Z Z Z
ξ

y

p

m̄+∆ m̄ξ ,y, p
m̄



ḡ0 (m, ξ , y, p)d md p d y d ξ ≈ g0 ( m̄)E ∆ m̄ξ ,y, p .

(2.9)

In this case, estimates of bunching and the counterfactual mortgage size distribution near the conforming limit allow us to back out the average change in mortgage amounts due to the interest rate
difference generated by the conforming loan limit.16

2.3. Data
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data on loan sizes and interest rates from two main
sources. The first is a proprietary data set of housing transactions from DataQuick (DQ), a private
vendor which collects the universe of deed transfers and property assessment records from municof mortgage sizes be smooth. Any model for which these conditions hold would generate equation (2.8).
16
Kleven and Waseem (2013) show a directly analogous result in the context of earnings responses to notched income
tax schedules.
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ipalities across the U.S. These data serve as our primary source of information on loan size. The
second data source consists of loan-level records collected by Lender Processing Services (LPS) and
contains extensive information on interest rates, borrower characteristics, and loan terms, which
we use to estimate the jumbo-conforming spread. A brief description of each data source and our
sample selection procedures is given below.
2.3.1. DataQuick
Each record in the DQ data set represents a single transaction and contains information on the
price, location, and physical characteristics of the house, as well as the loan amounts on up to three
loans used to finance the purchase. We restrict the sample to include only transactions of singlefamily homes with positive first loan amounts that took place within metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) in California between 1997 and 2007. We use data from California because that is where
the information from DataQuick is most reliable, particularly for identifying when multiple loans
were used to finance a purchase. In addition, because average house prices in California are higher
than in other states, we expect that the differences between the typical transaction and one financed
with a loan near the conforming limit will be less stark in California than in other parts of the
country.
We limit our time frame to the period between 1997 and 2007 for several reasons. First, the LPS
data that we use to estimate the jumbo-conforming spread are most comprehensive from the mid1990s on. Second, we want to ensure that the conforming limit was being set in a consistent way
across all years in the sample. Until 2007, a single conforming limit was set annually according
to a formula and was imposed uniformly across all of the lower 48 states. However, after the
GSEs were taken into government conservatorship in 2008, the standards for determining the
conforming limit were changed in several ways, including a provision that allows it to vary across
different metropolitan areas.
The final reason we avoid using post-2007 data is that there were significant changes to the structure
of the mortgage market during the financial crisis that could potentially confound our analysis.
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For example, the jumbo securitization market almost completely dried up during this period,
which lead to a sharp reduction in the number of jumbo loans originated and a large rise in the
jumbo-conforming spread (Fuster and Vickery, 2013). We limit our sample period to years before
2007 in order to avoid conflating the reduction in supply of jumbo loans during the housing bust
with the demand-side response to the conforming limit that we are most interested in. Finally, we
drop all loans originated from October through December, since banks may hold such loans in
their portfolios until the conforming limit changes in January (Fuster and Vickery, 2013).17 These
restrictions leave us with a primary estimation sample of approximately 2.7 million transactions
across 26 MSAs. Summary statistics for this sample and the sub-sample with first loan amounts
within $50,000 of the conforming limit are reported in Appendix Table A.6.
2.3.2. LPS
The primary disadvantage of the DQ data set for studying mortgages is that it does not record interest rates and lacks important information on borrower characteristics, such as credit scores and
debt-to-income ratios. Consequently, we turn to data from LPS to estimate the jumbo-conforming
spread, as well as interest rates on second mortgages taken out at closing. The LPS data are at the
loan level and run from 1997 to the present, covering approximately two-thirds of the residential
mortgage market.18 The data contain extensive information on mortgage terms and borrower
characteristics, as well as geographic identifiers down to the zip code level. We focus on first mortgage originations for home purchases and apply the same set of restrictions described above for the
DQ data, in particular the limitations to California and the first nine months of each year between
1997 and 2007. Descriptive statistics for the full LPS sample the sub-sample of loans with first loan
amounts within $50,000 of the conforming limit are reported in Appendix Table A.7.
17

We also drop extreme outliers in appraisal value or LTV ratio.
Although data are available from earlier years, they are less comprehensive and the loans have higher average “seasoning,” meaning that it takes longer after origination for them to appear in the data set (Fuster and Vickery, 2013). If
loans that are quickly prepaid or foreclosed on never appear, seasoned data may be less representative of the universe
of loans.
18
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2.4. Empirical Methodology
2.4.1. Estimating the Behavioral Response to the Conforming Limit
In Section 2.2, we showed that the behavioral response to the conforming loan limit can be derived
from estimates of the amount of bunching and the counterfactual mass at the limit. To estimate
these quantities, we follow the approach taken by Kleven and Waseem (2013).
Since we are primarily interested in estimating the behavioral response in percentage terms, we
first take logarithms of the loan amounts. We then center each loan in our data set at the (log)
conforming limit in the year that the loan was originated. A value of zero thus represents a loan
size exactly equal to the conforming limit while all other values represent (approximate) percentage deviations from the conforming limit. We group these normalized loan amounts into bins
centered at the values m j , with j = −J , . . . , L, . . . , 0, . . . , U , . . . , J , and count the number of loans
in each bin, n j . To obtain estimates of bunching and the counterfactual loan size distribution, we
define an excluded region around the conforming limit, [mL , mU ], such that mL < 0 < mU and
fit the following regression to the count of loans in each bin
nj =

p
X

βi (m j )i +

i=0

U
X



γk 1 mk = m j + ε j .

(2.10)

k=L

The first term on the right hand side is a p-th degree polynomial in loan size and the second term
is a set of dummy variables for each bin in the excluded region. Our estimate of the counterfactual
distribution is given by the predicted values of this regression omitting the effect of the dummies
in the excluded region. That is, letting n̂ j denote the estimated counterfactual number of loans in
bin j , we can write
n̂ j =

p
X

β̂i (m j )i .

(2.11)

i=0

Bunching is then estimated as the difference between the observed and counterfactual bin counts
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in the excluded region at and to the left of the conforming loan limit,
B̂ =

0 
X
j =L

0
 X
n j − n̂ j =
γ̂ j ,

(2.12)

j =L

while the amount of missing mass due to bunching is M̂ =

PU 
j >0

 P
n j − n̂ j = Uj>0 γ̂ j .

ˆ the empirical analogue of ∆ m̄ from equation (2.8).
The parameter of primary interest is ∆ m̄,
This parameter represents the average behavioral response of the marginal bunching individual
measured as a percentage deviation from the conforming limit. Following the theory, we calculate
it as
ˆ=
∆ m̄

where gˆ0 ( m̄) =

 
j =L n̂ j /

P0

m0 −mL
L

B̂
,
gˆ0 ( m̄)

(2.13)

is the estimated counterfactual density of loans in the ex-

cluded region at and to the left of the conforming loan limit. Intuitively, if the ratio of bunched
to counterfactual loans is large, the existence of the limit has a large effect on the behavior determining the observed distribution of loan amounts. We calculate standard errors for all estimated
parameters using a bootstrap procedure, as in Chetty et al. (2011).19
There are two key identifying assumptions necessary for equation (2.13) to provide a valid estimate
of the behavioral response to the conforming limit. The first is that the counterfactual loan size
distribution that would exist in the absence of the limit is smooth. That is, any spike in the loan
size distribution at the conforming limit must be solely attributable to the existence of the limit
and not some other factor. We test for violations of this assumption below by examining how the
distribution of loan sizes changes when the conforming limit moves from one year to another. The
second assumption is that households can be uniquely indexed by their counterfactual choice of
mortgage size in the absence of the limit—that is, there is a well-defined marginal buncher. While
this assumption is fundamentally untestable, most reasonable models of mortgage choice would
At each iteration (k) of the bootstrap loop we draw with replacement from the estimated errors, ε̂ j , in equation
(2.10) to generate a new set of bin counts, n kj . We then re-estimate bunching using these new counts. Our estimate of
ˆ is the standard deviation of the estimated ∆ m̄
ˆ k s. The same procedure produces standard
the standard error for ∆ m̄
errors for all the other bunching parameters that we report.
19
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imply such a result.
In order to estimate the components of equation (2.13), there are several free parameters that we
must choose: the bin width (

m0 −mL
L

), the order of the polynomial ( p), and the location of the

lower and upper limits of the excluded region (mL and mU ). Following Kleven and Waseem (2013),
we choose the upper limit to minimize the difference between bunching (B̂) and missing mass to
the right of the notch in the excluded region (M̂ ).20 For the other three parameters, our preferred
specification uses 1-percent bins, a 13th-degree polynomial, and sets mL = 0.025. We prefer this
specification because, among the parameter configurations we considered, it yields the smallest
difference between B̂ and M̂ in the sample that pools across all years and loan types.21
2.4.2. Estimating the Jumbo-Conforming Spread
In order to convert our estimate of borrowers’ responsiveness to the conforming loan limit into an
elasticity, we also need to estimate the magnitude of the change in rates that borrowers face. This
exercise is complicated by the fact that there is a large class of borrowers who, as we demonstrate,
bunch precisely at the conforming limit. These borrowers may have unobserved characteristics
that are correlated with interest rates and that might bias an estimate of the jumbo-conforming
spread based on a simple comparison of observed mortgage rates. However, this concern is not
as grave as it may first appear. In particular, we are aided greatly by the fact that mortgage rates
are typically determined based on a well defined set of borrower and loan characteristics that are
all readily observable in the LPS data. To the extent that we are able to fully control for these
characteristics, our estimates of the jumbo-conforming spread should be relatively close to the
true interest rate differential facing the average borrower in our sample.
20

This is done using the following iterative procedure: First, initialize mU at a small amount (mU0 ) near the limit
and estimate bunching (B̂ 0 ), missing mass (M̂ 0 ), and the difference between the two, (B̂ 0 − M̂ 0 ). Next, increase mU by
a small amount to mU1 and calculate the difference B̂ 1 − M̂ 1 . We repeat this process until B̂ k − M̂ k > B̂ k−1 − M̂ k−1 , at
which point we stop and take mUk−1 to be the upper limit of the excluded region.
21
It is worth noting, however, that the estimated missing mass from the right of the limit need not be exactly equal to
the number of bunched loans since the procedure we use to estimate bunching ignores both extensive margin responses
and the leftward shift of the distribution outside of the excluded region generated by intensive margin responses among
those who do not bunch. If these types of responses have a sizable effect on the observed loan size distribution, then
choosing parameters to minimize the difference between bunching and missing mass could lead to bias in the estimated
behavioral response. To account for this, we explore robustness to various choices of the underlying parameters, which
ˆ to our preferred specification.
often yield estimates of B̂ that are smaller than M̂ but give very similar estimates of ∆ m̄
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With this in mind, our main approach to estimating the jumbo-conforming spread follows that
of Sherlund (2008), who exploits the sharp discontinuity at the conforming loan limit while also
controlling semiparametrically for all other relevant determinants of interest rates. Of course, in
a finite sample, it is not possible to control completely for all observed determinants of interest
rates and there may be some unobserved characteristics which our controls are unable to capture.
To account for this, we also estimate models which use a discontinuous function of the value of
the home as an instrumental variable (IV) for jumbo loan status, as described in detail below.
Unlike Sherlund (2008), who uses an analogue to local linear regression, we incorporate the semiparametrics in standard ordinary least squares regressions. We do this both to reduce the computational burden and to allow for a straightforward comparison with the IV estimates. In particular,
we estimate variants of the following equation




ri,t = α z(i),t + βJi ,t + f J =0 mi,t + f J =1 mi,t + s LT V LT Vi,t + s DT I DT Ii,t


+ s F I C O F I C Oi,t + P M Ii,t + P Pi,t + g T E RM i,t + εi,t ,

(2.14)

where ri,t is the interest rate on loan i originated at time t , α is a zip-code by time fixed effect,
and J is a dummy variable for whether the loan amount exceeds the conforming limit. In the
spirit of a regression discontinuity design, we interact J with cubic polynomials in the size of the


mortgage separately on either side of the conforming limit ( f J =0 mi ,t and f J =1 mi,t ) in order
to control for any underlying continuous relationship between loan size and interest rates. In
addition, we include splines in the loan-to-value ratio (LT V ), debt-to-income ratio (DT I ), and
credit score (F I C O) as well as fixed effects for whether the borrower took out private mortgage
insurance (P M I ) and if the mortgage had a prepayment penalty (P P ). Finally, we also control
flexibly for the length of the mortgage (T E RM ).22 The coefficient of interest is β, which provides
a valid estimate of the jumbo-conforming spread under the assumption that we have successfully
controlled for borrower selection around the limit.
22

The exact specifications are described in the results section below.
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Instrumenting for Jumbo Loan Status
If there are other unobserved determinants of interest rates which are also correlated with jumbo
loan status, then estimates of β based on equation (2.14) will produce biased estimates of the true
jumbo-conforming spread. To gauge the extent to which this may be affecting our results, we
also estimate a version of equation (2.14) in which we instrument for jumbo loan status using a
discontinuous function of the value of the home, following Kaufman (2012).23
When making a loan, lenders typically require an independent appraisal as a check that the agreed
transaction price accurately reflects the value of the home. The “value” in the denominator of
the LTV ratio is then set as the lesser of the appraised value and the transaction price. Many
buyers purchase a home with an LTV of exactly 80 percent, both because it is a longstanding
norm and because exceeding 80 percent typically requires purchasing private mortgage insurance.
Consequently, if the value of the home is just under the conforming loan limit multiplied by
1.25, then a buyer is substantially less likely to take out a jumbo loan than if the value is just over
this limit. Figure 2.3A confirms this, showing that the fraction of loans that are jumbos jumps
discontinuously as the value crosses 125 percent of the conforming limit.
This fact suggests an approach in which we instrument for Ji,t in equation (2.14) with whether the
value of the home falls above or below 1.25 m̄, focusing in particular on a narrow range around
the discontinuity. The key to the exogeneity of this instrument is that, compared with their actual
loan amount, borrowers are less able to finely control the transaction price and have essentially no
control over the exact outcome of their appraisal. As a result, some borrowers who do not want
to or are not able to deviate from the 80 percent norm may be induced into or out of jumbo-loan
status based on factors which are not entirely within their control. As supporting evidence for
this assumption, Figure 2.3B shows that the distribution of house values around 125 percent of
the conforming limit is quite smooth, in contrast with the distribution of loan amounts around
the conforming limit itself, as in Figure 2.1B.24
23
Adelino et al. (2012) and Fuster and Vickery (2013) employ similar strategies to look at the effects of the conforming
limit on house prices and on mortgage supply, respectively.
24
Kaufman (2012), who uses the same LPS data that we do, motivates this instrument only in terms of a borrower’s
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This IV approach is not a panacea, however. As Kaufman (2012) notes, it identifies a local average
treatment effect among borrowers who choose to increase their first mortgage balance in order to
keep their LTV constant despite their home value being just above 125 percent of the conforming
limit. But in this paper, we are interested in estimating the average elasticity among the entire population of borrowers with counterfactual loan amounts above the limit. If there is heterogeneity
in the jumbo-conforming spread, then those facing the lowest spread will be the most likely to
take out a larger loan in response to a higher home value. Consequently, it is likely that the IV
estimates provide a lower bound on the average spread in the population. Given the clear difficulty of estimating the “true” jumbo-conforming spread in the full population of borrowers, our
preferred approach is to estimate the spread using both techniques and present a range of plausible
elasticities.

2.5. Bunching and Jumbo-Conforming Spread Estimates
The next three sections present our primary empirical results. We begin in this section by presenting graphical evidence documenting bunching at the conforming loan limit as well as formal
estimates of bunching and the behavioral response to the jumbo-conforming spread. We then
present a series of estimates of the magnitude of the jumbo-conforming spread which we combine
with the bunching estimates in Section 2.6 to calculate elasticities. In Section 2.6.3, we conclude
with a discussion on the ways in which borrowers appear to be adjusting their loan sizes.
2.5.1. Bunching at the Conforming Limit
Results for all Borrowers
As a starting point for our empirical analysis, Figure 2.4 plots both the observed (log) loan size
distribution and the counterfactual distribution estimated from the bunching procedure using all
available loans in the DQ sample. Although our estimation is carried out in the full sample, in
inability to control the appraisal amount. His motivation is a bit problematic, because the variable that both he and
we use is actually the minimum of the appraisal amount and the transaction price, as noted above. In principle, this
variable could be contaminated if buyers can manipulate transaction prices around 125 percent of the conforming
limit in response to differences in the jumbo-conforming spread, perhaps through negotiation with sellers. In practice,
however, Figure 2.3B strongly suggests that there is no such selection and that the exclusion restriction is valid.
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this (and subsequent) figures we have narrowed our focus to the range of loans which fall within
50 percent of the conforming limit. The x-axis shows the difference between the log loan amount
and the log conforming limit in the year the loan was originated, so that zero is the limit itself and
each bin represents roughly a 1 percent incremental deviation from the limit. The y-axis on the
right indicates the number of loans in each bin, while the y-axis on the left indicates the fraction
of all loans represented by that number.
The connected black line plots the histogram of (log) loan size, which exhibits a sharp peak at the
limit. This bin contains approximately 100,000 loans, representing 4 percent of the entire sample,
which is roughly four times as many loans as in the bin immediately to the left. The black line also
shows a clear deficit of loans to the right of the limit, with the first bin containing only about half
as many loans as the bin immediately to the left of the limit. The heavy dashed red line shows the
fitted polynomial that we take as our counterfactual loan size distribution. The vertical dashed
gray lines represent the lower (mL ) and upper (mH ) limits of the excluded region, as defined in
Section 2.4.1.
The estimated number of loans bunching at the limit is reported in the figure and is calculated as
the sum of the differences between the black and red lines in each bin in the excluded region at
and to the left of the conforming limit. As the plot makes clear, bunching is remarkably sharp;
almost all of the approximately 84,000 “extra” loans in this region are in the bin that contains the
ˆ the behavioral response to the conforming limit, is also reported
limit itself. Our estimate of ∆ m̄,
in the figure. It implies that the average marginal bunching borrower reduces his loan balance by
roughly 3.8 percent.
The first column of Table 2.1 repeats these estimates along with their standard errors and several other parameters estimated during the bunching procedure. As another way of gauging the
magnitude of the response, the third row of Table 2.1 reports a measure of the “excess mass” at the
conforming limit. We calculate this as the ratio of the number of loans bunching at the limit to the
number of loans which would have been there in its absence. The estimate implies that there are
roughly 3.78 times more loans at the conforming limit than would have otherwise been expected.
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All of these parameters are precisely estimated.
In the last row of Table 2.1, we also report the upper limit of the excluded region used in estimation
(mH ). If there were no extensive margin responses (borrowers leaving the market entirely) then
this number would provide an estimate of the largest percent reduction in mortgage size among
bunching individuals. That is, no individual with a counterfactual loan size more than mH percent
larger than the conforming limit would be induced to bunch. Given extensive margin responses,
it is possible that our estimate of mH differs from the true cutoff value. Nonetheless, it provides
a useful gauge of the magnitude of behavioral responses among those who reduce their mortgage
sizes the most. The estimate implies an upper bound on behavioral responses of roughly 16 percent, meaning that nearly all of the borrowers bunching at the conforming limit would have had
mortgages that were less than 16 percent larger than the limit had it not existed.
While the bunching evidence reported in Figure 2.4 is quite stark, it is interesting to note that
there are still a number of borrowers who locate just above the conforming limit despite the
large marginal interest rate associated with doing so. There are three potential explanations for
this behavior: inelastic preferences, heterogeneous costs of adjusting first mortgage balances, or
borrower-level differences in the magnitude of the jumbo-conforming spread that lead some borrowers to face no change in price at the conforming limit. In our analysis of the magnitude of the
jumbo-conforming spread we were able to largely rule out the third explanation. We find no evidence of heterogeneity in the interest rate spread across borrower credit scores or the distribution
of zip-code level median income, median house prices, or price-to-income ratios. This suggests
that the borrowers who locate in the region just above the conforming limit are likely doing so as
a result of either inelastic preferences or adjustment costs.
In the context of income taxes, Kleven and Waseem (2013) are able to distinguish between the role
of preferences and adjustment costs using the fact that a notch can sometimes create a dominated
region in which no wage earner, regardless of tax elasticity, would choose to locate in the absence of
adjustment costs. By counting the number of wage earners observed in the dominated region they
are able to back out an estimate of adjustment costs. Unfortunately, we cannot perform a similar
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exercise here because there is no such dominated region in our setting. In the terminology of
Kleven and Waseem (2013), the jumbo-conforming spread creates a “downward notch” where, for
any finite loan amount above the limit, there exists a first mortgage demand elasticity sufficiently
close to zero such that some borrower would be willing to take out that loan. It is therefore not
possible to estimate the magnitude of any potential adjustment costs in this setting. Because of
this, it is important to note that the elasticities we estimate are necessarily “reduced form,” in
the sense that they incorporate the effect of adjustment costs and are not driven entirely by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution alone.
Finally, as noted above, one of the key assumptions necessary for bunching to identify behavioral
responses is that the counterfactual loan size distribution be smooth. While there is no way to
directly test this assumption, one way to evaluate its plausibility is to examine what happens to the
empirical distribution of loan sizes as the conforming limit moves from one year to the next. If the
conforming limit is the only thing causing bunching, then bunching should track the movement
of the conforming limit, and the distribution should be smooth at previous and future conforming
limits. Figure 2.5 plots the empirical loan size distribution separately for the years 2000, 2002, and
2004.25 At any given nominal loan amount, the distribution appears to be smooth except in the
year for which that loan amount serves as the conforming limit. While not definitive, this result
strongly supports the counterfactual smoothness assumption.
Fixed versus Adjustable Rate Mortgages
In addition to looking at the effect of the conforming limit on overall loan size, recent work by
both Fuster and Vickery (2013) and Kaufman (2012) draws attention to several stylized facts that
make it particularly interesting to investigate heterogeneity in the response by type of loan.26 In
particular, these authors document a sizable and sharp decline in the share of fixed-rate mortgages
(FRMs) relative to adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) precisely at the conforming limit. We repli25

We avoid plotting consecutive years to preserve the clarity of the picture, but the results hold at any horizon.
In the appendix, we also examine heterogeneity by classifying borrowers by race and income. We find that lowincome or minority borrowers are substantially less prone to bunching at the limit than high-income or non-minority
borrowers.
26
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cate this stylized fact in Figure 2.6 using our own sample of loans from DataQuick. Using the same
1 percent bins as before, this figure plots the share of loans that are FRMs as a function of loan size
relative to the conforming limit. To the left of the limit, the FRM share declines gradually as the
loan amount increases, reaching roughly 55 percent just below the limit. It then spikes to about 75
percent at the limit before falling to 20 percent immediately to the right. Beyond the conforming
limit, the share then rises, eventually reaching a plateau of about 35 percent.
This drop in the FRM share is not a coincidence. Fixed-rate mortgages are generally estimated
to have a larger jumbo-conforming spread relative to ARMs due to the fact that their returns are
much more vulnerable to interest rate risk.27 Since the FRM share well to the right of the limit
is substantially lower the FRM share to the left of the limit, a quick glance at Figure 2.6 might
suggest an extensive margin response. That is, in response to the higher jumbo spread for FRMs,
some jumbo borrowers may choose to substitute toward ARMs.
In contrast, we argue that the change in the FRM share at the conforming limit occurs because
more FRM borrowers than ARM borrowers bunch at the limit, without switching loan type. To
show this, we separately estimate bunching for both fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages. If
the drop in FRM share at the limit is driven primarily by borrowers switching to ARMs, then we
should expect to see both a downward shift in the observed distribution of FRMs relative to its
counterfactual immediately to the right of the limit and a concomitant upward shift in the ARM
distribution.
Figure 2.7A and Figure 2.7B show the results from this exercise for FRMs and ARMs, respectively.
The standard errors and additional bunching parameters are also reported separately for each loan
type in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.1. While Figure 2.7A shows a substantial downward shift in the
FRM distribution to the right of the limit, Figure 2.7B shows no corresponding upward shift in the
ARM distribution. In fact, much like in the figures for the FRM and combined samples, the ARM
27

We replicate this well-documented difference in spreads using our own sample of loans from LPS in Section 2.5.2.
Since jumbo loans are harder to unload onto the secondary mortgage market, originators will demand a higher interest
rate on jumbo FRMs relative to jumbo ARMs in order to compensate them for the additional risk they bear by having
to hold the loans in portfolio.
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distribution features a region of missing mass immediately to the right of the limit. Moreover, in
our preferred specification, the missing mass for each type of loan is roughly equal to the mass of
that type of loan bunching at the limit.28
While we do not believe that our results invalidate any of the conclusions drawn by Fuster and
Vickery (2013) or Kaufman (2012), they do illuminate the fact that perhaps the most intuitive
channel for the drop in the FRM share above the limit—substitution between FRMs and ARMs—
is not the correct one. With this in mind, for the remainder of the paper we will present estimates
for FRMs and ARMs separately.
2.5.2. Jumbo-Conforming Spread
To convert the behavioral responses estimated from bunching into elasticities, we next need to
obtain an estimate of the interest rate differential at the limit. Table 2.2 presents estimates of the
jumbo-conforming spread, following the strategies discussed in Section 2.4.2. We estimate the
spread using OLS and IV for fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages separately, with four different
specifications each. All of the specifications include controls for the distance to the conforming
limit (linear, quadratic, and cubic terms) interacted with the jumbo loan indicator variable, as
well as controls for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, missing DTI ratio,
FICO credit score, missing FICO score, whether the loan includes private mortgage insurance
(PMI), and whether the loan has a prepayment penalty. They also include zip-code by month
fixed effects and fixed effects for standard loan lengths, such as 15, 30, and 40 years, as well as a
linear term to capture the effects of nonstandard lengths.
Across the columns of the table, the four specifications are: (1) a baseline, using all available data,
with linear controls for the LTV and DTI ratios and the FICO score; (2) the same specification
replacing the linear controls for LTV, DTI and FICO with more flexible cubic B-splines; (3) the
same specification as in (2) but with a sample limited to loans within $50,000 of the conforming
28
Of course, since we only observe average responses, it is still possible that some borrowers choose ARMs over FRMs
because of the limit, particularly if there is heterogeneity in the costs of ARMs and FRMs within the population. But
since the figures do not suggest any noticeable aggregate response, an offsetting group of borrowers would have to be
choosing FRMs over ARMs because of the limit.
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limit; and (4) the same specification in (2) but with a sample limited to loans within $10,000 of the
limit.
For FRMs, applying least squares yields estimates of the jumbo-conforming spread that are tightly
clustered around 17 to 18 basis points and precisely estimated, regardless of the specification. These
estimates are similar to Sherlund’s (2008) estimate of 22 basis points, despite our use of a simpler
estimation technique and a different data set covering a smaller geographic area and a shorter time
horizon.29
As discussed above, the OLS specifications do not control for borrower selection on unobservables
around the conforming limit, which is a particular concern given the substantial bunching that
we have just highlighted. To address this potential selection issue, the row labeled “IV” presents
estimates of the spread when we instrument for the jumbo indicator with an indicator for whether
the value of the house exceeds 125 percent of the the conforming limit. As would be expected, these
estimates are somewhat less precise than the OLS results but are still significantly different than
zero at conventional levels. The estimates run from 10 to 13 basis points and are uniformly smaller
than the OLS results, possibly reflecting either borrower selection or the fact that the IV approach
estimates a local average treatment effect among a population of borrowers who may face a lower
spread.30 Reassuringly, these estimates are quite similar to Kaufman’s (2012) estimate of 10 basis
points, using essentially the same technique but a different sample of loans.31
Our estimates of the jumbo-conforming spread for initial ARM rates, presented in the lower half of
Table 2.2, are considerably more noisy and merit further study. The OLS estimates are uniformly
negative—that is, jumbo loans have lower rates than conforming loans—and the negative coefficient
gets bigger as the sample becomes more focused on loans near the limit. It is quite unlikely that this
is an accurate representation of pricing of ARMs above and below the conforming limit. Indeed,
29
Specifically, Sherlund (2008) uses data from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey that cover the entire U.S. from 1993
to 2007. We use LPS data from California only from 1997 to 2007.
30
Regressing the jumbo indicator on the indicator for whether the value exceeds 125 percent of the conforming limit,
including all of the other covariates as controls—that is, the first stage of the IV—yields a coefficient of around 0.2, with
slight variation depending on the specification. The instrument is quite strong; in all cases, the standard errors on this
coefficient are tiny and the F-statistics very large.
31
Kaufman (2012) uses LPS data that cover the entire U.S. from 2003 to 2007.
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we saw in the previous section that some ARM borrowers are bunching at the limit, albeit fewer
than in the FRM market. Some aspect of the loans must be leading those borrowers to prefer
loans at the limit to loans above it. One possibility is that the negative coefficients result from
selection. The “IV” row uses the same instrument as in the FRM results. Here we see coefficients
that range from about zero, in the first two columns, to 7 and 4 basis points, in columns 3 and 4.
The standard errors are too large to rule out a negative spread, although the point estimates are
comparable to other estimates in the literature that are also close to zero.32
It is somewhat surprising that addressing borrower selection around the limit using the IV specification produces more positive coefficients in the ARM case and less positive coefficients in the
FRM case. Given the observed bunching at the limit among ARM borrowers, it is also surprising
to find no strong support for a positive jumbo-conforming spread among ARM loans. While we
control for many relevant aspects of mortgage contracts, such as prepayment penalties and private
mortgage insurance, it is possible that there are other unobserved factors that are more relevant
for ARMs than for FRMs and which could be biasing these results. Consequently, the remaining
discussion in this paper, including the calculation of elasticities, focuses on the results for FRMs.

2.6. Elasticities
2.6.1. Calculating Elasticities with a Notched Budget Constraint
As discussed above, the higher mortgage rate for loans above the conforming limit creates a “notch”
in which the average price jumps discontinuously, rather than a “kink” in which the marginal
price changes discontinuously but the average price is continuous. That is, borrowers must pay
the higher interest rate on the entire balance of the loan, not just the balance in excess of the
limit. As a result, it is not appropriate to calculate an elasticity using our estimate of the jumboconforming spread as the denominator. Instead, we follow an approach similar to the “reducedform approximation” suggested by Kleven and Waseem (2013). The idea is to construct a measure
32

Kaufman (2012) uses the IV approach to estimate an effect of jumbo status on initial ARM rates of about negative 5
basis points. Fuster and Vickery (2013) use data from surveys of loan officers, which should in principle hold borrower
characteristics constant, and find effects on ARM rates of 0 to 10 basis points between mid-2006 and mid-2007.

85

of the implicit marginal cost facing the marginal bunching borrower as a result of the conforming
limit. We can measure this cost either in terms of the monthly payment or the interest rate itself.
Focusing first on the monthly payment, let P (m, r ) denote the monthly payment on a 30-year
mortgage of amount m at fixed interest rate r .33 The total increase in payment generated by the
conforming limit for a loan of size m > m̄, is equal to
P (m, r̂ + ∆r̂ ) − P ( m̄, r̂ ) ,

(2.15)

where m̄ is the conforming limit, r̂ is the estimated conforming rate, and ∆r̂ is the estimated jump
in the interest rate at the limit (the jumbo-conforming spread).
The marginal increase in payment per dollar of the loan, averaged over the distance from the limit
to m, is then
P ∗ (m) =
Letting P 0 ( m̄) =

P ( m̄,r̂ )
m̄

P (m, r̂ + ∆r̂ ) − P ( m̄, r̂ )
.
m − m̄

(2.16)

be the (constant) marginal payment per dollar of the loan for loans made

at the conforming interest rate r̂ , we can then define
εP =



log P ∗



ˆ
∆ m̄

ˆ − log (P 0 ( m̄))
m̄ + ∆ m̄

(2.17)

as the elasticity of mortgage demand with respect to the implicit marginal increase in monthly
ˆ
payment implied by our estimate of the behavioral response, ∆ m̄.
While the monthly payment is an intuitive measure of the cost of a mortgage, the correct theoretical price per dollar of the loan is the underlying interest rate itself. For m > m̄, define r ∗ (m)
such that
(m − m̄) · r ∗ (m) = m · (r̂ + ∆r̂ ) − m̄ · r̂ .
33

We use a standard formula to compute the monthly payment: P (m, r ) = m
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(2.18)
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This r ∗ (m) is the implicit interest rate on the loan amount in excess of the conforming limit
(m − m̄), taking into account the jump in the overall rate. Solving explicitly for r ∗ (m) yields
r ∗ (m) = r̂ + ∆r̂ + ∆r̂ ·

m̄
.
m − m̄

(2.19)

Equation (2.19) makes clear that r ∗ (m) is equal to the jumbo rate (r̂ + ∆r̂ ) plus a term that is
increasing in the jumbo-conforming spread (∆r̂ ) and decreasing in the size of the loan relative to
the conforming limit (m − m̄).34 For loans just above the limit this additional term is very large,
reflecting the fact that the higher interest rate on jumbo loans is applied to the full balance of the
loan.35
As with the monthly payment, given an estimate of r ∗ (m), we can then calculate the (semiˆ
)elasticity of (first) mortgage demand implied by our estimate of ∆ m̄,
ε sr =

ˆ
∆ m̄

.

ˆ − r̂
r ∗ m̄ + ∆ m̄


(2.20)

ˆ is estimated in logs, so it represents the approximate percentage change in mortgage
As before, ∆ m̄
demand induced by the conforming limit, while the denominator measures the level change in
interest rates.36
The expressions given by equations (2.17) and (2.20) represent two different measures of the magnitude of borrower responses to interest rates. The two measures are not equivalent, both because
of the nonlinearity of the denominators and because the monthly payment is a nonlinear function
of the interest rate. Both measures are potentially useful. While the rate itself is the correct theoretical cost of borrowing, it is likely that many borrowers use the monthly payment to compare
34



ˆ above the limit in approximate percentage terms, equation (2.19) simplifies to r ∗ m̄ + ∆ m̄
ˆ =
For a loan that is ∆ m̄
∆r̂

r̂ + ∆r̂ + ˆ .
∆ m̄
35
For example, in 2006 the conforming limit was $417,000 and average interest rate on loans made just below that
was 6.38 percent. Given our OLS estimate of the jumbo-conforming spread of roughly 17 basis points, this implies an
average rate of 6.55 percent for a loan made just above the limit. Thus, the marginal interest rate on the last $1,000 of a
$418,000 loan originated in 2006 was approximately r ∗ (418, 000) = 6.55 + 0.20 × 417 = 89.95 percent!
36
We present our interest rate estimates as semi-elasticities because it is a bit more intuitive to consider changes in
interest rates in basis or percentage points.
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different loans or to compare owning to the monthly cost of renting (Attanasio et al., 2008).
2.6.2. Estimated Elasticities of First Mortgage Demand
The first two columns of Table 2.3 report the semi-elasticities we calculate for a range of estimates
ˆ and the jumbo-conforming spread, ∆r̂ . The semi-elasticities and associated standard errors,
of ∆ m̄
calculated using the delta method, are shown in the lower-right portion of the table. Each semielasticity is calculated from the estimate of ∆r̂ reported at the top of that column and the estimate
ˆ at the beginning of that row.
of ∆ m̄
Our preferred estimate of bunching for FRMs from Table 2.1 (0.063) is shown in the middle row.
ˆ across a
The other two estimates (0.052 and 0.083) are the smallest and largest estimates of ∆ m̄
range of different options for the three parameters chosen ex ante: the bin width, the polynomial order, and the lower limit of the excluded region.37 They provide reasonable bounds on the
variation in the elasticity implied by these parameters. The jumbo-conforming spread estimates
are taken from column 3 of Table 2.2 and correspond to the OLS (column 1) and IV (column 2)
estimates, respectively.
The estimated semi-elasticities range from -0.015 to -0.053, with our preferred estimates in the
middle row at -0.022 and -0.031. The associated standard errors are relatively small, although those
using the noisier IV estimate of the jumbo-conforming spread are larger than those using the OLS
estimate. The semi-elasticities can be interpreted as the percentage change in the balance of a first
mortgage demanded in response to a 1 basis point increase in the interest rate. As an example, our
preferred estimates imply that an increase in the mortgage rate from 5 percent to 6 percent—100
basis points—would lead to a decline in first mortgage demand of 2 to 3 percent.
Columns 3 and 4 report the analogous elasticities with respect to the marginal monthly payment
ˆ and equivalent estimates of the jumbo-confirming spread,
for the same set of estimates of ∆ m̄
estimated in logs.38 The preferred estimates in the middle row are -0.27 using the OLS estimate of
37

We considered bin widths of 0.01, 0.025 and 0.05; polynomials of order 7, 9, 11, and 13; and lower limits of 0.025,
0.05, 0.075 and 0.1.
38
The log jumbo-conforming spread estimates are provided in Appendix Table A.9.
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the spread and -0.35 using the IV estimate, indicating that a one percent increase in payment leads
to about a third of a percent decline in mortgage demand.
2.6.3. Accounting for Second Mortgages
The elasticities reported in Table 2.3 tell us how much borrowers reduce their first mortgage balance in response to the jumbo-conforming spread, but they do not tell us how the borrowers
adjust. There are three primary channels through which a borrower can reduce the size of her
first mortgage, each of which have different implications for the interpretation of our main results. First, a borrower could simply bring more cash to the table, making a larger down payment
and taking out a smaller loan.39 Second, she could take out an additional mortgage for the amount
of debt desired in excess of the conforming limit. Finally, she could spend less on housing, which
(holding leverage constant) would lead her to take out a smaller mortgage.40
To measure the extent to which borrowers are using second mortgages to lower their first mortgage
balance, Figure 2.8 plots the number of transactions financed using second loans as a function of
the associated fixed-rate first mortgage value relative to the conforming limit. Consistent with the
notion that many of the bunching borrowers take out second mortgages, there is a sharp spike
in the number of transactions which are financed with two loans precisely at the limit. The plot
suggests that roughly 25,000 more second loans were taken out in the bin at the conforming limit
relative to the bin just below it, which provides a reasonable counterfactual. Combining this
with our estimate from Table 2.1 that about 70,000 FRM borrowers bunch at the limit suggests
that roughly 35 percent of FRM borrowers who bunch do so by taking out a second mortgage.
These borrowers are presumably shifting debt from their first mortgage onto their second, holding
combined LTV roughly constant while reducing their first-mortgage LTV.
The remaining 65 percent of “excess" borrowers must be either putting up more cash, or spending less on housing than they otherwise would. In the appendix, we attempt to further distin39

“Putting up more cash” could be accomplished in many ways, including taking money out of savings, reducing
current consumption, or taking out non-mortgage debt. We do not observe any data that would allow us to distinguish
between these cases.
40
This could happen either through substitution to a lower-quality home or through direct price negotiation with
the seller.
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guish between these two margins using back-of-the-envelop calculations involving the observed
first mortgage LTVs and combined LTVs at the conforming limit. These calculation suggest that
the 65 percent who do not take out second mortgages are likely putting up cash rather than buying cheaper houses. Regardless of how they adjust, however, the roughly two-thirds of borrowers
who bunch at the conforming limit without the use of a second mortgage must be reducing their
total mortgage debt.
Our bunching measure provides estimates of the mortgage demand elasticity for the marginal
bunching borrower, while the estimate of second mortgage use is for the average bunching borrower. Since the fraction of all bunching borrowers who take out a second mortgage is not necessarily the same as the fraction of marginal bunching borrowers who do so, we cannot definitively
solve for the response of total mortgage debt among the latter group. If we assume, however,
that the use of second mortgages is the same among the average and marginal bunchers, then we
can scale down our elasticity estimates by a factor of one-third to provide a rough estimate of the
effect of a change in rates on total mortgage debt. Specifically, multiplying our preferred first mortgage semi-elasticity estimates of -0.022 and -0.031 by two thirds yields total debt semi-elasticities
of about -0.015 and -0.021. That is, a one percentage point increase in rates should reduce total
mortgage debt by between 1.5 and 2 percent.
2.6.4. Economic Magnitudes and Interpretation
Are these estimates large or small? In an absolute sense, they appear to be quite small. For example,
during our sample period the average interest rate on a loan taken out just below the conforming
limit was approximately 6.5 percent.41 Our semi-elasticity estimates imply that a one percentage
point increase from that baseline (a 15 percent increase), leads to a reduction in total mortgage
debt of only 1.5–2 percent. This corresponds to an elasticity of only about 0.1–0.13.
Our finding of a relatively small intensive-margin behavioral response to changes in interest rates
41
The mean interest rate across all fixed-rate mortgages falling within $10,000 below the conforming limit in the LPS
data was 6.53 percent. Similarly, when we predict interest rates for everyone in our sample if they were to have taken
out a loan just below the conforming limit using the regression estimates we use to estimate the jumbo-conforming
spread, the mean predicted rate is approximately 6.6 percent.
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is inline with several other findings from the literature. For example, Fuster and Zafar (2014)
survey households about their mortgage choices under randomized hypothetical interest rate scenarios and find that their chosen downpayment fractions respond in a way that would imply even
smaller intensive-margin semi-elasticities ranging between 0.6 and 1.8. Several studies of behavioral responses to interest rate changes in other consumer credit markets have found similarly
small effects. For example, Attanasio et al. (2008) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) document small
responses to interest rate changes for auto loans and microcredit, respectively.
These small responses could be explained by the presence of other binding constraints that make
households less responsive to interest rates than they otherwise might be. For example, since both
mortgages and auto loans are tied to the purchase of a large durable and frequently require a down
payment, one explanation for the small responses we document here and those documented for
auto loans could be the shadow cost of equity financing (i.e. downpayment constraints). Another
possible explanation is the time frame over which households are able to adjust. Our results only
apply to the relatively short-term decision of how much debt to incur at origination. If households
are able to re-finance out of the higher jumbo rates after origination then the implied long-run
behavioral response to the jumbo-conforming spread may be larger. This would be consistent
with results from the literature suggesting that demand responses to interest rate changes are larger
when measured over longer horizons (Karlan and Zinman, 2014) or when there are more available
substitutes (Gross and Souleles, 2002).

2.7. Policy Application: GSE Guarantee Fee Increases
As noted in the introduction, the magnitude of borrower responses to changes in mortgage interest rates has important implications in several domains of economic policy. In this section, we
illustrate how our elasticity estimates could be used to gauge the potential effects of one recently
proposed policy change.
In February 2012, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) published its “Strategic Plan for
Enterprise Conservatorships," outlining the steps that the agency plans to take to fulfill its legal
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obligations as conservator for the GSEs. As part of this plan, the FHFA established a goal of
gradually reducing the dominant role that the GSEs currently play in the mortgage market. One
of the primary proposed mechanisms for achieving this goal is a series of increases in the GSEs’
guarantee fee (or “g-fee”) up to the level that “one might expect to see if mortgage credit risk was
borne solely by private capital" (FHFA, 2012).
The g-fee is the amount that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge mortgage lenders in order to cover
the costs associated with meeting credit obligations to investors in GSE mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). It is typically collected in two components: an upfront fee assessed as a fraction of the
balance of the loan at origination and a recurring annual fee equal to a fraction of the outstanding
principal balance remaining at the end of each year.42 The fee has risen several times in recent years,
both by Congressional mandate and as part of the first steps in implementing FHFA’s strategic
plan.
In December 2013 the FHFA announced plans to increase the recurring fee by an additional 10
basis points for all loans and to reduce the up-front fee by 25 basis points for loans originated in all
but four states.43 The FHFA estimated that the combined effect of these increases and decreases
would generate an overall average increase in the effective annual g-fee of roughly 11 basis points
(FHFA, 2013).44 A report by the FHFA Inspector General noted that “Significant guarantee fee
increases, under some scenarios, could result in higher mortgage borrowing costs and dampen
both consumer demand for housing and private sector interest in mortgage credit risk.”(FHFA
OIG, 2013).45
Our estimates of the interest rate elasticity of mortgage demand can be used to gauge the potential
42
In 2012, g-fees from single-family mortgages generated roughly $12.5 billion in revenue for the GSEs, up 12% from
the previous year (FHFA OIG, 2013).
43
The four states for which the up-front fee would not be reduced are Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey, and New
York. The fee would remain higher in these states to compensate for the greater costs associated with lengthy foreclosure
timelines there.
44
FHFA reports this 11 basis point number as the combined overall effect of an approximate 14 basis point increase
in the g-fee for 30-year mortgages and a 4 basis point increase for 15-year mortgages, on average across all Freddie and
Fannie loans.
45
The future of this plan remains uncertain, particularly after it was delayed by incoming director Mel Watt in
January 2014.
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magnitude of any reductions in mortgage borrowing resulting from the proposed g-fee increases.
To carry out this calculation we make three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
full 11 basis point increase in the g-fee would be passed through to borrowers in the form of higher
interest rates on conforming mortgages. Second, we assume that this increase in rates for conforming mortgages would not have any general equilibrium effects on interest rates for non-conforming
loans. Finally, we assume that our estimates of the total mortgage demand (semi)-elasticity of 1.5
to 2 apply at all points of the mortgage size distribution, not just at the conforming limit. Under
these assumptions, our estimates imply that the proposed increase in the g-fee would reduce the total dollar volume of fixed-rate conforming mortgage originations by roughly 0.17 to 0.22 percent
relative to what it otherwise would have been.
Under the same set of assumptions, we can also provide an estimate of the cumulative effects of gfee increases to date. Between 2006 and the first quarter of 2013, the g-fee rose from approximately
20 basis points to 50 basis points, with much of the rise occurring in two waves in 2012 (FHFA
OIG, 2013). Multiplying the 30 basis point differential by our elasticity implies a reduction in the
dollar volume of fixed-rate conforming mortgage originations of 0.45 to 0.60 percent.46

2.8. Conclusion
In this paper, we use techniques for estimating behavioral responses from bunching at budget constraint nonlinearities in order to estimate the effects of the conforming loan limit on first mortgage
demand. We combine these estimates with estimates of the jumbo-conforming spread to calculate
the interest rate (semi-)elasticity of mortgage demand. Our estimates imply that size of a borrowers first mortgage falls by between 2 and 3 percent in response to a 1 percentage point increase in
the interest rate. Accounting for the third of bunching borrowers who take out second mortgages
suggests that total mortgage demand falls by between 1.5 and 2 percent. Applying these elasticity
estimates to recently proposed increases in GSE guarantee fees implies a reduction in fixed-rate
46

While our elasticity is well suited to examining the direct intensive margin effects of these relatively small changes
in fees, we emphasize that we cannot draw any inference on more general questions, such as how high the fees would
need to rise to draw private capital back into this part of the MBS market, or what the effects of the fee increases would
be on extensive margin responses.
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conforming mortgage originations of approximately one-fifth of one percent. The implied cumulative effect of similar increases that have occurred over the past several years has been to reduce
originations by approximately one-half of one percent.
We conclude by pointing to three potentially useful avenues for future research. First, our estimates are necessarily limited by their context. A large number of salient factors, especially the
presence of adjustment costs and the availability of second mortgages, affect how borrowers respond to the limit and, in turn, our estimates of the demand elasticity. A better understanding of
the importance of these factors for our estimates is required before they can be applied to more
general policy questions. Second, our estimates abstract away from the potential effect of interest
rates on the extensive margin choice of whether to purchase a home or not. A full accounting of
the effect of interest rates on mortgage demand would need to incorporate this margin as well.
Finally, although we show in the appendix that there seem to be differential responses of minority
versus non-minority and high-income versus low-income borrowers, data limitations prevent us
from being able to fully investigate this heterogeneity. Painting a fuller picture of heterogeneity in
elasticities and adjustment costs may be as important as pinning down the overall average elasticity
of demand.
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TABLE 2.1
BUNCHING ESTIMATES BY LOAN T YPE

(1)
Combined

(2)
FRMs

(3)
ARMs

Bunched Loans (B̂)

84183.8
(2687.0)

68306.3
(1561.6)

16174.3
(1446.7)

ˆ
Behavioral Response (∆ m̄)

0.0378
(0.0018)

0.0627
(0.0025)

0.0144
(0.0014)

3.781
(0.175)

6.266
(0.253)

1.436
(0.141)

0.160
(0.028)

0.160
(0.021)

0.080
(0.012)

Excess Mass (B̂/

P0

Upper Limit (mH )

j =L n̂ j )

NOTE.—Each column reports the estimated number of loans bunching at the
conforming limit (B̂), the average (log) shift in mortgage balance in response
ˆ the exto the conforming limit among marginal bunching individuals (∆ m̄),
P
cess mass at the conforming limit (B̂/ 0j =L n̂ j ), and the upper limit of the excluded region used in estimation (mL ). Estimates are reported separately for the
combined sample of all loans (column 1), fixed-rate mortgages only (column 2),
and adjustable-rate mortgages only (column 3). Standard errors (in parentheses)
were calculated using the bootstrap procedure described in section 2.4.1.
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TABLE 2.2
JUMBO-CONFORMING SPREAD ESTIMATES, PERCENTAGE POINTS

(1)

(2)

Baseline

Splines

(3)
Within $50k
of CLL

(4)
Within $10k
of CLL

Fixed-Rate Mortgages
OLS
IV
Observations

0.179
(0.002)
0.107
(0.010)
1,061,738

0.182
(0.002)
0.121
(0.009)
1,061,738

0.171
(0.014)
0.118
(0.028)
263,641

0.172
(0.038)
0.126
(0.056)
87,617

Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
OLS
IV
Observations

-0.076
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.020)
692,233

-0.090
(0.009)
0.004
(0.019)
692,233

-0.299
(0.037)
0.074
(0.054)
157,779

-0.362
(0.083)
0.040
(0.109)
39,542

NOTE.—Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of jumbo-conforming spread using OLS and IV with
an indicator for home value being greater than 1.25 m̄ used as an instrument for jumbo-status, as described
in the text. Controls include distance to CLL (cubic), LTV ratio, DTI ratio, missing LTV and DTI ratios, FICO score, missing FICO score, PMI, prepayment penalty, and mortgage term, as well as month
by zip-code fixed effects. Column 1 includes linear effects of LTV and DTI ratios. Column 2 includes
cubic B-splines in LTV and DTI ratios, as well as FICO score. Columns 3 and 4 limit the sample to loans
near the CLL.
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TABLE 2.3
INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT ELASTICITIES OF MORTGAGE DEMAND, FRMS ONLY

(1)
(2)
Interest Rate Semi-Elasticity (ε sr )

(3)
(4)
Payment Elasticity (εP )

∆r̂

∆ log r̂

ˆ
∆ m̄

0.171
(0.014)

0.118
(0.028)

0.023
(0.002)

0.017
(0.005)

0.052
(0.003)
0.063
(0.003)
0.083
(0.004)

-0.015
(0.002)
-0.022
(0.002)
-0.037
(0.004)

-0.022
(0.005)
-0.031
(0.008)
-0.053
(0.013)

-0.188
(0.022)
-0.267
(0.028)
-0.445
(0.051)

-0.246
(0.064)
-0.351
(0.091)
-0.589
(0.156)

NOTE.—Table reports estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the interest rate semi-elasticity and monthly
payment elasticity of mortgage demand for a range of different jumbo-conforming spreads and behavioral responses
ˆ
estimated from bunching. Each cell reports the elasticity implied by the estimated (log) behavioral response (∆ m̄),
and corresponding jumbo-conforming spread estimated in percentage points (∆r̂ ) and in logs (∆ log r̂ ), respectively.
Standard errors for the bunching estimates were calculated using the bootstrap procedure described in section 2.4.1.
Standard errors for the elasticities were calculated using the delta method.
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CHAPTER 3 : The Role of Contagion in the Last American Housing Cycle
3.1. Introduction
One of the striking features of the recent U.S. housing cycle is its heterogeneity across markets.
Both the magnitudes and timing of price swings varied greatly across metropolitan areas (Sinai,
2012). Figure 3.1 plots the geography and timing of the start of housing booms at the metropolitan
area level from 1993 to 2009 based on estimates reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).1 The
top left panel marks the 15 primarily rust belt and interior markets that never boomed. The other
panels show that the remaining markets boomed at very different times over a nearly decade-long
period from 1997-2005 and that the timing of these booms was non-random. The housing boom
spread from what were initially highly concentrated areas on the two coasts, with the earliest
booms beginning between 1997-1999 in California and the mid-New England region. On the
west coast, housing booms eventually spread inland towards central California and to neighboring
states to the east and north. On the east coast, housing booms spread to other markets in New
England and then to neighboring regions, eventually reaching the majority of Florida markets by
2004 and 2005. These patterns are suggestive of spillover effects that disseminate positive housing
price shocks from one market to another.
In this paper we investigate whether such spillovers were an important element of the last American housing cycle and also directly test which mechanisms may have contributed to them. In
the financial economics literature, a spillover of this type is often referred to as contagion when
it is found following a negative shock to one or more countries or markets.2 While we focus on
spillovers from a positive shock in much of the paper, we use the terms spillover and contagion
interchangeably in order to emphasize the close intellectual linkage of our work with the analysis
1
They define the beginning of a metropolitan area’s housing boom by the quarter in which there is a structural
break (a discrete positive jump in this case) in the market’s house price appreciation rate. This methodology and the
rationale behind it are discussed more fully below in Section 3.2.
2
See Forbes (2012) for an excellent recent review of that literature, and Dungey et al. (2005) for a more technical
analysis of the challenges involved in convincingly estimating contagion or spillover effects. Previous work on financial
market contagion includes studies of the 1987 U.S. stock market crash (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Lee and Kim, 1993),
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996), and the Hong Kong stock market and Asian currency crisis
of 1997 (Corsetti et al., 2005).
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of contagion in financial economics. We define contagion as the price correlation across space
between two different housing markets following a shock to one market that is above and beyond
that which can be justified by common aggregate trends.3
The nature of the housing market and richness of our data allow us to address several empirical
concerns that plague previous contagion-related research. One example involves the determination of the relevant period(s) in which to study spillovers. For example, a non-ad hoc procedure
for identifying the timing of a shock is preferred to an arbitrary choice of time period ‘after the
fact.’ This typically is not feasible in most studies of stock market or currency crises because there
is little or no variation across countries in the onset of those events. Fortunately, this was not the
case during the most recent housing cycle which saw substantial variation across markets (Ferreira
and Gyourko, 2011; Sinai, 2012). In addition, we are able to appeal to existing theory as a guide
in helping to determine how to time the beginning of a local boom. As is described more fully
in the next section, implications of Glaeser et al.’s (2012) dynamic version of the classic model of
spatial equilibrium in urban economics lead us to date the beginning of a given market’s boom
by whether and when there was a structural break in that area’s price appreciation rate. These
estimates were shown in Figure 3.1 and provide us with substantial variation in the timing of the
start of local market booms that can be used in testing for the existence of contagion.
A second advantage is provided by the use of a voluminous micro-level data on U.S. housing transactions. We have over 23 million observations on individual home sales in 99 metropolitan areas
dating back to the early 1990s in most cases.4 This data enables us to address specification search
bias of the type identified by Leamer (1978), which arises when the same data is used to identify
both the timing of a shock and the magnitude of the volatility during that period. Our strategy
uses randomly split samples to separately identify the timing of booms and the magnitude of price
3

There is no single, agreed-upon definition of contagion, but our definition is similar in spirit to many used in the
financial economics literature. See, for example, Forbes (2012), which emphasizes the distinction between contagion
and interdependence, with the latter term reflecting when events in one country affect others in all states of the world,
not just after severe negative events.
4
The property transaction data is collected by Dataquick or by intermediaries from county assessor’s offices and
captures the universe of sales.
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volatility in those periods.5 Most contagion studies in financial economics are not able to deal
with this issue because they use a single aggregate stock index in each country. Doing so increases
the likelihood of falsely concluding that there are more and bigger booms (or crisis periods in the
financial economics literature) than truly exist.
Third, the richness of our data and the variation in the timing of booms across markets also helps
us deal with omitted variable biases in several ways. We use the time line of a neighbor’s boom as
our source of variation in the data to identify contagion effects. Our baseline specification involves
regressing a focal market’s price changes on a series of indicators reflecting whether the relevant
neighboring market is booming and how proximate a given period is in time to the start of that
market’s boom.6 The added degrees of freedom afforded by the multiple, non-contemporaneous
booms we observe also allow us to control for omitted factors that might reflect common economic shocks. We do so through the inclusion of time by census division dummies, lagged price
changes, as well as a host of local fundamentals. We also are able to address the Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) critique regarding heteroskedasticity, whereby increased volatility in the ‘crisis
period’ (when the boom starts, in our context) generates upward bias in correlation coefficients
across markets. We adjust for the volatility in prices being higher than normal when the boom
starts by directly controlling for the time line of the focal market’s boom. Finally, in an alternative specification, we also address the potential for reverse causality with an instrumental variable
approach using further lags of close neighbor’s price changes.
Our main conclusion is that contagion played a statistically and economically significant role in
the development of the most recent housing boom. The elasticity of prices in a typical focal market with respect to those in the closest metropolitan area in the year following the beginning of the
boom in that neighboring area ranges from 0.10 to 0.27.7 Empirically, the upper end of our elas5

This is the same strategy followed by Card et al. (2008) in their study of tipping points in residential segregation
models.
6
As expected, this is very important empirically. Naively regressing ‘price on price’ yields contagion estimates that
are 3-5 times larger than the results we report below from our preferred specification.
7
We also report evidence of on-going contagion effects as the boom builds, but those results are potentially confounded by feedback effects. This is not a concern at the start of local booms because the data show no pre-trends, with
markets appearing to be on their equilibrium paths before the initial jump in price growth when the booms commenced.
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ticity range implies that from one-fourth to one-third of the average jump in price growth at the
start of a typical local boom was due to contagion effects. This average impact is driven entirely
by the physically closest neighbor and is only detected if the nearest neighbor had a statistically
significant housing boom. There is no evidence of spillovers on prices arising from more geographically distant markets. In addition, this impact does not vary materially with the number of
miles between the focal market and its nearest neighbor. As a robustness check, we investigated
whether there is evidence of contagion on the extensive margin. Hazard models show that the
probability of a boom beginning this quarter is indeed influenced by close metros that boomed in
the previous quarter.
We also investigated heterogeneity in the price contagion along a number of other non-distance related dimensions. For example, one might expect contagion to be stronger when the transmission
is from larger neighbor to a smaller focal market. That is precisely what we find. The magnitude of the contagion effect also varies with the elasticity of supply of the focal metropolitan area.
Specifically, there is no evidence of contagion in inelastically supplied markets, but the estimated
impact in the most elastically supplied markets is double the average effect discussed above.
What mechanisms could explain the observed price contagion effect? Fundamental factors including local income, migration flows between focal and neighboring markets, lending behavior
in both markets, and speculative behavior in the focal market, do not show much variation after
the beginning of the boom of the nearest neighbor. We also include a simple form of expectations
of these local market fundamentals in our main econometric model to see if this materially affects
the magnitude of the estimated contagion effect. It does not. This indicates that at least some of
the contagion we estimate may be due to forces not related to the fundamentals analyzed in this paper. This has potentially important implications for policy makers. To the extent that the spread
of a housing boom is even partially due to non-fundamental forces (e.g., some type of irrational
exuberance or otherwise mistaken perceptions of the influence of a neighboring market), it may
be worth rethinking the advisability of policy makers not responding to a boom.
Despite finding important spillovers during the run up of the U.S. housing boom, we report mixed
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evidence that contagion played a role in the bust. Estimated elasticities are zero at the beginning
of the bust, but they increase to about 0.15 by the third year of the housing bust of the nearest
neighbor. We also cannot detect any impact of contagion on the extensive margin during the bust.
This is perhaps not all that surprising since the timing of the bust across MSAs is heavily concentrated in an 18 month period during 2006 and 2007, while the buildup of the housing boom took
almost a decade. This highlights difficulties in detecting spillovers during economic or financial
crashes/booms that quickly spread across countries, regions, or firms.8
While our research is motivated by prior research in financial economics noted above, it is also
part of a growing body of work on the most recent housing cycle. One important strand of
that research tries to understand whether the most recent cycle was a bubble.9 Another more
voluminous body of papers analyzes the bust and its consequences.10 There are also some prior
studies of price spillovers in the housing market.11 In this paper we focus on one particular facet
of the cycle, the role of contagion, but contribute to the literature by: a) looking at contagion
over the full time span of the cycle, b) improving empirical identification in many respects, c)
estimating heterogeneity in the contagion elasticity, and d) investigating the potential causes of
8
In addition, we do not have the added advantage of relying on a prediction from external theory to date the beginning of the bust. In this part of the analysis, we follow the tradition in the contagion literature and date the bust’s
beginning in an ad hoc manner based on the assumption that it begins in the quarter after nominal price levels peaked
in a given metropolitan area.
9
Shiller (2005) provides perhaps the most famous characterization of the boom as a non-rational event. Others
recently have estimated rational expectations general equilibrium models to try to explain the national aggregate price
data (Favilukis et al., 2011) or the serial correlation and volatility of prices and quantities within and across metropolitan
areas (Glaeser et al., 2012). Related work includes Arce and Lopez-Salido (2011), Burnside et al. (2011), Lai and van
Order (2010), and Wheaton and Nechayev (2008).
10
Much of this research focuses on the subprime sector (Bajari et al., 2008; Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2008; Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2011; Gerardi et al., 2007; Goetzmann et al., 2009; Mayer and Pence, 2008; Haughwout et
al., 2010), mortgage securitization (Bubb and Kaufman, 2009; Keys et al., 2010), the default/foreclosure crisis (Adelino
et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2011; Foote et al., 2008; Gerardii et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Mian
et al., 2010; Piskorski et al., 2009) or the role of government regulation (Avery and Brevoort, 2010; Bhutta, 2009; Ho
and Pennington-Cross, 2008)
11
Some early examples include Clapp et al. (1995) and Dolde and Tirtiroglu (1997), who use data on towns in Connecticut and San Francisco (respectively) to test for the existence of cross-market linkages in price movements. More
recently, Holly et al. (2010, 2011) use data on U.S. states and U.K. regions to study the spatial and temporal diffusion
of changes in house prices during the most recent cycle. Fuss et al. (2011) and Cotter et al. (2011) use publicly available,
metropolitan area-level house price series to test for the existence of some form of contagion during the most recent
housing cycle. However, all studies use of the same aggregate market-level price data to determine both the timing of the
crisis period and to measure the magnitude of volatility changes during that period makes their estimates susceptible to
specification search bias. In addition, the timing of the shock is usually defined in an ad-hoc way and there are questions
about how that research deals with omitted factors.
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contagion across housing markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section motivates our use of an urban economic
approach to analyzing contagion in housing markets and discusses our method for dating the beginning of the boom. Section 3.3 then describes the various data sources employed and the variables created. Section 3.4 discusses the different types of specifications estimated, reports results,
and explores potential mechanisms that might explain the contagion effects. In Section 3.5 we
estimate alternative specifications, look at the extensive margin of contagion, and whether we can
find contagion at the housing bust. There is a brief conclusion.

3.2. An Urban Economic Motivation and Definition of Contagion
3.2.1. Timing of Local Housing Booms
Any analysis of possible contagion effects in the spreading of the recent housing boom first requires knowledge of the timing of the beginning of the boom in different markets. Our data on
the timeline of local booms come from estimates discussed above and reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). In that work, the start of local booms is determined by when there was a structural
break in each area’s price appreciation rate series. The justification for that strategy is based on
implications of the dynamic spatial equilibrium model developed in Glaeser et al. (2012). In particular, that model implies that in steady state each local market will exhibit constant and continuous
growth paths for house prices, new construction and population.12
Empirically, this means that we should see house prices in a given market growing at a constant
rate unless there is a shock to local productivity, amenities, or expectations, in which case we
12
Glaeser et al. (2012) introduce dynamics into Rosen’s (1979) and Roback’s (1982) classic static model of spatial
equilibrium. In this compensating differential framework, house prices (Pi ) are the entry fee paid to access the wages
(Wi , which reflect productivity) and amenities (Ai ) of labor market area i . Their model is closed with an assumption
that there is some elastically supplied reference market area which is always open to another household. The utility level
available in the reference market is given by U ∗ , and establishes the lower bound on utility provided in any market. In
the long run, perfect mobility ensures that U ∗ is achieved in all markets, so that in equilibrium, no one has an incentive
to move to another place which offers higher utility. A very simple, linear version of this framework would imply that
U ∗ = Wi + Ai − Pi , so that d Pi = dWi + d Ai in equilibrium. The steady state rate of price appreciation need not be
zero. Secular trends in house prices can come from an underlying trend in housing demand as long as the market is not
in perfectly elastic supply. It can also arise from trends in physical construction costs under certain conditions.
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would then observe a discrete jump in the appreciation rate for that market. The data are generally
consistent with this predicted pattern. As a particularly stark example, Figure 3.2 plots annualized
house price appreciation rates over time for the Las Vegas market. This graph shows that fastgrowing market to be appreciating at a high, but roughly constant rate for many years before house
price growth escalates sharply at the beginning of its boom. Informally, our approach defines the
beginning of the housing boom in a local market as the point at which house price growth rates
exhibit this type of discrete jump.
To formalize this idea, we start with the following reduced form model of house price growth in
MSA i at time t :
P Gi,t = di,t + εi,t ,

t = 1, . . . , T .

(3.1)

Glaeser et al. (2012) implies that di,t = di ,0 for all t if the market is on its steady-state growth path.
However, if there is a shock to local productivity, amenities, or expectations at time t then the price
growth rate will exhibit a discrete jump in that period. The beginning of a local housing boom can
thus be identified by testing for the existence of one or more structural breaks in the parameter
di,t . To carry out this test we follow well-established methods in the time series literature for
estimating structural breaks.
Borrowing heavily from Estrella’s (2003) notation, the null hypothesis is that di,t is constant for
the entire sample period
H0 : di,t = di,0 ,

t = 1, . . . , T .

The alternative is that di,t changes at some proportion, 0 < πi < 1, of the sample which marks
the beginning of a housing boom in market i. Specifically the alternative hypothesis is

H1 : di,t =



di ,1 (πi )

t = 1, . . . , πi T


d (π )
i ,1 i

t = πi T + 1, . . . , T .

For any given πi , it is straightforward to carry out this hypothesis test. However, things are
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slightly more complicated when πi is unknown and the determination of its value is the primary
interest, as the case here.
To see how we estimate the value of πi and assess its statistical significance, let Πi = [πi ,1 , πi,2 ]
be a closed interval in (0, 1) and let Si be the set of all observations from t = i n t (πi,1 T ) to t =
i nt (πi,2 T ), where i n t (·) denotes rounding to the nearest integer. The estimated break point is
the value t ∗ from the set Si that maximizes the likelihood ratio statistic from a test of H1 against
H0 .13 That is, for every t ∈ Si we construct the likelihood ratio statistic corresponding to a test
of H1 against H0 for that value of t , and we take the t that produces the largest test-statistic as our
estimated break point for MSA i.
Assessing the statistical significance of this breakpoint estimate requires knowing the distribution
of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic as calculated from among the values in Si . Let
ξi = s u pSi LR denote this supremum. Andrews (1993) shows that this distribution can be written
as




||B (s)||
P (ξi > c) = P s u pπi ∈Πi Q1 (πi ) > c = P s u p1<s <λi 11/2 > c 1/2
s

(3.2)



where ||B1 (s)|| is the Bessel process of order 1, λi = πi,2 1 − πi ,1 /πi ,1 1 − πi,2 , and
(B1 (πi ) − πi B1 (1))0 (B1 (πi ) − πi B1 (1))
Q1 (πi ) =
.
πi (1 − πi )
Direct calculation of the probability in (3.2) is non-trivial and prior research has relied on approximations that are typically based on simulation or curve-fitting methods (Andrews, 1993; Hansen,
1997). However, Estrella (2003) provides a numerical procedure for calculating exact p-values that
does not rely on these types of approximations. We use this method to calculate p-values for the
estimated break point, πi , for each MSA in the sample.
Note that this method does not provide an unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the change
in price growth rates at the breakpoint, di,2 . Under the null hypothesis that there is no break
13
We use the terms supremum and maximum interchangeably in this exposition. Technically, all of the results are in
terms of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic.
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point, the estimate of di,2 has a nonstandard distribution and OLS estimates of its magnitude will
be upwardly biased in absolute value. This problem can lead to an increased chance of falsely
concluding that di ,2 6= 0 and is a form of specification search bias arising from the fact that the
same data is being used to estimate both the timing and the magnitude of the structural break.
Several approaches for adjusting the estimate of the magnitude of structural break have been suggested and are typically based on simulations of the distribution of di,2 under the null hypothesis
of no break point (Andrews, 1993; Hansen, 2000). Our approach to correcting the estimates of
di,t follows the recently suggested method used by Card et al. (2008) of randomly splitting the underlying sample of housing transactions into two and using one sample to estimate the timing of
the boom and the other to estimate the magnitude of price changes around that time. The idea is
that if the two subsamples are independent, then estimates of di,2 from the second sample, which
was not used to estimate the location of the break point, will have a standard distribution even
under the null hypothesis of no structural break in the first sample. In practice, we randomly split
our sample of unique houses into two and create separate price growth series for each sample of
houses. The first price series is used to estimate the timing of the boom following the method just
discussed, while the second is used to analyze the magnitude of price changes following housing
booms in neighboring markets.14
The procedure above will generate a breakpoint estimate regardless of whether the structural break
represents a positive or negative change in the price growth rate. In the cases where the estimated
break point is either insignificant or implies a negative change in growth rates, we conclude that
the market did not have a boom. That is the case for the 15 interior markets shown in the first
panel of Figure 3.1. For those locations where we do find evidence of a statistically significant and
positive break point, we also test for the existence of two breaks against the null hypothesis of
14

Not accounting for this issue can result in large biases. Card et al. (2008) noted that their estimates from the full
sample were somewhat larger than the estimates from the split sample approach. In our case, if we use the full sample of
transactions to estimate both the timing of the beginning of the boom and the magnitude of the jump in price growth
at that time, the estimated jumps are also larger, on average, than those arising out of the split sample estimation. Part
of this difference, of course, could also be attributed to additional random variation that arises when reducing sample
sizes by half. This may be an issue for our smaller cities that do not have as many transactions per quarter as the big
cities, and are more subject to the influence of potential outliers.
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only one. To do so, we closely follow Bai (1999) and Bai and Perron (1998) and we refer the reader
to Appendix A.5 for the details of this procedure. About half of the MSAs were found to have
experienced more than one structural break. However, for many of those cases, the secondary
breaks were either small economically or not significantly different from zero. The estimation
of a secondary break generally does not displace the location of the main structural break either.
Moreover, comparison of histograms of timing of local booms based on one-break or two-break
methods lead to similar distributions of local booms over time. Given these facts, we simplify our
analysis by only using the one-break method in the empirical study below. When necessary, we
also report robustness tests based on the multiple break method.
3.2.2. Contagion in Local Markets
A potential role for neighbors to influence house price growth in a focal market arises naturally
within the dynamic urban model of spatial equilibrium referenced above. While users of that
framework typically presume that shocks originate from own market fundamentals, they could
arise from neighboring markets as well. In our case, we are interested in whether neighbors that
just had housing booms influence housing market outcomes in the focal metropolitan area, all
else constant. Note that any such contagion effects could arise from fundamental or behavioral
factors.
An example of a fundamental factor generating spatial spillovers is a positive industry or income
shock that triggers a housing boom in a local labor market. For example, if there is such a shock
in the Silicon Valley, house prices in the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA will increase in the
short run given supply constraints, and perhaps start a housing boom. Neighboring areas, such
as the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont MSA (or smaller, but more distant, metropolitan areas in
the central valley of California), may eventually benefit from that positive income shock, as some
of the Silicon Valley jobs could migrate to nearby areas. Even though such fundamental spillovers
may occur with lags, house prices in the neighboring markets should immediately capitalize the
expectation of future economic growth.
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Housing market shocks could also be disseminated through the credit market channel. In the example above, Silicon Valley lenders may achieve extra profits since foreclosures and delinquencies
tend to decline during an economic boom. If those lenders decide to reinvest profits and expand
market shares in a nearby MSA—possibly because it is less costly to expand business to nearby
communities—then the San Francisco metro may observe a shift in the availability of credit, which
will boost its housing market both in the short and long runs.15 A similar mechanism could exist
for land owners and housing investors in the Silicon Valley. Their wealth increases after the beginning of the Silicon Valley housing boom, which could trigger an expansion of investments into
neighboring MSAs.16
Spillovers could arise even in the absence of expected future fundamental changes in San Francisco
or the central valley. Residents in those neighboring markets may be right to think that some type
of positive income spillover will occur from the Silicon Valley boom, but they may incorrectly
predict its magnitude. Those biased expectations can lead to short-run increases in their housing
prices.17 In addition to this type of behavior, irrational factors may lead residents in the focal
market to have not only incorrect, but also non-fundamentally based expectations about future
price growth in their market following a shock to a nearby neighboring area. Finally, the housing
boom in the Silicon Valley may generate another type of behavioral spillover effect—namely, an
increase in Silicon Valley housing prices may lead its own local residents to pay more attention to
what is happening in neighboring markets, such as the city of San Francisco. Therefore, a shock
that makes the focal housing market and its interactions with neighbors more salient to investors
may itself lead to stronger contagion.
Regardless of its source, contagion would manifest itself in the form of abnormally large increases
15
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) show how increases in the availability of credit to marginal buyers can lead to
overreaction in house prices.
16
Chinco and Mayer (2012) report that out of town speculators played a significant role in the housing boom and
that their presence may have exacerbated price increases in some markets. Bayer et al. (2011) similarly document the
rise of speculative activity during the housing boom.
17
A similar mechanism underlies the analysis in King and Wadhwani (1990) who document that contagion in financial
markets can arise as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other markets.
Similarly, Clapp et al. (1995) document characteristics of house price dynamics that could be consistent with rational
learning. Burnside et al. (2011) and Favara and Song (2010) show how the presence of optimistic agents in the housing
market can lead to increases in house price levels and volatility.
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in focal market price growth rates immediately following a boom in a neighboring market. Our
empirical approach makes use of the estimates of the timing of local booms discussed above in
order to test for this type of spillover and its potential mechanisms. However, before discussing
the econometric specifications we estimate, we first give a brief description of the data underlying
our analysis.

3.3. Data
Our house price data come from DataQuick, a private data vendor which collects the universe of
housing transactions from county recorder’s offices in markets across the country. The sample
used is for 99 metropolitan areas, with information on over 23 million individual observations
ranging from the first quarter of 1993 (1993(1)) through the third quarter of 2009 (2009(3)). We
randomly split the sample into two and in each subsample we create a constant quality quarterly
price index for each MSA.18 From these indices we create the annualized growth series used in
estimating the timing of the boom and in assessing how neighboring booms affect price growth
in focal markets. The mean, standard deviation, and interquartile range for the price index we use
to measure magnitudes are reported in the first row of Table 3.1.
We also create a number of variables to measure fundamentals that are potentially correlated with
house price growth and the timing of the beginning of local housing booms. These are reported in
subsequent rows of Table 3.1. We consider three types of fundamentals: (1) demand shifters, such
as the average income of mortgage applicants, MSA-level unemployment rates, and net migration
flows; (2) buyer characteristics and property traits, including the percentage of speculators, the
percentage of minority buyers and the average square footage of transacted housing units; and
(3) credit market conditions, measured by the average loan-to-value ratio of home purchases, the
percentage of mortgages originated by subprime lenders and those insured by the FHA.
18
We create a MSA-level constant quality house price series by quarter using hedonic regressions. Price, in logarithmic form, is modeled as a function of the square footage of the home entered in quadratic form, the number of
bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and the age of the home. We also created a version of the Case and Shiller (1987)
repeat sales price index for 14 Case-Shiller markets that overlap with the DataQuick files, and found that the simple correlation of appreciation rates on the two different indexes based on DataQuick is usually higher than 0.9. We employ
hedonic price indexes because their data requirements are much less onerous.
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To construct many of the demographic measures of home buyers, we merge the DataQuick files
with Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which provide information on the income
and race of all mortgage applicants. In each time period, we calculate the average income of all
local loan applicants as reported in HMDA. Similarly, the ‘Percent Minority’ variable reflects the
fraction of African-American and Hispanic loan applicants as coded in the HMDA files. Because
these measures reflect the characteristics of all mortgage applicants, and not only the set who end
up purchasing a home, we take them to be an accurate description of the race and income of
potential homebuyers in each market.
MSA-level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics series, and net migration flows are calculated using data on county-to-county migration patterns provided on an annual basis by the Internal Revenue Service.
‘Percent speculators’ refers to the fraction of transactions involving a speculator on either the buyer
or the seller side of the transaction. We leverage the fact that we observe the names of both the
buyer and seller for each transaction in order to define speculators in a similar way as Bayer et al.
(2011). Specifically we define a person as a speculator if he or she is observed to have ‘flipped’ at
least two homes in the same metropolitan area during the entire course of the sample where a flip
is defined as a purchase and sale of the same home within a two-year period. We then consider all
transactions in which that person is involved as either the buyer or seller as being ‘speculative.’
Credit market variables include the average loan to value ratio (LTV) among homebuyers in DataQuick, the fraction of FHA-insured loans, and the fraction of subprime loans. We use information
on the names of the underlying mortgage lenders from the DataQuick files to calculate the share
of subprime loans. More specifically, we obtained lists of the top twenty subprime lenders from
1990-onward in a publication now called Inside Mortgage Finance.19 ‘Percent subprime lenders’ is
then defined as the share of mortgages issued by these top twenty lenders.
19

This publication claims to capture up to 85% of all subprime originations in most years. Previously, it was named
B&C Mortgage Finance. See Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) for more details on these lenders and lists.
Other papers such as Mian and Sufi (2009) and Keys et al. (2010) have access to micro-level FICO scores and use that to
define subprime borrowers.
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3.4. Econometric Model and Estimates
3.4.1. Econometric Model
As discussed in Section 3.2, the implications of the underlying dynamic model of urban economics
are readily extended to include shocks from neighboring housing markets. We estimate the following reduced form model to gauge the impact of housing market booms of close neighbors on
the prices of the focal MSA m in Census Division d and quarter t :

log P m,d ,t =
+

4
X

4
X

θ1r ∗ ψ1m,r +

r =−4,r 6=0

r =−4,r 6=0

4
X



τ=1

θ2r ∗ ψ2m,r +

4
X
r =−4,r 6=0

θ r ∗ ψ m,r
(3.3)

θτ ∗ log P m,d ,t −τ + γd ,t + ε m,d ,t

The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3.3) contains the primary variables of interest,
the ψ1m,r ’s, which are indicators for the years relative to the beginning of the housing boom (r )
of the closest neighboring market (neighbor number 1). The coefficients, θ1r , on these indicator
variables describe how prices in the focal market evolve over the course of its nearest neighbor’s
housing boom. We define Relative Year 0 to be the 12-month period prior to the beginning of the
neighboring market’s boom.20 Relative year 1 then includes the quarter in which the boom starts
as well as the subsequent three quarters. Relative years from −2 to +3 are entered individually,
with all relative years greater (less) than those numbers binned together.21 This allows us to see
whether there are any important pre-trends and to track the build-up of the boom after it starts.
The second term on the right-hand side of (3.3) includes an analogous set of controls, denoted ψ2m,r
for the second closest neighbor. In a set of robustness tests presented below, we also control for
log prices of other near MSAs, to make sure that our elasticity estimates from the nearest neighbor
20

We work with 12 month periods because there is noise in the quarterly data that is not due solely to error in the
estimation of the break point. For example, it is common for there to be at least a one quarter difference between
the time that a transactions price is agreed upon and when the actual closing occurs. In addition, we know that prices
in housing markets do not follow a random walk, but move slowly and are strongly positively correlated over short
horizons (Case and Shiller, 1987, 1989). Locations for which we do not estimate a statistically significant boom are still
assigned a relative year according to their estimated break points.
21
We did estimate all our models with lengthier spans of individual relative years controlled for, but they did not
yield any new insights beyond those reported below.
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are not confounded by other neighbors, or other neighboring shocks.
Physical proximity is the most natural measure of distance, and the specifications reported below
assign the nearest neighbor based on the number of miles between the centroids of the relevant
metropolitan areas.22 We also experimented with a measure of proximity based on migration flows
between pairs of markets. Those results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar, so we do not
report them for space reasons.23
This specification also controls for the time line of the focal market’s boom via the third term
on the right-hand side of equation (3.3). By including the relative year effects of the focal MSA
(denoted ψ m,r , where the absence of a superscript indicates the variable refers to the focal market
itself), we control for the average increase in prices of the focal market over the course of its own
boom. This vector serves a similar role to the adjustments made in related financial economics
research to deal with upward bias in contagion estimates arising from volatility being higher in all
markets during ‘crisis’ periods (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2002)).
The remaining terms of equation (3.3) include four quarterly lags of (log) focal market prices to
control for potentially unobserved time-varying characteristics of MSA m 24 , as well as Census
Division-by-quarter fixed effects to deal with common regional shocks that might influence close
neighbors simultaneously. Finally, note that we do not control for contemporaneous focal market fundamentals in this baseline specification. This is because they could represent intermediate
outcomes through which the contagion effect may be operating. In the mechanisms section be22
Distances are calculated using the full set of MSAs according to the 2000 Census. Because we only have price
data for 99 of these MSAs, some data for nearest neighbors remain empty in 24 cases. In our regressions, we create an
indicator for whether we have price data for the nearest neighbor, and interact this indicator with the relevant relative
years. The results are qualitatively similar when we drop MSAs with missing neighbors’ price data and also when we
calculate distances using only the 75 MSAs for which we have data.
23
This economic measure of distance based on migration flows between metropolitan areas has been used in other
research (Sinai and Souleles, 2009). It is strongly positively correlated with geographic distance between markets. For
example, the probability of the physically closest neighbor also being the closest economic neighbor is 57%, and the
probability it is one of the two closest economic neighbors is 76%. Hence, it is not surprising these two measures of
distance yield similar results.
24
We also considered specifications that dispense with the lags of the dependent variable in favor of MSA fixed effects.
Results from these specifications are qualitatively similar. However, we believe that the lagged dependent variable
specification is more appropriate given that omitted time-varying common factors are more likely to confound the
contagion effect than unobservable but fixed MSA-specific characteristics.
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low, we will directly estimate the impact of the neighbor’s housing boom on those intermediate
outcomes, and also test whether their inclusion in equation (3.3) mitigates the contagion effect.
3.4.2. Main Estimates
Column 1 of Table 3.2 reports baseline estimates of equation (3.3) for the metropolitan areas whose
nearest neighbors had statistically significant booms. The reported coefficients show that prices
were relatively stable in the three years prior to the beginning of the boom in the nearest neighboring MSA, so that there is no evidence of a pre-trend. In the year that the neighboring MSA
begins its boom (Relative Year [1]), focal market prices then jump 0.87 percentage points and remain almost 1% higher for another couple of years. Column 2 reports the analogous coefficients
on the relative year dummies for the set of neighboring MSAs for which we do not estimate a
statistically significant or positive break point. These results confirm that a positive effect is only
detected when the neighboring MSA actually had a housing boom. Hence, we find spillovers on
focal market prices only if the nearest neighbor actually experienced a significantly positive shock.
Columns 3 and 4 show analogous estimates for the second closest neighbors. The coefficients on
the timeline of the boom for 2nd nearest neighbor generally are not statistically different from
zero regardless of whether this particular neighbor had a housing boom. Hence spillovers mostly
arise from the closest neighbor, and we will focus on those results in the remaining of the paper.25
In order to determine the elasticity of focal market housing price growth with respect to near
neighbors’ price growth, we need to gauge the magnitude of the housing boom for the nearest
neighbors. The starting point of this exercise is to estimate a version of equation (3.3) that uses
the log price of the nearest neighbor as the dependent variable. Table 3.3 reports those results.
Pre-boom prices are trending down a bit in these results, and then jump 3% in the first year of the
housing boom. By the third year of the boom, prices are 8% higher than the pre-boom period,
and are more than 11% higher in subsequent years.26
25
If we do not control for the time line of the focal market’s boom, the point estimates of the nearest neighbor’s
contagion effects are about 20% higher than those reported just below for our baseline specification in Table 2. However,
the results are not statistically different once the standard errors are taken into account. While this is consistent with
price volatility being artificially high when the focal market itself is booming, we note that including these indicators
could also be controlling for intermediate outcomes.
26
These magnitudes are similar to those in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) who conduct a similar exercise using the full

121

An upper bound on the implied elasticity can be computed by using only the estimates of price
changes in the first year of the boom under the assumption that agents in these markets are myopic.
Combining these figures with the estimates from Table 3.2 yields an elasticity of 0.27.27 Smaller
elasticities result if we consider cumulative price changes by the third year of the shock. In that
case, the elasticity falls to about 0.10.
While differences in data and methodologies make it difficult to directly compare our estimates
of contagion to others in the literature, our magnitudes appear to be smaller and we find that
spillovers only arise from the closest neighbors.28 We suspect this is partially due to our empirical
strategy that minimizes specification search bias and includes various controls to deal with omitted
factors related to common shocks.
A rough gauge of the relative importance of contagion in fomenting local booms can be made
as follows. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) concluded that jumps in one fundamental, local income
growth, could account for one-half of the magnitude of the jump in price growth at the beginning
of local booms (on average). Our estimates indicate that contagion did not play as important a
role, but it still was economically meaningful, as it can account for over one-quarter of the jump
at the start of the boom.29 Using different and more conservative figures and assumptions reduce
the share, but nothing reasonable can drive it below 10%.30
set of MSAs, not just those who serve as closest neighbors to some other MSA in the sample.
27
This is the result of dividing the 0.008688 spillover estimate from column 1 of Table 3.2 by 0.03224 from column
1 of Table 3.3.
28
For example, Cotter et al. (2011) regress housing price appreciation in eleven MSAs near San Francisco on the
contemporaneous and 3 quarterly lags of San Francisco’s housing appreciation rate and report coefficients ranging
from 0.05-0.67 on lagged housing price appreciation of San Francisco. Fuss et al. (2011) model the volatility spillover
intensity and suggest that a 1 percentage point shock in housing return in Las Vegas could result in an eventual 0.19
percentage point increase in housing return in San Diego.
29
To see this more clearly, start with the 0.27 elasticity just discussed. Given the 3.2% average jump in Relative Year
[1] reported in Table 3.3, that aforementioned elasticity implies that about 0.9 points, or about 27 percent of the jump
at the start of the boom, can be explained by contagion.
30
It is not clear what figure to use for the average level of price growth in the denominator of this ratio, which is
why we focus more on the elasticity. The 3.2% number used here based on Table 3.3’s results is close to the log price
changes reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). However, one also could use the 6.5% average jump in price growth
rate (not the change in the log prices) also reported by those authors. That number arises from an estimate that does
not control for any year or metropolitan area fixed effects. With that denominator, the 0.9 points amounts to about
14% of the jump at the start of the boom. As noted in the text, there are no reasonable assumptions one could make
that drive the share below 10%.
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Finally, the economic interpretation of the contagion estimates for the years after the beginning of
the boom may be more complicated due to potential feedback effects. Feedback effects are less of
a concern in the first year of the boom, as we showed that prices, roughly speaking, are in equilibrium right before that moment. It may not play a major role in subsequent years either, especially
if only 10% or less of the main price effect propagates across close neighbors. Nonetheless, contagion estimates for relative years two and three, for example, are better thought of as reduced form
estimates that include the impact of recent contagion, but that also embed a share of contagion
from the complete path of price appreciation since the beginning of the boom.
3.4.3. Heterogeneity in the Contagion Effect
We test for heterogeneity in the average contagion effect along a number of dimensions. The first
is distance. We already found that only the nearest neighbor matters. A natural extension is to ask
whether the strength of the contagion impact associated with the closest neighbor increases with
its proximity to its focal market. The first two columns of Table 3.4 show that the answer is no.
Those figures are the output from a regression like that in equation (3.3) which further interacts the
neighbor’s relative year dummies with an indicator for whether that neighbor is more or less than
the median distance of about 40 miles away from the focal market. Although the estimates tend to
be imprecise, the point estimates show little difference between relatively close and farther away
nearest neighbors, especially around the time when the neighbor’s boom begins. Thus, contagion
effects arise only from the nearest neighbor, but they do not vary materially based on how close
that nearest neighbor is.31
It also seems natural to ask whether contagion impacts depend upon the relative sizes of the focal
and neighbor markets. To investigate this, we classified focal MSAs whose population sizes are
within 50% of the population of the closest neighbor as being of similar size. They are considered larger if they have at least 50% more population, and smaller if they have less than 50% of
31

The interquartile range of distances between neighboring markets runs from 30-48 miles, so there is not much
variation for much of the sample. The mean is larger at 74 miles, but that reflects the influence of Honolulu, whose
nearest neighbor is over 2,000 miles away. The next biggest distance is 111 miles. We also experimented with alternative
groupings such as dividing markets into whether their nearest neighbor was less than 30 miles away, from 36-60 miles
away, and greater than 60 miles away. The results were no different from those reported here.
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the population of the closest neighbor. Appendix Figure A.16 shows the distribution of relative
population size, and the thresholds used to determine groups of MSAs for both geographic and
economic neighbors. The estimates reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 indicate
that the contagion effect on a focal market is larger if the nearest neighbor is substantially bigger
than the focal area. Prices in the focal market are 1.3% higher immediately when the large near
neighbor booms, but are little changed when the focal market is bigger (row 3 for Relative Year
[1]). Prices stay higher in subsequent years for focal markets being influenced by large neighbors.
In sum, size does matter and in an intuitive way in the sense that contagion effects are much larger
(and consistently statistically significant) if the nearest neighbor is large relative to the focal market.
The final dimension along which we investigated whether there was any heterogeneity was by the
degree of the focal market’s elasticity of housing supply. For this test, we split the focal MSAs into
three groups according to the supply elasticities provided by Saiz (2010).32 Results are reported
in the final two columns of Table 3.4 for the bottom third (supply inelastic) and top third (supply
elastic) groups. Note that prices do not jump when the closest neighbor of an inelastically-supplied
market begins to boom. However, for the most elastically-supplied metros, prices in the focal
market are about 2% higher if its nearest neighbor begins to boom. The gap increases to about 3%
by the third year of the boom. Performing calculations analogous to those discussed above for the
economic importance of the average contagion effect show that spillovers could account for nearly
two-thirds of the jump in prices at the beginning of booms in the most elastically supplied markets.
Basic economics suggests that any contagion effects would be more likely to be capitalized in the
inelastically supplied markets, ceteris paribus, so this outcome may seem counterintuitive at first
glance. However, all else is not constant in this case. It turns out that a disproportionately large
share of these markets are large coastal metropolitan areas with relatively small neighbors.33 So,
32
Saiz’s supply elasticity estimates are available for only 76 of our metropolitan areas, so we start with a smaller
sample for this particular analysis.
33
Included in this most inelastic tercile are the metropolitan areas of Barnstable Town, MA, Boston-CambridgeQuincy, MA-NH, Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH, Deltona-Daytona BeachOrmond Beach, FL, Eugene-Springfield, OR, Jacksonville, FL, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA, New HavenMilford, CT, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA, Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Palm
Bay-Melboune-Titusville, FL, Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA, Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL, Riverside-San
Bernardino-Ontario, CA, San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, Santa RosaPetaluma, CA, Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA, Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL,
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at least some of the variation we document by degree of supply elasticity could have been driven
by the size results just discussed.34
3.4.4. Mechanisms
In this subsection, we investigate some of the potential mechanisms that could account for the
influence of a near neighbor’s boom on house prices in the focal market. We are particularly
interested in whether our contagion effects are fundamentally-based in the sense discussed in Section 3.2. . If not, the relevance of our results for policy makers is increased, as they well may want
to reevaluate their past practice of not intervening in response to asset booms in housing markets
if their spread is based on some type of irrational exuberance or otherwise mistaken expectations.
We begin by asking whether there are visible economic changes in the focal market that may
be driven by the neighboring market boom. We then alter our baseline specification to account
for these potential fundamental drivers. Four fundamentals are investigated, with each having
received prominent mention in previous academic research or by policy makers and the popular
press. They are focal market income, mortgage market activity, net migration flows into the focal
market and the share of house ‘flips’ in overall market sales. Table 3.5 reports results using these
local market traits as the dependent variable in a specification similar to that in equation (3.3), with
one difference being that here we include MSA fixed effects rather than own price lags.
Column 1 reports estimates for focal market income, where income is defined as the average income for all mortgage applicants in that market and quarter. If what is driving our contagion
result is a real spillover such as focal market income going up because of boom in a nearby market,
then we should see it changing along the timeline of the neighbor’s boom. Table 3.5’s results show
that there is a jump from zero to 1% in Relative Year [1], but this impact is not precisely estimated
and Vallejo-Fairfield, CA. Each of these areas also has one of the 99 markets in our sample as its closest market.
34
We also investigated whether contagion effects varied by the relative timing of booms in order to see if contagion
impacts occurred primarily when the focal market itself was booming. Appendix Figure A.15 shows a histogram of
the difference between the timing of the boom of the focal MSA and its closest neighbor. There is wide variation in
timing of the booms of these pairs of markets. We find that contagion effect seems concentrated in focal MSAs that
were already booming when the closest neighbor started to boom. This result suggests salience being a feature of the
contagion effect. But as with the heterogeneity by supply elasticity, relative timing is correlated with other factors, such
as market size.
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(the t -statistic is 1.3). The results are similar for the second and third relative years. It is only
at least four years after the nearest neighbor booms that we see focal market income higher by
a statistically significant amount. One would not want to interpret these coefficients as proving
that contagion does not operate via spillovers onto focal market income, but they also provide no
robust evidence to the contrary.
The next two columns investigate whether the contagion effect might operate through credit markets in some fashion. We approach this question by examining two aspects of credit lender activities. First, we investigate whether the mortgage lender bases become more similar during and after
the nearest neighbor booms. The intuition is that if lenders observe a boom in that neighbor, they
might increase their activity in the focal market for the reasons discussed in Section 3.2. We use a
proportional index to measure lender similarity.35 Second, we investigate whether lenders speed
up mortgage lending during and after the closest neighbor booms by calculating the rate at which
each lender increases mortgage issuance in the focal market. The regression results in Column 2
and 3 indicate that on average, both lender similarity and lending amount largely are unaffected
by the housing boom of the nearest neighbor.36 Therefore, based on our two measures of lender
activities, we did not find robust and material role of lenders in causing contagion.37
The fourth and fifth columns report analogous specifications using net migration between two
MSAs (which uses IRS data on annual tax records) and focal market flippers (based on the fraction
of transactions conducted by speculators) as the dependent variable. Both sets of results show no
1P
This lender similary index is calculated as 1 − 2 Ll=1 |m l − n l |, where m and n are the market shares of lender l
in the focal and the nearest neighbor markets, respectively. A value of zero implies no similarity, while a value of one
means that each lender has the same shares in both markets.
36
We also found that lending amount by subprime lenders also does not respond to the neighbor’s boom. If we
restrict the analysis to the top 5 lenders with the highest lending amount for each market, we observe a jump in lender
similarity index in Relative Year [1]. However, this result is not robust when we go from top 5 to top 10 or top 3 lenders.
Including only top lenders also leads to a jump in lending growth rate in Relative Year [2] (the coefficient is around
0.5), but not in Relative Year [1]. However, lending growth also is higher before neighbor’s boom, with coefficients on
Relative Year [-1] and Relative Year [-2] being in the range of 0.2-0.4. Given this noticeable pre-trend, it is difficult to
come to any conclusion that major credit lenders are the channel in disseminating positive housing market shocks.
37
This average result, however, does not exclude the possibility of major credit lenders responding to neighbor’s
booms in other dimensions. The increase in similarity index among top lenders and the dip in their lending amount
right at neighbor’s boom may suggest some bank-level spillovers or substitution effects going on across markets. To fully
understand the role of credit markets in this contagion context would require a closer examination of a full spectrum
of lender behaviors, including those at the corporate level (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, and shocks to other business
sectors of the lenders), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
35
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discernible effect before or after the beginning of the nearest neighbor’s housing boom.38
The fact that only focal market income shows any correlation with the timeline of the nearest
neighbor’s boom, especially its beginning, indicates that these fundamental factors are unlikely
to be able to account for our estimated contagion elasticity. Table 3.6 provides additional support for this conclusion with alternative specifications similar to our baseline equation (3.3) that
use (log) focal market price as the dependent variable. The first column reports results from a
model that includes focal market fundamental controls and the log average price of near neighbors on the right-hand side, in addition to the standard controls from the baseline specification in
Table 3.2. Our fundamental controls are local incomes, migration, subprime and FHA lending
market shares, percentage of speculative buyers, percent minority, average LTV, average square
footage, and the local unemployment rate. Note that these new estimates are very similar to the
baseline results presented in Table 3.2. Controlling for these fundamentals does not change the
magnitudes or time pattern of estimated contagion effects very much, indicating that the spatial
spillovers are not being transmitted via the fundamentals that we consider here.
Thus far, we have abstracted from expectations of future fundamental factors, effectively treating
actors as myopic. The second column of each panel in Table 3.6 begins to address this issue by
adding four leads of own market income to the previous specification. Effectively, this presumes
that local residents can fully predict the path of local incomes over the next four quarters. The
inclusion of such stylized expectations does not change the estimated contagion effect. The third
and final column of each panel reports results from adding four quarterly leads of all fundamentals,
not just income. Once again, the magnitudes of the point estimates as well as the time pattern are
relatively unchanged.
That we find no evidence that these spatial spillovers work through fundamental factors has po38
We also investigated the shares of experienced and inexperienced speculators, respectively. Speculators are defined
as experienced if having flipped at least four homes during the sample period, or inexperienced if otherwise. We did
not find significant jumps in either experienced or inexperienced flippers when the closest neighbor begins its boom.
However, the market share of experienced flippers declined by up to 0.5 percentage point (which is statistically significant) since two years after the neighbor booms, which is in line with those types of flippers being more sophisticated
in timing the housing cycle and maximizing their return (Bayer et al., 2011).
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tentially important implications for how policy makers should view intervention during housing
booms. To the extent the booms are spread by non-fundamental forces (e.g., some type of Keynesian/Shillerian irrational exuberance), they might want to try to stop them from growing in scale
and scope. Of course, fundamentals could encompass more than just income growth (or speculators, migration, etc.), and we would like to control for expectations as generally as possible. One
extreme way that does eliminate the impact of contagion is to presume that the future path of price
growth in the focal market is known with certainty in every period. In this context, the effect of
a nearby housing boom on future prices in the focal MSA is immediately known and expectations
are simply equal to the future value of price growth in the focal area. Adding four quarterly price
growth leads completely wipes out the contagion impact. This indicates that the spillover could
be operating primarily via expectations. Unless those expectations are based solely on fundamentals, the implications just discussed still hold. The likelihood that contagion operates via effects on
expectations makes that issue an essential component of future research, but that clearly is beyond
the scope of the current paper.

3.5. Additional Analysis: Instrumental Variable, Extensive Margin, and Bust
3.5.1. Alternative Model and Instrumental Variable
In this subsection, we relate price changes in the focal MSA with price changes from all neighbors,
not just the nearest two. This direct estimation of the contagion elasticity has the benefit of allowing us to use an instrumental variable strategy to deal with omitted factors. Also, by interacting
the price changes of the closest neighbor with a set of relative year dummies, we are able to explore how this effect varies over the course of a neighbor market’s housing boom. The downside
of this approach is that the specification does not allow us to fully observe the dynamic pattern
of contagion, as we restrict the effect of neighboring price changes to operate through only one
quarterly lag.
More specifically, we group neighboring locations into bins based on their distance from the focal
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market and estimate the following equation:
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where ∆P̄ m,t
−1 is the lagged average price growth among neighboring MSAs falling into bin k

for focal MSA m. In theory, we could allow each neighbor to be in its own bin based on how
close it was to the focal area. However, that turns out not to be practical due to data limitations,
so we bin neighbors based on distance rankings 1,2, 3–5, 6–10, 11–50, and 51+.39 This makes
the coefficients, ρk , the elasticity of focal area current price growth with respect to the average of
lagged price growth among neighbors in bin k. For the closest neighbor, we further interact the
lagged price growth variable with relative years to that neighbor’s boom—resulting in a coefficient,
ρ1r , for each of the neighbor’s relative years, as shown in the first term on the right-hand side of
(3.4). Relative year 0 again is the omitted category in all specifications. Thus, the coefficients on
the lagged average price growth of the closest neighbor are interpreted relative to the effect in the
12-month period prior to that neighbor’s boom.
One concern is that, even after including lags of the dependent variable (the third term on the
right-hand side of (3.4)) and area-by-time fixed effects (the γd ,t vector), there still could be some
common omitted factors helping drive the observed correlations. Ideally, we would like an instrumental variable that shifts the lagged average price growth of the focal MSA’s closest neighbor, but
does not directly affect the contemporaneous appreciation rate in the focal market itself. If taken
literally, our estimating equation implies that further lags of the neighbor’s price growth could
potentially serve as an instrument because those variables would only affect the focal market’s
contemporaneous price growth through their impact on the lagged neighbor’s price growth. This
leads us to instrument for the lagged average price growth in each group of neighbors using one
39
As in our main regressions, we include an indicator for whether we have price data for a given bin and interact this
indicator with the relevant lagged average price variable. Results are qualitatively similar when we drop MSAs with
missing neighbors’ price data and also when we calculate distances using only the 99 MSAs for which we have data.
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further lag of the average price growth among the relevant neighboring areas.40
Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (3.4). Once again, there is a clear pattern that
shows a shift in the importance of contagion right after the first year that close neighbors boom.
Estimates for the first year of each of the neighbor’s boom are 0.148, or approximately half the
elasticity derived from our baseline estimates when considering the first year of the housing boom.
Estimates for subsequent relative years fade relatively slowly, reaching a 0.1 elasticity that is similar
to the baseline results.
3.5.2. A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion
Our work above focuses entirely on the magnitude of contagion. In this section, we give empirical
content to the extensive margin on the timing of booms that was suggested by Figure 3.1. We
estimate simple hazard models to see if the probability of a focal market booming is influenced
by the fact that neighbors boomed previously, after controlling for a host of covariates that also
might account for the beginning of a boom.
Recent work on technology diffusion provides an intuitive way to generate contagion that is particularly appropriate for the specifications estimated in this subsection. In some of that research,
contagion refers to a process in which people adopt a new technology when they physically meet
with others who have already adopted it (Young, 2009; Comin et al., 2012). In our context of housing booms, this suggests that the probability of one metropolitan area entering a housing boom
increases with its connection to other such areas that already have boomed. A standard assumption is that the intensity of the connection decays in distance between MSA pairs at a constant
rate. Given that assumption, it is straightforward to generate the following two conclusions from
a simple model: (a) if MSA q enters a housing boom at time t , that increases the hazard of MSA
m 6= q having a housing boom at time t + 1; and (b) this contagious effect is larger the closer is
40

It turns out that the second quarterly lag of neighbor’s price growth has a small and statistically insignificant impact on the focal MSA price appreciation, after controlling for all other covariates. In the specifications that interact
the lagged average price growth of the neighbors with the focal MSA relative year indicators, we also interact lagged
neighbors income growth and the second lag of neighbor’s price growth with the focal area’s relative year and include
the full set of these interactions as instruments.
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MSA m to MSA q.41
To investigate these implications, we begin by estimating whether the beginning of a boom in
neighboring MSAs affects the hazard of focal MSAs entering a boom. We consider the following
proportional hazard model relating the hazard of each focal MSA entering a boom in quarter
t ,h m (t ), to a series of factors as noted in the following equation:
¨
h m (t ) =h0 (t ) exp
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number of MSAs among neighbors in bin k that began their boom in the previous quarter. We
allow for multiple groups of neighbors (indexed by k) based on how close they are to the focal
MSA. As before, we rank each focal MSA’s neighbors and group them into K mutually exclusive
bins based on these ranks, with N mk denoting the set of neighbors in bin k for focal MSA m. A
positive coefficient γk would suggest a positive contagion effect. If the contagion effect decays
with distance, we should also expect the γk ’s of closer neighbors to be larger than those of farther
away neighbors. As with the estimation of magnitudes, we control for many potential correlates
of a housing boom through the vector ∆X m,t .
We use the same bins as in Table 3.7. Table 3.8 then lists summary statistics on the number of
booms started across different bins of neighbors. The very small means for the bins containing five
or fewer markets document how unlikely it is that even a single boom began in any given quarter
P
among the few markets in those bins. Thus, the lagged value of this variable ( j ∈N k B oo m ) will
m

j ,t −1

contain many zeroes, making it difficult to estimate precise contagion effects about the timing of
the beginning of local market booms. Nevertheless, we use these bins initially given the differential
importance of the two closest neighbors in the contagion magnitude results and discuss findings
41

See Appendix A.6 for a more formal presentation of how that approach generates specifications of the type we
estimate in this section.
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later that use larger bin sizes.
Our baseline results are from a common parametric specification, the exponential model, which
assumes a flat baseline hazard h0 (t ) = exp(α0 ). Implied changes in the probability of the focal area
experiencing a boom this quarter (i.e., the hazard ratio) from one more neighbor having experienced a boom last quarter are reported in Table 3.9. The unconditional hazard, which is reported
in column 1, indicates that the probability of the focal MSA booming this quarter more than triples
if one more of its two physically closest neighbors boomed last quarter. The coefficients on the
next three bins (Neighbors[3-5], Neighbors[6-10], and Neighbors[11-50]) are much smaller and
none is statistically significant at conventional levels. That the lack of significance might be due
to the nature of these variables having so little natural variation is indicated by the statistically significant impact of the group of furthest away markets (Neighbors[51+]). Still, it is lagged booms
among the two closest neighbors that have the strongest correlation with a contemporary boom
in the focal market.
Controlling for a standard set of covariates lowers the estimated effect substantially, as reported
in column two. This time, the coefficients on the bins for all but the two closest neighbors are
close to or below 1, indicating they have no positive impact on the probability of the focal market
booming this period. And, the coefficient on the bin for the two closest neighbors falls by more
than half. Even the 49% increase in probability implied by the coefficients on Neighbors[1-2] is
not statistically significant, although that could be due to the nature of our data as discussed above.
This conclusion is supported by the findings reported in column 3, which uses a Weibull hazard.42
It reports a statistically significant correlation between lagged booms in very near neighbors and
contemporaneous booms in the focal markets. These results show that if one of the two closest
neighbors boomed last quarter, the probability of the focal market booming this quarter is about
70%–80% higher. The standardized marginal effect is smaller, of course, given the 0.18 standard
deviation on Neighbors[1-2]. Using the middle of the range estimate from the Weibull hazard
model, it is about 30% (i.e., 1.69 ∗ 0.18).
A Weibull hazard model presumes a monotonic baseline hazard h0 (t ) = p t p−1 exp(α0 ). We experimented with
different functional forms to see if the pattern of results was materially affected.
42
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These results only allow for a contagion effect from a single quarterly lag of neighbors’ booms.
We also estimated models that allowed for an increase in the number of booming neighbors over
the past 6 to 12 months. There is a modest increase in the hazard (to 32%) if we allow for booms in
any of the previous two quarters, but the result does not increase further if we allow for booms in
any of the previous four quarters. Thus, the spatial effect estimated here appears to happen fairly
quickly. This is also consistent with the elasticity estimates reported above.
The magnitude of the economic impact is hard to gauge on its own. We can gain some useful perspective by comparing it to the impacts on the hazard ratio of standard deviation changes in other
variables. Among the underlying controls, the focal market’s current income growth and previous
quarter’s price growth also were highly statistically significant predictors of a higher probability
of booming. A one standard deviation higher own income growth rate is associated with about
a 28% higher probability of the focal market booming. A one standard deviation higher rate of
lagged house price appreciation is much more influential, as it is associated with an 87% higher
hazard ratio. Thus, the standardized marginal effect of a boom in a very close neighbor appears
to be quite influential and on a par with a standard deviation increase in its own income growth
rate.43 And, that we still find a meaningful influence of lagged near neighbors after controlling for
everything else shows that the implications of the ‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 3.1 are not
entirely due to many other potentially important factors.44
3.5.3. Was There Contagion During the Spread of the Housing Bust?
Our results indicate that contagion played a statistically and economically meaningful role in the
timing and magnitude of the spread of housing booms across metropolitan areas. For completeness, we also explored the extent to which the same is true for the bust. In many respects, analysis
43

The growth rate in the percentage of buyers with mortgages insured by the FHA also is a very powerful control.
As expected, it is associated with a lower probability of booming. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in that
share is associated with an 86% fall in the hazard. Other statistically significant controls include the growth rate of
the metropolitan area unemployment rate, as well as the second and fourth quarterly lags of focal market house price
appreciation.
44
Conditional hazard model estimates using more aggregate bins (Neighbors[1-10], Neighbors[11-50] and Neighbors[51+]) do not show any impact on the timing of the beginning of the boom in focal markets. Averaging across
the ten closest neighbors masks the distinct impact of the two closest neighbors. As in the analysis of the magnitude of
contagion, only the closest neighbors appear to matter.
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of the bust is more challenging. One of the challenges is in deciding how it is defined and determined. We choose it to be the quarter in which nominal house prices peaked in the relevant MSA.
While that may be intuitive, it also is much more ad hoc than our definition of the beginning of
the boom, which is based on an external prediction of an economic model. Another challenge
is that the bust was much more temporally correlated across markets than was the boom. This
can be seen in Figure 3.3 which plots histograms of the quarters in which local market booms and
busts began. This plot includes all markets that had a statistically significant boom. Note that the
temporal concentration of busts is much greater, with every market experiencing a peak in prices
within a 2.5-3 year period from mid-2005 through early 2008.
Figure 3.4 then provides more geographical detail with its plots of market busts over time. The
first panel in this figure is identical to the first panel in Figure 3.1 and plots the MSAs for which
we never estimate a statistically significant boom. The remaining panels show the timing of the
bust among those MSAs that experienced booms. Unlike Figure 3.1’s plots of the time line of
metropolitan area booms, we see markets in all parts of the country, not just in coastal California
and upper New England, with early price peaks between 2003-2005. The largest fraction of those
peaks happening in last two quarters of 2005. Thus, the beginning of the bust is more national in
scope than was the beginning of the boom. The subsequent plots in this figure do show a spreading
out of the ‘busts’ to nearby markets. In the west, prices tended to peak earlier in interior markets
and then spread to the coast. In Florida, the first price peaks were in markets on both coasts of that
state. Peaking then occurred in a few other coastal markets before spreading to interior markets.
While this has the flavor of contagion seen in the start of the boom, more detailed analysis shows
this not to be the case. For example, Table 3.10 reports hazard model estimates akin to those in
Table 3.9, except here the dependent variable is the start of the bust, not the start of the boom.
Unconditionally, lagged busts of neighbors are positively correlated with contemporary busts in
focal markets, and near neighbors matter the most (column 1). However, column 2 of this table
shows this conclusion of ‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 3.4 does not survive the inclusion of
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covariates.45
In Table 3.11 we estimated price specifications for the bust akin to those in Table 2. First, using
geographic distance, we do not see significant jumps in the magnitude of the contagion effect in
relative year one. But focal prices decline by 1.2% and 3.8% in relative years two and three respectively. Results using economic distance follow a similar pattern. When compared to the magnitude
of the price decline in the neighboring MSA, we find an elasticity of around 0.15. Those results
are surprisingly similar to the ones observed during the spread of the housing boom.

3.6. Conclusion
We provide estimates of the role of contagion in the most recent American housing boom and bust.
We find a statistically and economically meaningful role for contagion during the beginning and
spread of the housing boom, and mixed evidence of contagion for the bust. Our key results are as
follows. First, contagion impacts arise only from the very closest neighbors. There is no evidence
of spillovers associated with more distant neighbors. The elasticity of focal market prices with
respect to changes in its nearest neighbor’s prices is in the range of 0.10-0.27. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest this is large enough to account for up to 30% of the jump in prices at the
beginning of local booms, on average.
Finally, we found that local fundamentals and expectations of future fundamentals have very limited ability to account for our estimated contagion effect. That contagion transmission is not associated with local fundamentals suggests a potential role for non-rational forces. That is an issue in
urgent need of new research because, if contagion does reflect some type of irrational exuberance,
policy makers may want to rethink their past policy of not intervening to stop the spread of asset
booms in housing.

45

All markets are used in this particular estimation, including those that did not boom. The results are virtually
identical if we restrict the sample to those that did boom.
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FIG. 3.1.—Timing of Housing Boom by MSA
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FIG. 3.2.—Las Vegas’ Constant Growth Rate Before Booming. Source: Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).
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FIG. 3.3.—Histograms of the Beginnings of Booms and Busts, MSAs
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FIG. 3.4.—Timing of Housing Busts by MSA
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TABLE 3.1
SUMMARY STATISTICS

Mean

Std. Dev.

Price Index
Average Income ($1000’s)
Percent Minority
Percent Speculators
Percent FHA Insured
Percent Subprime Lenders
Average LTV
Average Square Footage
Unemployment Rate
Net Migration

132
75
.18
.054
.096
.14
.73
1672
5.9
266

52
26
0.13
0.032
0.097
0.075
0.1
161
3.3
6878

N.

5043

25th Percentile
96
56
0.075
0.031
0.014
0.087
0.69
1584
4
-668

75th Percentile
156
86
0.25
0.071
0.14
0.19
0.79
1764
6.6
1408

NOTE.—Columns present descriptive statistics for all MSA-quarter observations in our sample. Observation counts
in regressions will vary depending on the specification and control variables used.
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TABLE 3.2
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BOOM ON LOG FOCAL MARKET PRICE

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbors’ Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
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Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Neighbor 1

Neighbor 2

Neighbor Boom
Significant

Neighbor Boom
Insignificant

Neighbor Boom
Significant

-.003029
(.004662)
-.000076
(.003184)
.008688**
(.004191)
.00977**
(.004236)
.008542*
(.004985)
.005247
(.004774)

-0.003357
(0.01543)
-.03365**
(0.01526)
0.00297
(0.00563)
-.02102*
(0.01091)
-.01698***
(0.005502)
-0.006412
(0.004954)

-0.00013
(0.005425)
0.002323
(0.005658)
0.006096
(0.006421)
.01487***
(0.005638)
0.01029
(0.006735)
0.004154
(0.00551)

Neighbor Boom
Insignificant
0.0114
(0.008886)
-0.003854
(0.006118)
0.000575
(0.00634)
0.002127
(0.01006)
0.001398
(0.005476)
0.005613
(0.005984)

Y
Y
Y
Y
4584

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest or second closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. Specification
also includes dummy variable(s) indicating whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census
division by year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

TABLE 3.3
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BOOM
ON N EAREST N EIGHBOR LOG P RICE

Dep. Var: Log Nearest Neighbor’s Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

.02815**
(.01333)
.01751
(.0153)
.03224
(.02066)
.06701***
(.02199)
.08197***
(.02188)
.1179***
(.01976)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
3583

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA
and is the omitted category. Relative year effects are interacted with a
dummy for whether the neighboring market had a statistically significant
and positive break point and only the coefficients for the MSAs that actually had a boom are reported here. Specification also includes dummy
variables indicating whether the closest neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted
by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 3.4
HETEROGENEITY IN THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BOOM ON LOG FOCAL MARKET PRICE

Distance

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
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Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Relative Size

Focal Market Elasticity

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

<= 40 Miles

> 40 Miles

Focal Larger

Nbr. Larger

Inelastic

Elastic

-.004239
(.004747)
-.001823
(.003802)
.008405
(.005087)
.008409
(.005425)
.008389
(.007093)
-5.5e-06
(.005004)

-.001194
(.005436)
.001363
(.004727)
.008564
(.006187)
.009215
(.006344)
.005968
(.005006)
.0118**
(.005328)

-.001048
(.004448)
-.001269
(.003668)
.00461
(.00417)
.01116***
(.004208)
.007858
(.005809)
.005298
(.004551)

-.005334
(.005874)
.000373
(.003878)
.01288**
(.005703)
.009466*
(.005423)
.0104**
(.004913)
.008329
(.005509)

-.001111
(.006739)
-.003162
(.004464)
.00769
(.007545)
.008632
(.005739)
.00978
(.007775)
.01061*
(.006347)

.001165
(.007681)
.003788
(.006904)
.01877*
(.0103)
.02683**
(.01069)
.02897***
(.0102)
.01055
(.01232)

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

4647

4584

3586

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor interacted with dummies for
whether the focal market is in the category indicated in the column header for various measures of heterogeneity. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest
neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%,
and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

TABLE 3.5
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BOOM ON FOCAL MARKET FUNDAMENTALS USING GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE

Dependent Variable
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years

Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
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Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Year-by-Census Division FE
MSA FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Focal Market Price and LTV Growth
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Focal Market
Income

Lender
Similarity

Lending
Amount

Net
Migration

Focal Market
Flippers

-0.013
(.009)
-0.006
(.008)
0.011
(.008)
0.016
(.0115)
0.0135
(.0132)
.0229*
(.013)

.0127*
(.0065)
0.005
(.0051)
0.0025
(.0039)
-0.0015
(.0047)
0.0004
(.0071)
0.0048
(.0073)

0.0205
(0.0609)
0.0572
(0.0562)
0.0239
(0.0505)
0.0491
(0.0416)
-0.0230
(0.0448)
0.0194
(0.0618)

84.43
(132.6)
91.49
(132.9)
-43.23
(85.75)
-93.54
(78.01)
-165.4
(114)
-251.6**
(101.4)

.0078***
(0.0029)
0.0039
(0.0026)
-0.0004
(0.0032)
-0.0012
(0.003)
-0.0038
(0.0031)
-0.0037
(0.0032)

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

4877

4219

996941

1215

4829

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0
indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also include dummy
variables indicating whether the closest neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

TABLE 3.6
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BOOM ON LOG FOCAL MARKET PRICE,
CONTROLLING FOR LOCAL FUNDAMENTALS AND EXPECTATIONS

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]

-.003202
(.004133)
-.000332
(.003053)
.007821**
(.003796)
.008964**
(.004278)
.00804
(.005421)
.003512
(.004924)

Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Log Average Price of Neighbor Groups
Four Leads of Own Income
Four Leads of All Fundamental Controls
N

-.003899
(.003979)
-.000577
(.003016)
.008673**
(.003624)
.01033**
(.004157)
.008275
(.006464)
.006228
(.004178)

-.002159
(.004018)
.000934
(.00288)
.007878**
(.003235)
.008651**
(.003704)
.005047
(.005994)
.005626
(.004507)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

4538

4142

4142

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA
and is the omitted category. All specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest
neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported
in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 3.7
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR PRICE CHANGES ON FOCAL MARKET PRICE CHANGES—IV
RESULTS

Dep. Var: Focal Market Price Changes
Nearest Neighbor Price Changes

OLS

Relative Year [-2]

0.139*
(0.072)
0.094**
(0.042)
0.135***
(0.038)
0.102**
(0.040)
0.090**
(0.039)
0.089***
(0.027)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

IV
-0.045
(0.228)
0.041
(0.131)
0.148***
(0.037)
0.125***
(0.035)
0.090**
(0.037)
0.088***
(0.028)

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

4156

4131

NOTE.—Table reports the results from a regression of annualized focal market price
growth rates on the lag of the nearest neighbor’s annualized price growth interacted
with dummies for the indicated relative years of the neighboring market. In the second
column, lagged neighbor’s price growth is instrumented using one further lag.Standard
errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 3.8
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON THE L AGGED NUMBER OF BOOMS FOR THE HAZARD ESTIMATION

Lagged Number of New Booms
Neighbors [1-2]
Neighbors [3-5]
Neighbors [6-10]
Neighbors [1-10]
Neighbors [11-50]
Neighbors [51+]

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

0.0297
0.0393
0.0626
0.1317
0.3051
1.3055

0.1777
0.2058
0.2692
0.4246
0.6079
1.6134

0
0
0
0
0
0

2
3
3
5
7
6

% Zero Boom
97.2%
96.2%
94.3%
89.0%
76.2%
39.5%

NOTE.—Neighbors are ranked with respect to their geographic distance from the focal MSA.
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TABLE 3.9
HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES OF MSA NEIGHBORS ON THE PROBABILITY OF BOOMING BY
GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE

Independent Variables

Unconditional
Hazard
(1)

Lagged Number of New Booms
Neighbors[1-2]
Neighbors[3-5]
Neighbors[6-10]
Neighbors[11-50]
Neighbors[51+]
Other Controls
Lagged % MSAs that Already Boomed
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
Census Region FE

Baseline Results
(Prop. Hazard)
(2)

Weibull
Hazard
(3)

1.49
0.79
1.26
0.86
1.02

1.69*
0.84
1.25
0.8
1.05

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

2114
-29.93

2114
29.43

2114
34.14

3.49***
1.31
1.41
1.14
1.23***

N
Log-Likelihood

NOTE.—Implied Hazard Ratios are reported along with indicators of statistical significance of the underlying regression coefficients. Significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 3.10
HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES OF MSA NEIGHBORS ON THE PROBABILITY OF BUSTING

Independent Variables
Lagged Number of New Busts
Neighbors[1-2]
Neighbors[3-5]
Neighbors[6-10]
Neighbors[11-50]
Neighbors[51+]
Other Controls
Lagged Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
Census Region FE
N
Log-Likelihood

Unconditional
Hazard
(1)

Proportional Hazard
with Controls
(2)

1.66*
1.14
1.55**
1.12*
1.18***

0.96
0.74
1.08
0.96
1

N
N
N

Y
Y
Y

3637
2.181

3637
100.1

NOTE.—We define the time of housing bust as the quarter when price peaks in our sample period. Implied
hazard ratios are reported along with indicators of statistical significance of the underlying regression coefficients. Significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
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TABLE 3.11
THE IMPACT OF NEAREST NEIGHBOR HOUSING BUST ON LOG FOCAL MARKET PRICE

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

-.01169**
(.004509)
-.003846
(.003101)
-.006359
(.005119)
-.01228**
(.006151)
-.03804***
(.007463)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
5178

NOTE.—Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated
relative years of the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates
the 12 month period preceding the bust of the neighboring MSA and is the
omitted category. All specifications also include dummy variables indicating
whether the closest neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered
at the Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Additional Institutional Detail
TABLE A.1
MPDU INCOME LIMITS – 2014

Household
Size

Adjustment
Factor

Maximum
Household Income

Minimum
Household Income

1
2
3
4
5

0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.08

$52,500
$60,000
$67,500
$75,000
$81,000

$35,000
$35,000
$35,000
$35,000
$35,000

NOTE.—This table shows the MPDU income limits for households of various sizes in 2014. For a
four-person household, the maximum income limit is set at 70 percent of the area median income for
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area as published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). That limit is then multiplied by the adjustment factor shown in the second column to determine the maximum income limits for households of other sizes. The minimum income
limit is the same for all households and is set based on consultation with lenders in order to reflect the
minimum income required to qualify for a typical mortgage on an MPDU home.

TABLE A.2
HISTORY OF MPDU CONTROL PERIOD RULES

Date MPDU Originally Offered for Sale
Before October 1, 1981
October 1, 1981–February 28, 2002
March 1, 2002–March 31, 2005
After March 31, 2005

Control Period
(Years)

Control Period
Resets on Resale

5
10/15
10
30

No
No
Yes
Yes

NOTE.—This table shows the history of MPDU control period rules from the inception of the program to the present. The rules governing the length of the control period and whether the control
period resets upon resale prior to expiration are determined based on the date the MPDU was originally offered for sale by the developer. For MPDUs originally offered for sale between October
1, 1981 and February 28, 2002, the length of the control period was 10 years with the exception of
MPDUs located in one of several DHCA designated “Annual Growth Policy Areas” for which the
control period was 15 years.
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FIG. A.1.—Examples of MPDU Exterior Design. This figure presents images of the exterior of two representative MPDUs and nearby market-rate units. The MPDUs shown are located in different subdivisions.
Images were accessed on June 24, 2014 and captured by Google Maps in May (top image) and August
(bottom image) of 2012.
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FIG. A.2.—Example Deed Restriction. This figure shows an example deed restriction for an MPDU originally sold by the developer on October
20, 1995. The deed was originally recorded in the Montgomery County Circuit Court (Land Records) MQR 13728, p. 0590, MSA_CE_63-13683
and was accessed online through MDLANDREC on June 24, 2014.

A.2. Data
A.2.1. Matching MPDU Properties to the DataQuick Assessment File
MPDU properties were matched to the DataQuick assessment file in several steps. Prior to matching, the raw addresses in both datasets were cleaned in order to correct obvious spelling errors, such
as city names, and to standardize common abbreviations for street suffixes and compass directions
(North, South, etc.). After being cleaned in this way, both sets of addresses were geocoded using
an address locator service provided by the state of Maryland and developed in close collaboration
with local jurisdictions that provides highly accurate geographic coordinates for addresses located
throughout the state. Of the 8,289 MPDU properties, 91.8 percent were assigned an exact geographic location through this process. Many of the remaining 8 percent had expiration dates that
occurred prior to 1980, suggesting that the reason they went unmatched was likely due to poor
record keeping in the early years of the program. The DataQuick match rate was substantially
higher. Over 99 percent of the properties were assigned unique geographic coordinates by the
Maryland address locator. For the remaining unmatched DataQuick properties, I kept the geographic coordinates assigned by DataQuick, which uses a less accurate national address locator.
In the first step of the match, MPDU properties were assigned to DataQuick properties using exact
geographic location. For each MPDU that was given a set of geographic coordinates, I first found
the closest DataQuick property measured in straight-line distance. If the closest property was
less than one foot away, the DataQuick property ID was assigned to that MPDU and considered
a match.

1

All the remaining properties were considered unmatched and proceeded to the next

step.
The remainder of the matching process used the actual address strings contained in both datasets.
This part of the process proceeded in 13 iterations, re-matching unmatched addresses on increasingly lenient criteria at each step of the process. In the first step, properties were considered
1

The Maryland geocoding service uses a "composite" address locator which looks to several sources to identify the
geographic coordinates for a particular address. Because of this, it is possible for there to be slight differences in the
geographic coordinates for the same property if it is identified using a different source. This is likely what generates
distances that are less than 1 foot but still greater than zero.
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matched if all components of the address string—house number, street name, unit number, zip
code, and city—perfectly agreed. In the next two steps, previously unmatched properties were
considered matched if all components of the address agreed except for one of either city or zip code
(but not both). In the fourth step, properties were matched only if the entire address agreed, but
some spelling error in the street name was accommodated by using the soundex code for the street
name.

2

Steps five and six again allowed either city or zip code (but not both) to disagree while

requiring an exact match on the soundex street name and the other components of the address.
Steps 7–12 repeated steps 1–6, but allowing the unit number to differ at every step as long as one
property had a missing unit number and the other did not. Explicit unit number disagreements
were never permitted. In the final step, unit, city, and zip code were all allowed to disagree as long
as the house number and street name perfectly agreed. At every step of the process, non-unique
matches were randomly assigned.
Overall, the quality of the match is quite high. In total, 7,404 (90 percent) of the MPDUs were
matched to a DataQuick property at some point in the process. Of these, only two percent were
randomly assigned due to non-uniqueness. Eighty-two percent of matches occurred in one of the
first two steps using either exact geographic location or the exact and complete address string.
Ninety-five percent of the matches occurred in the first six steps, which required the unit numbers
to agree.
A.2.2. Cleaning the Transaction and Loan-Level Data
The transaction and loan-level datasets were both cleaned in order to ensure that the transactions
represent true ownership-changing arm’s length transactions and that the loan information is accurate and consistent. The procedures for cleaning each dataset are described below.
2
Soundex is a phonetic algorithm that indexes words based on their pronunciation. The goal of the algorithm to
encode homophones in a similar manner. For example, "Willow Road" and "Wilow Road" have the same soundex
code.
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Cleaning the Transactions Data
The raw transactions dataset contains 249,264 transaction records that are coded by DataQuick as
"arm’s length" and involve one of the 286,484 single-family residential properties with non-missing
housing characteristics contained in the assessment file. Starting with this sample, I first dropped
4,169 transactions where the year of sale preceded the year that the associated property was built
(i.e. vacant land sales). A few transactions (197) recorded as having occurred in the last quarter of
2012 were dropped because the file provided by DataQuick was received in that quarter and only
meant to cover up through the first three quarters of 2012. Many of the transactions recorded in
1997 were listed twice, with the first record containing the transaction price and no loan amount
and the second record containing a loan amount with either no transaction price or a clearly erroneous transaction price (e.g. $1.00). In these cases, all of the other transaction characteristics were
identical including the dates, buyer and seller names, and lenders. To correct this, I replaced the
missing loan amount in the first record with the loan amount from the second record, and dropped
the second record. This dropped 6,431 erroneous “transactions.” A similar issue was present for
a smaller number of transactions recorded in other years. In these cases, two transactions were
recorded on the same day for the same property with transaction prices that differed by less than
one percent and only one record containing a positive or realistic loan amount. In these cases, I
kept the record with the non-erroneous loan amount and dropped the 2,918 duplicate records. A
few transactions were exact duplicates of another transaction on property, date, price, and loan
amounts, but differed along some other dimension (typically an alternate lender name). In these
cases, one of the duplicates was randomly dropped. This dropped 375 records. In some cases, two
transactions were recorded on the same day for the same property where the buyer for the first
transaction was listed as the seller on the second transaction and the price for the first transaction
was clearly not a market price. In these cases, the intermediary was typically a title company, escrow company, or some other similar entity and only the transaction containing the market price
was kept (dropping 656 intermediary transactions). Finally, I randomly dropped 474 transactions
that were exact duplicates of another transaction on property and date but differed along some
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other dimension for unknown reasons as well as 165 transactions recorded on the same property
in the same week but differing in some other way. In these cases, one of the records was kept to
serve as a “placeholder” documenting the change in ownership that occurred on that day or during
that week. These transactions were used in determining change of ownership, but their prices were
not included in any analyses. The final sample contained 233,879 transactions involving one of the
286,484 single-family residential properties with non-missing housing characteristics contained in
the assessment file.
Cleaning the Non-Purchase Loans Data
The non-purchase loans dataset was cleaned in a similar way as the transactions data. The raw
dataset contains 780,927 non-purchase loans recorded on one of the 286,484 single-family residential properties with non-missing housing characteristics contained in the assessment file. Starting
with this sample, I first dropped the 267 records with non-positive loan amounts. I also dropped
1,477 records where the loan amount was listed as $1.00. All of these records listed the lender
name as “HUD,” and were typically recorded on the same day as another loan with a more sensible loan amount. The DataQuick data contains a variable indicating whether a loan involved
multiple parcels. This can happen when a real-estate investor owns multiple properties and borrows against their full portfolio using a single loan. I dropped all 4,130 loans coded in this way. As
with the transactions data, I also dropped 3,074 loans recorded in years prior to the year that the
associated property was built and 781 loans recorded in the last quarter of 2012. In cases where
multiple loans were recorded on the same property on the same date with the same loan amount,
I randomly kept one of the duplicates and dropped the remaining 743 records. Visual inspection
of these records suggests that in most cases all other characteristics of the loan were also identical
except for slight variations in lender name. Finally, I recoded 1,366 non-purchase loans as purchase
loans if they occurred in the same week as a transaction recorded on the same property with no
positive loan amounts. In these cases, the recoded loans were removed from the non-purchase
dataset and recorded as the first loan on the associated transaction in the transactions dataset. The
final sample of non-purchase loans contains 769,089 loans secured against one of the 286,484 single157

family residential properties with non-missing housing characteristics contained in the assessment
file. These loans were used to construct the equity extraction measures used in the analysis.
A.2.3. Constructing “Debt Histories”
To accurately measure equity extraction, it is important to distinguish between three different
types of non-purchase loans: (1) regular refinances, which replace an existing loan without extracting any equity; (2) cash-out refinances, which replace an existing loan with a larger loan,
thereby extracting equity for the amount of the difference; and (3) new non-purchase originations,
which directly extract equity for the amount of the new loan. In order to make this distinction,
I construct a “debt history” for every property that records an estimate of the current amount of
outstanding debt secured against the property at any point in time on up to two potential loans.
Given this history, when a new loan is observed, I am then able to determine whether that loan
represents a purchase loan, cash-out refinance, new non-purchase origination, or regular refinance
by comparing the size of the new loan to the estimated outstanding balance on the relevant existing
loan. This section describes the details of that procedure.
At each point in time, a given property can be thought of as having two potential “loan accounts,”
representing the current owner’s first and second mortgage (I assume that owners carry at most
two mortgages). The debt histories I construct are meant to estimate the remaining balance owed
in each of these two accounts. The balances in the two loan accounts are initialized based on
the first observed event in the property’s history. For example, if the first observed event is a
transaction with a $100,000 first loan and no second loan, then the balance in the first loan account
will be initialized at $100,000 and the balance in the second loan account will be initialized at
zero. If the first observed event is a non-purchase loan, then the balances are initialized based on
a comparison of the loan amount with an estimate of the property’s current resale value. Current
resale values are estimated using quarterly constant-quality hedonic price indices constructed from
the transactions data for each of 28 local planning areas designated by the Montgomery County
Planning Department (see Appendix A.2.4 for details on how the price indices are constructed).
These indices are used to adjust either the most recent transaction price or, for properties that
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never transact, the 2011 assessed value to the relevant quarter.

3

If the loan amount is greater than

50 percent of the estimated current resale value, then the loan is used to initialize the first account
balance and the second account balance is initialized at zero. If the loan amount is less than 50
percent of the current resale value, then the loan is used to initialize the second account balance
and the first account balance is initialized at zero.
When a new transaction occurs, the balances in each account are replaced with the loan amounts
associated with that transaction and a new ownership-spell is initiated. For non-purchase loans that
occur between transactions, the balances in each loan account are updated based on a comparison
of the new loan amount with the amortized balances remaining in the two accounts as of the date
of the new loan. Since the DataQuick data does not contain information on loan terms or interest
rates, all loans are amortized using the average offered interest rate on a 30-year fixed rate mortgage
in the month that the loan was originated. Monthly average offered interest rates are taken from
the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). Similarly, since the data does not
distinguish between closed-end liens and HELOCs, all loans are treated as fully amortizing with
an initial principal balance equal to the origination amount, which, for HELOCs, represents the
maximum draw-down amount.
Several rules are used to determine whether the new loan updates the first loan account or the
second loan account. When both accounts have a positive remaining balance, the new loan updates
the account with the remaining balance that is closest to the new loan amount. If the new loan
amount is at least five percent larger than the old loan, then the new loan is considered a cashout refinance and replaces the old balance.

4

In this case, the difference between the two loans

is counted as equity extraction. If the new loan is less than five percent larger than the old loan,
then the new loan is considered a regular refinance and replaces the old balance, with no equity
extraction recorded. If the second loan account has a zero remaining balance while the first loan
3

Since prices for MPDU properties are not permitted to appreciate faster than the rate of inflation during the control
period, I use the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to adjust prices for these properties before
the end of the control period and the hedonic price indices afterwards. Only transactions on the relevant side of the
expiration date are used to derive the current resale price for MPDUs.
4
The five percent threshold is chosen to reflect the cutoff used by Freddie Mac in its definition of cash-out refinancing.
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account has a positive balance, then one of two things will happen. First, if the new loan is larger
than 50 percent of the current first loan balance, then the new loan will replace the first loan and
equity extraction will be determined using the same rules as above. Second, if the new loan is
less 50 percent of the current first loan balance, then the new loan will replace the zero balance
in the second loan account and be counted as a new loan origination. For new originations, the
entire loan amount is counted as equity extraction. In the rare case in which there is a positive
second loan balance and zero first loan balance the same rules are followed; in this case, however,
the comparison is made with respect to the estimated current resale value rather than the first loan
balance. Finally, if both loan accounts have a zero current balance, the new loan always replaces
the first loan and is counted as a new origination.
Validating the Equity Extraction Measure
While the deeds data provide exhaustive coverage of all loans secured against a property, the assumptions needed to determine whether a new loan adds to or replaces existing debt introduce
measurement error in the equity extraction variable.

5

To gauge the magnitude of this error, Fig-

ure A.4 presents aggregate time series evidence comparing my equity extraction measure against
two external measures that were calculated using data from which it is possible to directly determine whether a new loan adds to a borrower’s existing debt. Panel A. plots the yearly average
probability of equity extraction. The dashed grey line plots a measure of equity extraction that
was calculated by Bhutta and Keys (2014) using nationally representative data from the Equifax
Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). The CCP data tracks individual debt obligations at a quarterly
frequency and provides a near complete picture of the liability side of household balance sheets.
Using this data, Bhutta and Keys (2014) define equity extraction as any instance in which an existing homeowner’s total mortgage debt increases by more than five percent. The two solid lines
were calculated using the DataQuick data and the measure of equity extraction discussed above.
They plot the fraction of properties from which equity was extracted in each year for all proper5
Under standard assumptions, such measurement error should only affect the precision of my estimates and not
their accuracy. In particular, measurement error in the dependent variable does not introduce bias or inconsistency as
long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. See, for example, Bound et al. (2001).
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ties in Montgomery County (orange circles) and for the restricted set of properties in my analysis
sample (blue squares).

6

The two methods of measuring equity extraction generate remarkably

similar time series. Both the DataQuick series and the Equifax series increase rapidly during the
period 1999–2003 before reaching a peak of roughly 20 to 25 percent and eventually declining and
leveling off at around 5 percent by 2010.

7

The correlations between the Equifax measure and the

two DataQuick series are also reported in the figure and are greater than or equal to 0.95 in both
cases. Panel B. provides an alternative way of validating my measure—in this case, plotting the
fraction of all refinance loans that in the DataQuick data that I code as cash-out. The dashed grey
line plots a similar series taken from Freddie Mac’s Quarterly Cash-Out Refinance Report. This
series reports the share of all refinance mortgages in Freddie Mac’s portfolio that were at least five
percent larger than the loan they replaced. Again, the two methods for measuring the cash-out
share generate very similar time series. Both the DataQuick series and the Freddie Mac series show
clear cyclicality in the early and late 2000s, mimicking the cyclicality of interest rates during that
period. The correlations in this case are slightly lower but nonetheless still quite high (0.87 for the
full sample and 0.82 for the analysis sample). Taken together, the evidence presented in Figure A.4
suggests that any measurement error in my equity extraction variable is not substantial enough to
affect the ability of that variable to accurately measure changes in equity extraction over time.
A.2.4. Estimating Local House Price Indices
The current resale values used to generate the “debt histories” for each property are estimated using
quarterly constant-quality hedonic price indices constructed from the transactions data for each
of 28 local planning areas designated by the Montgomery County Planning Department. I use
planning areas to construct the house price indices because their boundaries are drawn in order
to specifically take into account the homogeneity of interests, land use types, and local economic
conditions of each respective area.

8

I use hedonic indices instead of repeat sales indices in order

6

The criteria used to select the analysis sample are described in detail in Section 1.4.3.
The series in Panel A. are only shown for 1999–2010 because Bhutta and Keys (2014) only report their measure for
that period.
8
Planning areas also have the added advantage that they cover the entire county and are large enough to provide
enough data to reliably estimate a local house price index. The median planning area contains approximately 8,000
properties, which is about six times more than the median census tract.
7
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to maximize the number of local indices available since repeat sales indices generally require much
more data and therefore need to be estimated over larger geographies.
To construct the price indices, I begin by estimating the following hedonic regression:
log(Pi j m t ) = α + Xi0 β + γ m + ψ j × η t + εi j m t ,

(A.1)

where Pi j m t denotes the transaction price of property i, in planning area j , that transacts in calendar month m and quarter t , Xi is a set of property characteristics, γ m is a set of calendar month
fixed effects, ψ j × η t is a set of fully interacted planning area by quarter fixed effects, and εi j m t is
the error term. The property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of
the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms and the number of stories, dummies for the year
the property was built, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well
as the interaction of that indicator with all the other characteristics. The property characteristics
are included to control for changes in the composition of the transacted housing stock, while the
calendar month fixed effects are included to control for the well-known seasonality of the housing
market.
Having estimated this regression, I then obtain the (exponentiated) predicted values for each property, leaving out the contribution of the property characteristics and calendar month dummies.
These predicted values, which are constant within planning area and quarter, are then used to conÓ denote the predicted value for planning area j in quarter
struct the price index. Specifically, let P
jt
t . Then the price index for that planning area and quarter is given by

H P I j t = 100 ×

Ó
P
jt

,

(A.2)

PÓ
p0

where quarter zero is the base period used to normalize the index. Figure A.5 plots the price
indices for all 28 planning areas normalized to 100 in the first quarter of 2000. In general, prices in
Montgomery County evolved similarly to the national housing market over this period; however,
there is substantial heterogeneity even within the county. Some rural areas barely saw any changes
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in prices over this period, while prices nearly tripled in some of the more volatile areas of the
county.
A.2.5. Matching the DataQuick Transactions Data to HMDA
To gauge the economic and demographic representativeness of my sample, I match a subset of the
DataQuick transactions data to data on mortgage applications reported under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975. HMDA requires lenders to report loan-level information on all
loan applications received in a given year for home purchases, home purchase pre-approvals, home
improvements, and refinances involving 1 to 4 unit and multifamily dwellings. This data is made
publicly available by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). I match
the HMDA data to the transaction-level data from DataQuick using information on the primary
loan amount, lender name, loan type (Conventional, FHA, VA), census tract, and year in which
the transaction occurred. This section contains an overview of the matching process.
Prior to matching the data, I first selected a subsample of eligible transactions and loan applications
based on two criteria. First, I restricted each dataset to include only transactions or loan applications pertaining to single-family homes with a positive first lien amount.

9

Second, I restricted

the HMDA data to include only home purchase loan applications for which a loan was actually
originated and presumably resulted in a completed transaction.
I then matched the data using a straightforward iterative process that proceeded in 6 steps, rematching unmatched transactions and loans on increasingly lenient criteria at each step. In the
first step, each transaction was matched to a loan using the year in which the transaction occurred,
the census tract number, the loan type (Conventional, FHA, VA), the exact lender name, and the
exact loan amount.

10

In cases where there were multiple matches, one of them was randomly

9
HMDA only reports property type and whether a loan was a first or subordinate lien starting in 2004. However,
this information is reported for all years in DataQuick. I restrict the DataQuick sample in all years and the HMDA
sample in the years in which the information is available. There is no discernible difference in match rates or match
quality between the years preceding and following 2004.
10
HMDA rounds loan amounts to the nearest $1,000. Accordingly, I used a rounded version of the DataQuick loan
amount to conduct the merge, but required that the rounded amounts agree exactly in both datasets. Census tracts were
all converted to reflect boundaries as of the 2000 census using a crosswalk file provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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assigned as being the true match while the rest were considered unmatched.
Remaining unmatched observations were then re-matched again based only on year, census tract,
exact lender name, and exact loan amount, with multiple matches being randomly assigned as in
the first step. The next two steps repeated the first two but used a truncated version of the lender
name containing only the first 5 letters. The last two steps omitted the lender name entirely. Any
observations remaining after this process are considered unmatched.
In total, 70.8 percent of the 233,870 transactions in the cleaned DataQuick file were matched at
some point in the procedure. Of those, approximately 76 percent were matched in the first step
requiring an exact match on the full lender name and including the loan type. Of the matched
observations, 12.6 percent were randomly assigned due to having multiple matches.
To validate the quality of the match among matched observations, I further merged the surnames
provided in the DataQuick transactions file with a Census generated list of the 1,000 most common
surnames in the U.S. that also tabulates the percent of people with each name by race. For each
race—Black, White, Hispanic, and Asian—I then grouped the Census percentages into 5 percent
bins and used the race reported in HMDA to calculate the fraction of matched transactions in
that bin for which the buyer had the same race. Since race was not used as a matching criteria, a
strong positive correlation between the Census shares and matched HMDA shares would imply
that the HMDA/DataQuick match does a good job of identifying the demographic characteristics
of a particular home purchaser. Figure A.6 plots these correlations separately for each race. In
each panel the blue circles plot the fraction of matched transactions in each 5 percent bin who
report having the indicated race on their loan application. The black line in each panel plots
the fitted values from a regression estimated in the underlying unbinned microdata, while the
slope coefficient from that regression and its standard error are reported in the top left of each
panel. The dashed orange line is the 45-degree line. For each race, the correlations are close to
one and precisely estimated, suggesting that the match successfully identifies the demographic
characteristics of individual home buyers.
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A.2.6. Residential Building Permits Data
The data used to measure residential investment activity was obtained from the Montgomery
County Department of Permitting Services and includes address-level information on all residential building, home improvement, and mechanical permits issued by the department since 2000.
Each record includes information on the date the permit was applied for, the street address for the
associated property, the type of work to be performed, and the type of structure on which the
work will be performed. The permits data covers all areas of the county except for the cities of
Gaithersburg and Rockville, which have their own permitting departments. The data covers both
new construction and any major renovations, alterations, improvements, or additions to a home
as well as any work performed on the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system.
I drop any records where the listed structure type is clearly non-residential (e.g. “Restaurant,”
“Commercial,” “Industrial”) as well as any records for which the listed work type is not related
to the actual improvement or alteration to the property (e.g. “Inspect and Approve”, “Information”). The remaining dataset contains 148,647 unique permit applications, which I match to the
DataQuick assessment file using the same approach used to match the list of MPDU addresses
(see Appendix A.2.1) but allowing for multiple permits to match to the same property. Of the
original 148,647 permits, a total of 137,510 (92.5 percent) were matched to a DataQuick property
at some stage of the matching procedure. These permits were then used to construct the annual
property-level panel used in the analysis as described in Section 1.7.
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FIG. A.3.—Geographic Distribution of MPDU Properties within Montgomery County, Maryland. This figure
shows the location of all MPDU properties that were successfully matched to a property in the DataQuick assesment file (N=7,404). MPDU properties are marked with an orange circle. Census tracts within Montgomery
County are shaded according to the median year built for all housing units in the census tract as reported in the
2010 American Community Survey.
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FIG. A.4.—Validating the Home Equity Extraction Measure. This figure provides evidence validating the accuracy of the home equity extraction measure derived
from the DataQuick deeds records against nationally representative aggregate series derived from other sources. Panel A. plots the yearly aggregate probability
of extracting equity. Panel B. plots the yearly fraction of refinance mortgages that were cash-out. In both panels, the solid lines were generated using the equity
extraction measure for Montgomery County derived from DataQuick for the full sample (orange circles) and the analysis sample (blue squares). In Panel A., the
dashed grey line was taken from Bhutta and Keys (2014) and constructed using nationally representative borrower-level data from the Equifax Consumer Credit
Panel. In Panel B., the dashed grey line was constructed using data from Freddie Mac’s Quarterly Cash-Out Refinance Report. The correlations between the
DataQuick measures and the corresponding national aggregate measures in each panel are reported in the legend. The time span in Panel A. is shorter than that of
Panel B. because Bhutta and Keys (2014) only report their measure for the period 1999–2010.
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FIG. A.5.—Quarterly Hedonic House Price Indices for Montgomery County Planning Areas. This figure plots
quarterly constant-quality hedonic price indices over the period 1997–2012 for each of the 28 local planning areas
designated by the Montgomery County Planning Department. Each index was generated from the predicted values
of a regression of (log) transaction price on a series of property characteristics, seasonal dummies, and planning
area by quarter fixed effects as described in ??. All series are normalized to 100 in the first quarter of 2000 and are
shaded according to their maximum value obtained over the entire period.

168

1

HMDA Fraction

.6
.5
.2

.3

HMDA Fraction

HMDA Fraction

.7

.8

.9

slope = 0.889
(0.005)

.4

1
.6
.5
.4
.2

.3

HMDA Fraction

.7

.8

.9

slope = 0.882
(0.003)

.1

.1

Mean
45° Line

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

0

0

Linear Fit
0

1

0

.1

.2

.3

Census 2000 Fraction

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

.7

.8

.9

1

1

Panel B. Black
slope = 0.901
(0.002)

.8

HMDA Fraction

.7
.6
.5
.4

HMDA Fraction

.3
.2
.1
0

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

HMDA Fraction

.7

.8

.9

slope = 0.892
(0.002)

.9

1

Panel A. White

HMDA Fraction

.4

Census 2000 Fraction

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

0

Census 2000 Fraction

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

Census 2000 Fraction

Panel C. Hispanic

Panel D. Asian

FIG. A.6.—Validating the DataQuick HMDA Match. This figure presents evidence validating the quality of the
match between DataQuick housing transactions and HMDA loan applications. In each panel, the blue circles plot
the fraction of matched transactions belonging to the indicated race as reported in HMDA on the y-axis against the
fraction of households with the same surname as the home buyer who belong to that race as implied by the list of the
1,000 most popular surnames provided by the U.S. Census on the x-axis. The solid black line in each panel is the fit
from a linear regression fit in the underlying microdata. The slope coefficient from that regression and its standard
error are also reported in each panel. The dashed orange line is the 45-degree line.
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FIG. A.7.—Distribution of Homebuyer Income. This figure plots the distribution of (log) homebuyer income (in real
2012 $1,000s) as reported on loan applications contained in the HMDA data for three separate samples. Panel A. shows
the distribution for the set of all approved purchase-mortgage applications filed in the United States between 1997 and
2012 for which the borrower reported a non-missing income (N = 62, 267, 113). Panel B. restricts the sample to include
only mortgage applications that were successfully matched to a transaction contained in the primary analysis sample
(N = 21, 696). Panel C. further restricts the sample to include only applications that matched to a transaction in the
analysis sample that involved an MPDU property (N = 1, 523). Each panel also reports the mean, median, standard
deviation, and interquartile range in levels for the plotted log income distribution. A bin width of 10 log points is used
in all three panels.
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FIG. A.8.—Distribution of Homebuyer Race. This figure plots the distribution of homebuyer race as reported on
loan applications contained in the HMDA data for three separate samples. The first set of bars shows the racial
breakdown for the set of all approved purchase-mortgage applications filed in the United States between 1997 and
2012 for which the borrower reported a non-missing race or ethnicity of either White, Black, Hispanic, or Asian
(N = 57, 710, 449). The second set of bars restricts the sample to include only mortgage applications that were
successfully matched to a transaction contained in the primary analysis sample (N = 19, 780). The third set of
bars further restricts the sample to include only applications that matched to a transaction in the analysis sample
that involved an MPDU property (N = 1, 427). Racial shares are calculated only within the sample of applications
with one of the indicated races so that the height of the bars adds to one within each sample. The four categories
are mutually exclusive, meaning that a borrower is categorized as Hispanic if she reports an ethnicity of Hispanic
regardless of which race she reports.
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A.3. Additional Results and Robustness Checks
A.3.1. The Effect of Expiring Price Controls on MPDU Turnover
One potential concern with implementing a difference-in-differences research design at the property level is that in addition to the increase in collateralized debt capacity, the expiration of the
price control also creates incentives for MPDU owners to sell their homes, which could lead to a
differential increase in turnover at MPDU properties. While this concern is explicitly addressed in
the main analysis through the inclusion of property and ownership-spell fixed effects, it is nonetheless interesting to empirically gauge the magnitude of any changes in turnover induced by expiring
price controls.
To do so, I construct an annual property-level panel which records for each property in the main
analysis sample whether that property was sold in a given year. For properties built prior to
1997, the panel covers the full sample period from 1997–2012; for properties built afterwards,
the construction year is used as the first year of observation. Using this panel, I then estimate
regressions of the following form:
S o l di s t = α s + δ t + Xi0t γ + β1 · M P D Ui + β2 · M P D Ui × P o s t s t + εi s t ,

(A.3)

where S o l di s t is an indicator for whether property i in subdivision s was sold in year t , and all
other variables are as described in Section 1.5 in reference to equation (1.10). The coefficient of
interest is β2 , which measures the differential change in the turnover rate for MPDUs relative to
non-MPDUs following the expiration of the price control, holding constant individual housing
characteristics and aggregate differences in turnover rates across subdivisions and over time.
Table A.3 presents results from estimating this regression using various specifications. In the first
column, I include only time-invariant property characteristics and fixed effects for both the year
of observation and the age of the property in that year. The property characteristics include a
quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms and

172

the number of stories, and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well as
the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics including property age. In the second column I also include fixed effects for the subdivision
the property is located in. In column 3, I further interact the subdivision fixed effects with a linear
time trend to allow for differential aggregate trends in turnover across subdivisions. In the fourth
column, I include property fixed effects, causing the time-invariant property characteristics and
the MPDU main effect to drop out. In this specification, the effect of expiring price controls is
identified by comparing within-property changes in turnover probabilities for properties that are
and are not MPDUs. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, I dispense with the linear probability model and
report probit and logit marginal effects using the same specification as in column 3.
The estimated effects are relatively stable across specifications and imply that expiring price controls lead to an increase in the annual turnover rate at MPDU properties of roughly three to five
percentage points. These effects are large relative to the pre-period average annual turnover rate
of 4.8 percent among MPDUs reported in the bottom panel of the table. Comparing the MPDU
main effect with the interaction term shows that expiring price controls close between 50 to 80
percent of the gap in turnover rates between MPDUs and non-MPDUs that existed during the
period of price control. However, the estimates are small in absolute terms, reflecting the fact
that turnover is a relatively rare event. For example, adding the estimated three percentage point
increase in column six to the pre-period mean turnover rate among MPDUs implies an annual
post-expiration turnover rate of 7.8 percent. At that rate, it would take almost 13 years for the
entire MPDU housing stock to turnover.
To give a sense of the dynamics of the turnover effect, Figure A.9 plots estimates from a version
of equation (A.3) that allows the effect of the price control to differ separately for MPDUs and
non-MPDUs by year relative to the first control period expiration (as described in the discussion
of equation (1.11) in Section 1.5). Specifically, the series in orange squares plots the coefficient
estimates on a set of dummies indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative
year as measured from the year the first MPDU in the relevant subdivision expired (relative year
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zero). This series measures the trend in the turnover rate for non-MPDU properties around the
time the price control expired. Relative year −1 is the omitted category so that all estimates should
be interpreted as relative to the year prior to when the first price control in the subdivision expired.
Similarly, the series in blue circles shows the trend for MPDU properties. This line plots the sum
of the relative year main effects (the series in orange squares) and the interaction of those effects
with an indicator for whether the property is an MPDU. The figure also reports the 95 percent
confidence interval for that sum. All controls included in column 3 of Table A.3 were also included
in the regression. As the figure makes clear, the turnover rate at MPDU properties exhibits a sharp
departure from it’s pre-period trend precisely in the year the first price control expires while there
is no corresponding change for non-MPDU properties. Moreover, the trends for MPDUs and
non-MPDUs are statistically indistinguishable in the period prior to the expiration of the price
control and only diverge beginning in the year of expiration.
A.3.2. Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Borrowing Response
Another potential concern with the main difference-in-differences estimates provided in Section 1.6
is that they rely on standard OLS estimation, which can be sensitive to differences in the distribution of covariates across treatment and control groups and relies heavily on extrapolation in
areas where the covariates do not overlap (Imbens, 2004). In this section, I explore the sensitivity of the main results to an alternative estimation approach which restricts attention to the set
of properties with overlapping characteristics and constructs the counterfactual outcome for each
MPDU property using a locally weighted average of the outcomes among the non-MPDU properties whose characteristics are most similar. Specifically, I provide estimates based on the local
linear propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimator developed in Heckman et al.
(1997, 1998).
Adopting the notation in Smith and Todd (2005), let t 0 and t denote the time periods before and
after the expiration of the first price control within a property’s subdivision. Let Y1t i denote
the observed outcome for property i if it receives the “treatment” in period t , where here the
treatment is defined as being an MPDU in the post-period. Similarly, let Y0t i denote the out174

come for property i without treatment. Further, let the dummy variable Di = 1 if a property is
an MPDU and Di = 0 if a property is not an MPDU. Given a vector of fixed property characteristics, Xi , the propensity score is defined as the conditional probability that a property is an
MPDU, P (Xi ) = Pr(Di = 1|Xi ). A property is said to be in the region of common support, SP ,
if its propensity score has positive density in both the MPDU and non-MPDU distributions of
propensity scores: SP = {P : f (P |D = 1) > 0 and f (P |D = 0) > 0}.
Having established this notation, the propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimator can be expressed as:
ˆ DI D = 1
∆
D=1
n1t
1
n1t 0

n1t
¦
©
X
Y1t i (Xi ) − Ê (Y0t i |P (Xi ), Di = 0) −
i∈I1t ∩SP
n1t 0
X


©
¦
Y0t 0 j (X j ) − Ê Y0t 0 j |P (X j ), D j = 0 ,

(A.4)

j ∈I1t 0 ∩SP

where I1t 0 and I1t denote the set of MPDU properties with outcomes observed in the pre- and
post-periods, respectively, and n1t and n1t 0 are the number of observations for MPDU properties in those two sets that are also in the region of common support. Implementing this estimator requires determining the region of common support and estimating the two expectations


Ê (Y0t i |P (Xi ), Di = 0) and Ê Y0t 0 j |P (X j ), D j = 0 , which serve as the counterfactual outcomes
for MPDU properties in the two periods.
Both the determination of the region of common support and the estimation of the counterfactual
outcomes depend on the propensity score, which I estimate using a simple probit model. Specifically, I take the estimated propensity score for property i to be the fitted values from a probit
regression of the MPDU dummy on a set of property characteristics which includes the interior
square footage of the home, the year it was built, the number of bathrooms and stories in the home
and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome. In order to get an accurate
prediction of the propensity score, these covariates are entered into the model in a highly flexible
fashion. I include cubic splines in both the square footage and year built as well as the linear interaction of both variables with a fully interacted set of dummies for the number of bathrooms and
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the number of stories. All of these terms are then further interacted with the condo dummy.
Having estimated the propensity score for each property, I then define the region of common support as the set of all propensity scores that are larger than the maximum of the first percentile in
the distribution of propensity scores in both sets of properties and smaller than the minimum of
the 99th percentile of propensity scores in both distributions. Figure A.10 plots the distribution of
propensity scores for properties that fall within the region of common support separately for MPDUs and non-MPDUs. Dropping properties outside the region of common support leaves a total
of 1,836 MPDU properties and 8,443 non-MPDU properties. Table A.4 provides an assessment
of how well the estimated propensity score does in balancing covariates across these properties.
The table shows the means of the covariates used to estimate the propensity score separately for
MPDUs and non-MPDUs within terciles of the combined propensity score distribution. For each
set of means, I also report the t -statistic from the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in
means. While the propensity score does not do a perfect job of balancing the covariates, as is evidenced by the statistically significant differences for several of the variables, in nearly all cases, the
differences in means are not economically meaningful and are far less stark than the differences in
the full sample shown in columns 5 and 7 of Table 1.1.
I use a local linear regression estimator to construct the matched counterfactual outcomes for each
observed MPDU outcome. Implementing this estimator is relatively straightforward, and the full
details can be found in Todd (1999). I focus the discussion here on how I construct the counterfactual outcome for observed MPDU outcomes in the post-period, Y1t i . The process for constructing counterfactual outcomes for the pre-period outcomes, Y0t i , is completely analogous. To
construct the matched outcome for a particular MPDU property, i , observed in the post-period, I
first match the post-period outcome for that property to all observed post-period outcomes among
non-MPDU properties. I then calculate the difference in propensity scores between the MPDU
property and each of the matched non-MPDU properties. For a particular non-MPDU property,
j , denote this difference as P (Xi ) − P (X j ). I then run a weighted least squares regression of the
outcomes for the matched non-MPDU properties on a constant and a linear term in this differ-
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ence. I weight each observation according to the difference in propensity scores using a quartic
kernel function and an bandwidth of 0.1. This means that outcomes among non-MPDUs whose
propensity scores are more than 0.1 away from the propensity score for MPDU i receive no weight
in the regression while those with identical propensity scores receive a weight that is close to 1.
The estimated counterfactual outcome, Ê (Y0t i |P (Xi ), Di = 0), is given by the constant from this
this regression. This process is then repeated for all observed MPDU outcomes in both periods in
order to obtain all of the matched outcomes.
With the matched outcomes in hand, I can then directly calculate the propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimate given by equation (A.4). To calculate the standard error for
this estimate, I bootstrap the entire process using a stratified resampling procedure that randomly
samples properties with replacement in a way that ensures that the number of properties sampled
from each subdivision stays the same. Table A.5 reports the matching estimates for each of the
three main outcomes—log transaction prices, the annual probability of extracting equity, and the
total amount of equity extracted per year. The estimated effect for all three outcomes is positive
and precisely estimated. The equity extraction estimates are almost identical to the main OLS
difference-in-differences estimates reported in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4. Similarly, the price effect
is slightly larger but qualitatively similar to the main estimates reported in Table 1.2. Together,
these results suggest that the main estimates are not being greatly affected by the fact that OLS
relies on extrapolation in regions of the covariate space with poor overlap.
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FIG. A.9.—Dynamic Effects of Expiring Price Controls on Turnover at MPDU Properties. This figure reports
estimates of the effect of expiring price controls on the annual turnover rate at MPDU properties derived from
a flexible difference-in-differences regression that allows the effect to vary by year relative to the expiration of
the price control. Estimates were constructed by regressing an indicator for whether a given property sold in a
particular year on an indicator for whether that property is an MPDU and the interaction of the MPDU indicator
with a series of dummy variables indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured
from the year the first MPDU in the relevant subdivision expired. Relative year zero denotes the year the first
price control in the subdivision expired. Relative year −1 is the omitted category so that all estimates should be
interpreted as relative to the year prior to expiration. Results are shown for five years preceding and following the
expiration of the price control, with all years outside that window grouped into the effects for relative years −5
and 5. The series in orange squares plots the coefficient estimates on the relative year main effects, which represent
the trend in turnover rates among non-MPDU properties. The series in blue circles plots the estimate and 95
percent confidence interval for the sum of the relative year main effects and the interaction of those effects with the
MPDU indicator, representing the trend among MPDU properties. The 95 percent confidence intervals are based
on standard errors which were clustered at the subdivision level. The regression also included year fixed effects,
subdivision fixed effects and their interaction with a linear time trend and a set of property characteristics. The
property characteristics include a quadratic in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number
of bathrooms, stories, and property age, as well as an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhome
and the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of the other property characteristics.
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FIG. A.10.—Propsensity Score Overlap. This figure shows the overlap in the distribution of estimated propensity
scores for MPDU and non-MPDU properties in the region of common support. The propensity score was estimated using a simple probit regression of the MPDU dummy on a set of property characteristics that included
the interior square footage of the home, the year it was built, the number of bathrooms, the number of stories
and an indicator for whether the property is a condo or townhouse. These covariates were entered in a flexible
fashion that included cubic splines in square footage and year built as well as the linear interaction of both of those
variables with a fully interacted set of dummies for the number of bathrooms and the number of stories. All of
these terms were then further interacted with the condo dummy. The region of common support is defined as the
set of all propensity scores that are larger than the maximum of the first percentile in the distribution of propensity
scores in both sets of properties and smaller than the minimum of the 99th percentile of propensity scores in both
distributions.
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TABLE A.3
THE EFFECT OF EXPIRING PRICE CONTROLS ON TURNOVER AT MPDU PROPERTIES
OLS
(1)
MPDU
MPDU × Post
Property Characteristics
Year and Age FEs
Subdivision FEs
Subdivision Trend
Property FEs
Pre-Expiration MPDU Mean
Number of Observations

-0.072***
(0.007)
0.050***
(0.008)
X
X

0.048
483,805

(2)
-0.064***
(0.007)
0.049***
(0.008)
X
X
X

0.048
483,805

(3)
-0.063***
(0.008)
0.049***
(0.008)
X
X
X
X
0.048
483,805

(4)

0.032***
(0.008)
X
X
X
0.048
483,805

Probit

Logit

(5)

(6)

-0.057***
(0.007)
0.034***
(0.008)

-0.055***
(0.008)
0.030***
(0.009)

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

0.048
483,805

0.048
483,805

NOTE.—This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring MPDU price controls on the annual turnover
rate at MPDU properties. Each column reports a separate regression estimated at the property-year level where the dependent
variable is an indicator for whether the property sold in a particular year. Coefficients are reported for the “treatment” dummy,
denoting whether the property is an MPDU, and the interaction of that dummy with an indicator for whether the year of observation falls on or after the year the first price control within the relevant subdivision expired. All specifications include fixed
effects for both the year of observation and the age of the property in that year. The property characteristics include a quadratic
in the interior square footage of the home, dummies for the number of bathrooms and the number of stories, and an indicator
for whether the property is a condo or townhome as well as the interaction of that indicator with the year fixed effects and all of
the other property characteristics including property age. Subdivision trends are estimated by interacting the subdivision fixed effects with a linear time trend. Columns 1–4 report coefficient estimates from linear probability models, while columns 5–6 report
marginal effects from probit and logit specifications. The mean of the dependent variable among MPDU properties in the period
prior to the first price control expiration is reported in the second to last row. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the subdivision level. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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TABLE A.4
COVARIATE BALANCE WITHIN TERCILES OF THE PROPENSITY SCORE DISTRIBUTION

First P-Score Tercile
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Fraction Condo
Square Footage (1000’s)
Number of Bathrooms
Number of Stories
Age (Years)
Number of Observations

Non-MPDU

MPDU

0.824
1.333
2.391
1.690
24.207

0.871
1.249
1.971
1.557
23.186

Second P-Score Tercile
t-stat

Non-MPDU

-1.164
1.977*
2.921***
1.691*
1.315
3,392

0.774
1.179
2.124
1.635
24.033

MPDU
0.843
1.134
2.187
1.623
23.832

t-stat

Third P-Score Tercile
Non-MPDU

-3.884***
3.687***
-1.455
0.470
0.802
3,395

0.916
1.159
2.084
1.852
23.562

MPDU
0.924
1.141
2.056
1.893
23.400

t-stat
-0.797
2.715***
1.004
-2.369**
1.065
3,492

NOTE.—This table presents means of the covariates used to estimate the propensity score. Properties are grouped based on whether their propensity score falls
in the bottom, middle, or top third of the combined distribution of propensity scores. Means are then calculated separately for MPDUs and non-MPDUs within
these three terciles. For each set of means, the table also reports the t -statistic from a test of the null hypothesis of no difference in means between MPDUs and
non-MPDUs. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

TABLE A.5
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES
Log Transaction
Price

Probability of
Extracting Equity

Amount Extracted
($1,000s)

(1)

(2)

(3)

DID Matching Estimate

0.610***
(0.060)

0.035***
(0.013)

2.783***
(0.686)

Number of Matched MPDUs
Number of Matched Non-MPDUs
Number of Bootstrap Replicates
Bandwidth

1,846
8,443
100
0.1

1,846
8,443
100
0.1

1,846
8,443
100
0.1

NOTE.—This table presents propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of expiring price controls on log transaction prices, the annual probability of equity extraction, and the total amount of equity extracted per year
among MPDU properties and their owners. Estimates were constructed as described in ??. Bootstrap standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and *** and were determined based on
the assumption that the bootstrap distribution is normally distributed.
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A.4. Supplementary Material
A.4.1. The GSEs and the Conforming Loan Limit
The two large government sponsored enterprises—the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)—were created
to encourage mortgage lending. The GSEs purchase mortgages from lenders and either hold them
in portfolio or package them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are guaranteed by the
GSEs and sold to investors in the secondary market. By purchasing mortgages, the GSEs free
up lender capital, allowing the lenders to make additional loans and thus expanding the general
availability of mortgage credit.
The GSEs play a large role and exert a substantial amount of influence in the mortgage market.

11

However, they are only allowed to purchase loans which satisfy a specific set of criteria as outlined
by their regulator. These criteria include requirements for loan documentation, debt-to-income
ratios, leverage, and a nominal cap on the dollar amount of any purchased loan. Loans which meet
these criteria and are therefore eligible to be purchased by the GSEs are referred to as “conforming
loans." In this paper we are primarily interested in the cap on loan size, known as the “conforming
limit.” Mortgages exceeding this limit are not eligible for GSE purchase and are referred to as
“jumbo loans.”
Figure A.11 plots the conforming limit in nominal terms (the solid black line) and in real 2007
dollars (the dashed red line) for each year during our sample period. During this period, the GSEs
were regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which set the
limit each year based on changes in the national median house price. The limit was the same for
all mortgages in a given year irrespective of local housing market conditions.
11

12

Following the

As of 2010, the GSEs were responsible for nearly 50 percent of the approximately $10.5 trillion in outstanding
mortgage debt, either directly or through outstanding MBS (Jaffee and Quigley, 2012). More than 75 percent of all
mortgages originated in 2011 passed through the hands of one of the GSEs (Kaufman, 2012).
12
The only exceptions to this rule were Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, which were deemed to be high
cost areas and had a 50 percent higher conforming limit prior to 2008. Since the housing crisis, the national conforming
loan limit has been replaced by a more complicated series of limits set at the metropolitan level. All of the analysis in
this paper pertains to the pre-2008 period.
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trend in national house prices, the nominal limit increased from around $215,000 in 1997 to its
peak in 2006 and 2007 at approximately $420,000. In real terms, the limit also rose sharply over
this period, especially during the house price boom of the mid-2000s.
Interest rates on loans above the conforming limit are typically higher than those on comparable
loans below the limit for two reasons. First, because the debt underlying the MBS issued by the
GSEs is backed by an implicit government guarantee, investors are willing to accept lower yields
in exchange for that guarantee.

13

Part of this savings is eventually passed on to borrowers in the

form of lower interest rates on conforming loans.

14

Second, the GSEs are also granted several

special privileges that private securitizers are not. These include access to a line of credit at the
U.S. Treasury, exemption from disclosure and registration requirements with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and exemptions from state and local income taxes.

15

These advan-

tages lower the cost of securitizing mortgages for the GSEs relative to private market securitizers,
with some of the savings passed on to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates on loans below
the conforming limit.
A.4.2. Endogenous Housing Choice
With the choice of housing fixed, as in the discussion in the main text, borrowers can only respond
to the presence of a notch by adjusting their mortgage balance. In other words, all households
buy the same house at the same price as in the absence of a notch, but some households respond
to the notch by making a larger down payment or taking out a second mortgage. In reality, some
households may instead choose to buy a lower quality home, leading to a lower level of h.
Our model extends to cover endogenous housing choice, albeit at the cost of a closed-form solution. Consider again equation (2.5), the household’s intertemporal optimization problem. Households can now choose the quantity of housing services to purchase (h), and this quantity has a
13

The implicit guarantee became explicit in 2008 when the GSEs were placed under government conservatorship.
Passmore et al. (2002) and Passmore et al. (2005) provide several theoretical explanations for how the savings from
the guarantee are eventually passed down to mortgage borrowers.
15
For a full description of the direct benefits conferred on the GSEs as a result of their special legal status see Congressional Budget Office (2001).
14
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direct effect on first-period utility, so that
V = max{u(y + m − p h, h) + δv( p h − (1 + r ) m)},
m,h

(A.5)

with v (c2 ) now denoting second-period utility, as distinct from u (c1 , h) in which housing enters
directly.
The optimal h and m must now satisfy two first-order conditions:
∂V
= u1 − δ (1 + r ) v1 = 0
∂m

(A.6)

∂V
= u2 − ( p u1 − pδv1 ) = 0.
∂h

(A.7)

Intuitively, the first condition captures the trade-off, using mortgage debt, between consumption
today and consumption tomorrow. The second condition says that households trade off the cost
of purchasing housing today, less the amount recovered tomorrow when it is sold, against its consumption value today.
While there are no obvious functional forms that allow us to derive equivalents to equation (2.6),
the intuition remains the same. Under standard conditions, there are optimal m ∗ and h ∗ , both of
which can shift in response to the notch in the interest rate schedule. Our bunching estimation
will capture the shifts in m ∗ , which could result in part from changes in housing consumption
(h ∗ ).
A.4.3. Summary Statistics
Table A.6 presents summary statistics for our primary estimation sample from DataQuick as well
as the sub-sample of transactions with first loan amounts within $50,000 of the conforming limit
that was in place in the year of the transaction. All dollar amounts here and throughout the analysis
are converted to real 2007 dollars.
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In the full sample, shown in column 1, the mean first loan size is approximately $350,000 and
the mean transaction price is $465,000. Column 3 shows the means from the restricted sample.
Although the large sample size means that many of the differences between columns 1 and 3 are
statistically significant, they are qualitatively similar along all dimensions. Interestingly, because
the restricted sample drops both high priced houses and low priced houses, the average transaction
price and loan amount near the conforming limit are actually a bit lower than the averages for the
entire sample. In many states with lower average house prices, there are relatively few loans made
substantially above the limit, but in California such transactions are much more common.
Table A.7 presents summary statistics from the LPS data for fixed-rate (FRM) and adjustablerate (ARM) loans separately. Columns 1 and 3 report statistics for the full analysis sample while
columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to loans within $50,000 of the conforming loan limit. In
general, the restricted samples for each loan type are quite similar to the full sample, suggesting
that loans near the limit are reasonably representative of the entire sample, at least along these
dimensions.
A.4.4. Heterogeneity by Borrower Type
In addition to investigating bunching behavior by loan type, as in subsubsection 2.5.1, it is also
interesting to examine whether bunching varies with the observable characteristics of borrowers.
While the available information on borrower demographics is somewhat limited, we are able to
provide several rough cuts of the data based on race and income by matching a subset of DQ transactions to loan application information made available through the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA). 16 For this exercise we restrict attention to fixed-rate mortgages, where the sample
sizes are largest. Using the race and ethnicity information in the HMDA data, we define a loan
as belonging to a “minority" borrower if the primary loan applicant reports his race as black or
his ethnicity as Hispanic and as belonging to a “non-minority” borrower otherwise. Similarly, we
define a borrower as “low-income" if the income reported on the loan application was below the
16

The matching procedure uses information on the primary loan amount, lender name, Census tract, property type,
and year. We successfully match about 60 percent of the larger DQ sample to observations in HMDA. Further details
are available from the authors on request.
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median income reported across all loans and “high-income" if the reported income is above the
median.
Figure A.12 shows results from estimating bunching separately in each of these four sub-samples.
Panels (A) and (B) show results for non-minority and minority borrowers while panels (C) and (D)
present the results for high-income and low-income borrowers, respectively. In each case there is
substantial evidence of heterogeneous responses, with far less bunching among minority and lowincome borrowers than among non-minority and high-income borrowers. For non-minority and
high-income borrowers the estimated percentage reduction in loan size is roughly 7 to 8 percent
while for minority and low-income borrowers it is closer to 4 to 5 percent.

17

These differences could arise from at least three sources: heterogeneous preferences, heterogeneous
costs of adjusting first mortgage balances, or borrower-level differences in the magnitude of the
jumbo-conforming spread. While we cannot test for differences in the magnitude of the spread
along these dimensions because the LPS data do not contain information on race or income, we
do not find robust evidence of differences along other dimensions that are likely correlated with
these characteristics, such as borrowers’ credit scores. This finding suggests that one of the first
two sources of heterogeneity are likely operative.
In the context of income taxes, Kleven and Waseem (2013) are able to distinguish between the role
of preferences and adjustment costs using the fact that a notch can sometimes create a dominated
region in which no wage earner, regardless of tax elasticity, would choose to locate in the absence of
adjustment costs. By counting the number of wage earners observed in the dominated region they
are able to back out an estimate of adjustment costs. Unfortunately, we cannot perform a similar
exercise here because there is no such dominated region in our setting. In the terminology of
17
Table A.8 confirms the visual impressions given by Figure A.12, reporting the point estimates and standard errors
for the bunching parameters we estimate. For each of the reported parameters, the standard errors are small enough to
reject the null that bunching behavior is the same across the high-income and low-income samples, as well as across the
non-minority and minority samples. Part of the smaller response among low-income borrowers could be driven by the
fact that there are virtually no borrowers in the low-income sample who take out jumbo loans. That is, almost all of
the low-income borrowers who would locate anywhere to the right of the limit have chosen to bunch, which limits the
possible magnitude of the estimated response. Consequently, the bunching borrowers may all be infra-marginal, and
the bunching estimate cannot be interpreted as an average marginal response, as in the theory.
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Kleven and Waseem (2013), the jumbo-conforming spread creates a “downward notch” where, for
any finite loan amount above the limit, there exists a first mortgage demand elasticity sufficiently
close to zero such that some borrower would be willing to take out that loan. It is therefore not
possible to estimate the magnitude of any differences in adjustment costs across these four groups.
While it seems more likely that these differences are driven by adjustment costs than by differences in underlying preferences for first mortgage debt, we leave a full analysis of this issue for
future research. However, it is important to note that because we are not able to determine the
magnitude of such adjustment costs, the elasticities we estimate are necessarily “reduced form,” in
the sense that they incorporate the effect of adjustment costs and are not driven entirely by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution alone.
A.4.5. More Cash or Cheaper Houses?
In Section 2.6.3 we provide results suggesting that roughly 65 percent of borrowers who bunch
at the conforming limit do so without the use of a second mortgage. In order to lower their first
mortgage amount, these borrowers must either be putting up more cash or spending less on housing than they otherwise would. If they are spending less on housing while holding their leverage
roughly constant, then both their first and combined LTVs should be little changed relative to the
counterfactual in which the conforming limit does not exist.

18

Therefore, if all of the bunching

borrowers were either taking out second mortgages or buying cheaper houses, then we would expect the average combined LTV at the conforming limit to be about the same as in nearby bins.
Figure A.13, which plots the combined LTV against the first mortgage amount, makes clear that
this (admittedly extreme) scenario is far from true. The combined LTV at the limit is about 75
percent, well below the 80 to 85 percent that would be predicted based on the red line, which is a
polynomial fit using the data outside of the same excluded region that was used to estimate bunching in Figure 2.7A.

19

Thus, a significant portion of the 65 percent of borrowers who bunch

18
Some borrowers may buy a cheaper house but target an ideal monthly payment, rather than an ideal LTV. Such
borrowers would slightly reduce their LTV when they bunch, but by much less than buying the same house at the same
price.
19
The 85 to 90 percent combined LTVs to the right of the limit, which are higher than any of the other points on the
plot, also stand out. One possibility is that the borrowers in these bins who do not bunch have different characteristics
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without a second mortgage must be doing so by putting up more cash as opposed to spending less
on housing.
In the most extreme case, all of these borrowers are putting up more cash. Since both putting up
more cash and taking out a second mortgage reduce a borrower’s first-mortgage LTV while spending less on housing does not, we can gauge the plausibility of this extreme case by examining the
relationship between first-mortgage LTV ratios and loan size near the limit. To do so, Figure A.14
plots the first-mortgage LTV against the first mortgage amount. This figure is analogous to Figure A.13 except for the blue “X”, which is a first-mortgage LTV calculated under the assumption
that none of the bunching borrowers adjust their housing expenditure.
To calculate this LTV, we first generate a “counterfactual” mean house price for each loan size
bin by fitting a 5th degree polynomial to the observed mean price in each bin omitting the bins
in the excluded region used to estimate bunching. We then take the weighted average of these
mean counterfactual house prices in the bin containing the limit and in each bin to the right of the
limit in the excluded region. In calculating this average, the weight assigned to the mean price at
the limit is the estimated counterfactual bin count from the bunching procedure, and the weights
assigned to each of the mean prices to the right of the limit are equal to the difference between
the counterfactual and observed bin counts from Figure 2.7A. To calculate the LTV plotted in the
figure, we then compute the average conforming limit for all loans observed at the limit and divide
by the weighted average counterfactual house price.
Somewhat surprisingly, the observed LTV at the limit is even lower than under the extreme scenario used to calculate the “X”, in which no borrower adjusts her house price. Even allowing for
some noise in the estimates, this comparison suggests that very few borrowers who bunch at the
limit do so by buying cheaper houses. This LTV result is consistent with the results in Adelino
et al. (2012), who also document that borrowers who purchase homes using mortgages at the conforming limit have substantially lower first loan LTVs than those just above the limit.
than those who do and are thus a selected sample. Indeed, these borrowers are clearly somewhat “abnormal,” in that
they do not bunch despite the seemingly large gains from doing so. However, as we know from Figure 2.7A, there are
relatively few borrowers remaining in these bins.
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Although these calculations suggest that there is no direct impact of the interest rate differential on
house prices and the demand for housing itself, we do not necessarily want to draw that inference,
for three reasons. First, the LTV calculations above are “back of the envelope” and there are several
untested assumptions involved. Second, the interest rate differential at the limit is relatively small
and may not be as informative about larger changes in rates over time. Finally, it is likely that other
methods, in particular those used by Adelino et al. (2012), are better suited to studying the effects
of rates on house prices. They estimate the elasticity of house prices to interest rates by following
similar houses over time as they become more or less difficult to finance with a conforming loan at
a constant LTV of 80 percent, essentially using a difference-in-difference approach rather than the
bunching approach we follow. This approach has advantages over ours for this particular question,
especially because we cannot observe borrowers who drop out of the market entirely (the extensive
margin).
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FIG. A.11.—Conforming Loan Limit Over Time. This figure plots the annual conforming loan limit for single
family homes in nominal and real 2007 dollars for each year between 1997 and 2007. Historical conforming
limits were taken from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s (OFHEO) 2007 annual report to
congress. Nominal dollars are inflated using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
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FIG. A.12.—Bunching at the Conforming Loan Limit by Borrower Type, Fixed Rate Mortgages Only. This figure plots the
empirical and counterfactual density of (log) loan size relative to the conforming limit estimated separately for: (a) non-minority
borrowers, (b) minority borrowers, (c) high-income borrowers and (d) low-income borrowers. The connected black line is the
empirical density. Each dot represents the fraction of loans in a given 1-percent bin relative to the limit in effect at the time of
origination. The heavy dashed red line is the estimated counterfactual density obtained by fitting a 13th degree polynomial to
the bin counts, omitting the contribution of the bins in the region marked by the vertical dashed gray lines. The figure also
reports the estimated number of loans bunching at the limit (B) and the average behavioral response among marginal bunching
individuals (∆m), calculated as described in Section 2.4.1.
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FIG. A.13.—Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio by First Mortgage Amount. This figure plots the average combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) as a function of the first loan amount relative to the conforming limit. Each
dot represents the average CLTV in a given 1-percent bin relative to the limit in effect at the time of origination. The heavy dashed red line is the counterfactual mean CLTV obtained by fitting a 5th degree polynomial
to the bin averages, omitting the contribution of the bins in the region marked by the vertical dashed gray
lines. The excluded region is the same region used to estimate bunching for the sample of fixed-rate mortgages. CLTV is calculated as the ratio of the sum of up to three mortgages used to finance a transaction to
the recorded purchase price. Sample includes only transactions with a fixed-rate first mortgage.
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FIG. A.14.—First Mortgage Loan-to-Value Ratio by First Mortgage Amount. This figure plots the average
first mortgage loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as a function of the first loan amount relative to the conforming
limit. Each dot represents the average LTV in a given 1-percent bin relative to the limit in effect at the time
of origination. The heavy dashed red line is the counterfactual mean LTV obtained by fitting a 5th degree
polynomial to the bin averages, omitting the contribution of the bins in the region marked by the vertical
dashed gray lines. The excluded region is the same region used to estimate bunching for the sample of fixedrate mortgages. The blue “X” is an LTV calculated assuming that borrowers who bunch at the limit do so
without adjusting their housing price. See the text for the details of this calculation. LTV is calculated as
the ratio of the first loan amount to the recorded purchase price. Sample includes only transactions with a
fixed-rate first mortgage.
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TABLE A.6
SUMMARY STATISTICS, DATAQUICK SAMPLE

Full
Sample

Transaction and Loan Characteristics
First Loan Amount ($1,000)
Transaction Price ($1,000)
Has Second Loan
First Loan ARM
Housing Characteristics
Square Footage
Property Age (Years)
Number of Bedrooms
Number of Bathrooms
Borrower Characteristics
Applicant Income ($1,000)
White
Black
Hispanic
Observations

Within $50k
of CLL

(1)
Mean

(2)
SD

(3)
Mean

(4)
SD

349
465
0.37
0.49

(229)
(340)
(0.48)
(0.50)

342
449
0.41
0.48

(55)
(123)
(0.49)
(0.50)

1,764
29
3.2
2.1

(4,614)
(25)
(1.3)
(1.0)

1,787
29
3.3
2.2

(2,979)
(24)
(1.4)
(0.9)

142
0.50
0.03
0.21

(181)
(0.50)
(0.18)
(0.41)

133
0.50
0.03
0.19

(127)
(0.50)
(0.17)
(0.39)

2,739,775

637,369

NOTE.—Means and standard deviations for select variables from DataQuick data set.
Columns (1) and (2) are based on the full sample of all DataQuick transactions recorded in
California between 1997 and 2007. Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to only transactions with first mortgage amounts within $50,000 of the conforming limit in effect at the
time of origination. All dollar amounts are in real 2007 dollars. Statistics for transaction
and housing characteristics are calculated using all available transactions. Statistics for borrower characteristics are calculated using only the subset of transactions that match to a
HMDA loan application. See text for details on sample construction.
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TABLE A.7
SUMMARY STATISTICS, LPS SAMPLE

FRMs

Interest Rate (Initial for ARMs)
Jumbo
First Loan Amount ($1,000)
Appraisal Amount ($1,000)
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Debt-to-Income Ratio
Missing DTI Ratio
FICO Score
Missing FICO Score
Term (Months)
30-Year
Observations

ARMs

(1)
Full
Sample

(2)
Within $50k
of CLL

(3)
Full
Sample

(4)
Within $50k
of CLL

6.69
(0.91)
0.17
(0.38)
278.03
(174.40)
396.50
(281.31)
74.09
(16.35)
35.62
(12.47)
0.70
(0.46)
731.18
(51.81)
0.32
(0.47)
345.91
(52.58)
0.90
(0.30)

6.70
(0.90)
0.14
(0.35)
322.55
(56.81)
447.16
(156.74)
76.09
(13.63)
36.79
(11.96)
0.75
(0.44)
731.70
(49.98)
0.35
(0.48)
350.14
(46.44)
0.93
(0.26)

5.05
(2.13)
0.50
(0.50)
452.13
(283.42)
611.28
(438.51)
76.31
(10.07)
35.51
(11.96)
0.45
(0.50)
719.70
(52.82)
0.20
(0.40)
365.78
(30.73)
0.93
(0.25)

5.04
(2.09)
0.39
(0.49)
376.95
(47.29)
497.01
(105.31)
77.33
(9.17)
36.50
(11.46)
0.45
(0.50)
717.97
(52.52)
0.22
(0.41)
365.63
(28.83)
0.94
(0.23)

1,062,164

264,654

947,565

224,475

NOTE.—Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for select variables from the LPS data set. Columns
(1) and (3) are based on the full sample of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate purchase mortgages originated in California between 1997 and 2007. Columns (2) and (4) restrict these samples to only loans that fall within $50,000
of the conforming limit in effect at the time of origination. All dollar amounts are in real 2007 dollars. See
text for details on sample construction.
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TABLE A.8
BUNCHING ESTIMATES BY BORROWER T YPE, FRMS ONLY

(1)
High-Income

(2)
Low-Income

(3)
Non-Minority

(4)
Minority

Bunched Loans (B̂)

33187.7
(548.4)

8899.3
(464.6)

34013.6
(736.5)

3715.2
(150.3)

ˆ
Behavioral Response (∆ m̄)

0.0780
(0.0028)

0.0487
(0.0036)

0.0741
(0.0033)

0.0378
(0.0019)

7.801
(0.276)

4.868
(0.362)

7.406
(0.328)

3.777
(0.196)

0.180
(0.021)

0.120
(0.019)

0.180
(0.023)

0.110
(0.015)

Excess Mass (B̂/

P0

Upper Limit (mH )

j =L n̂ j )

NOTE.—Each column reports the estimated number of loans bunching at the conforming limit (B̂), the average (log) shift in mortgage balance in response to the conforming limit among marginal bunching individuals
ˆ the excess mass at the conforming limit (B̂/ P0 n̂ ), and the upper limit of the excluded region used in
(∆ m̄),
j =L j
estimation (mL ). Estimates are reported separately for high- and low-income borrowers and for minority and
non-minority borrowers. High-income borrowers are those who report an income on their loan application
that is higher than the median in the pooled sample. Low income borrowers are those below the median. Minority borrowers are those who identify as either black or Hispanic on their loan applications. Sample includes
only transactions with a fixed-rate first mortgage which could be successfully matched to a mortgage application
in the HMDA data and for which the borrower reported their income as well as both a race and an ethnicity.
Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated using the bootstrap procedure described in section 2.4.1.
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TABLE A.9
JUMBO-CONFORMING SPREAD ESTIMATES, LOG POINTS

(1)

(2)

Baseline

Splines

(3)
Within $50k
of CLL

(4)
Within $10k
of CLL

Fixed-Rate Mortgages
OLS
IV
Observations

0.026
(0.000)
0.017
(0.002)
1,061,738

0.027
(0.000)
0.018
(0.001)
1,061,738

0.023
(0.002)
0.017
(0.005)
263,641

0.025
(0.006)
0.017
(0.010)
87,617

Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
OLS
IV
Observations

-0.051
(0.003)
0.005
(0.008)
686,970

-0.053
(0.003)
0.009
(0.008)
686,970

-0.168
(0.015)
0.014
(0.022)
156,403

-0.210
(0.034)
0.002
(0.045)
39,198

NOTE.—Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of jumbo-conforming spread, in log points, using
OLS and IV with an indicator for home value being greater than 1.25 m̄ used as an instrument for jumbostatus, as described in the text. Controls include distance to CLL (cubic), LTV ratio, DTI ratio, missing
LTV and DTI ratios, FICO score, missing FICO score, PMI, prepayment penalty, and mortgage term,
as well as month by zip-code fixed effects. Column 1 includes linear effects of LTV and DTI ratios. Column 2 includes cubic B-splines in LTV and DTI ratios, as well as FICO score. Columns 3 and 4 limit the
sample to loans near the CLL.
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A.5. Estimating Multiple Breakpoints
In estimating the break points, we allow for the possibility that a given market might experience
more than one housing boom during the course of our sample period. Our method is recursive
in that we first test for the existence of one break point against the null hypothesis of zero. Given
the existence of at least one break point, we can then test the hypothesis of m + 1 break points
against the null of m using the results from Bai (1999). Bai and Perron (1998) show that the test for
one break is consistent in the presence of multiple breaks, which is what allows for this sequential
estimation procedure.
More specifically, let 0 < ψi,1 < · · · < ψi,m < 1 mark the proportions of the sample generated
by the m break points estimated under the null hypothesis for MSA i. For technical reasons,
we require that ψi, j − ψi, j −1 > πi,0 for some small πi ,0 where we define ψi,0 = 0, ψi ,m+1 = 1.
Further, let ηi, j =

πi,0
,
ψi, j −ψi, j −1

j = 1, , m + 1. The likelihood ratio test compares the maximum of

the likelihood ratio obtained when allowing for m + 1 breaks to that from only allowing for m.
The distribution of this likelihood ratio statistic is given by
P (LR > c) = 1 −

m+1
Y
i=1



1 − P s u pπi ∈[ηi, j ,1−ηi, j ] Q1 (πi ) ,

(A.8)

which we calculate by recursive application of the method provided in Estrella (2003).
We apply this procedure to test for the existence of two break points against the null of one as well
as three against the null of only two among those MSAs for which we find at least two statistically
significant break points. There are some noteworthy practical issues involved with carrying out
this procedure. We have not until this point said where the sample proportions πi,0 , πi,1 , πi,2
come from. In practice, we restrict the full sample period for each MSA to lie between the first
quarter in the data and the peak of price growth. We then do not allow any break points to lie
in either the first or last two quarters of this sample for each MSA. This determines the fractions
πi,1 and πi,2 which, because different MSAs have a different number of quarters, will vary across
areas.
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When estimating multiple break points, we further require that any two break points be at least
four quarters apart. This determines the fraction πi,0 which, again, will vary across areas due to
differing sample sizes. Because of these restrictions, we are not able calculate p-values for many
MSAs in the case of multiple breaks. The reason for this can be seen from the expression in (A.8)
. Because this expression requires that η j < 0.5, we must require that

πi ,0
ψi, j −ψi, j −1

> 0.5 for all

j . This implies that we will not be able to calculate p-values for the two-break case in MSAs
(neighborhoods) where the first break is less than πi,0 /0.5 from the beginning of the sample period.
Naturally, this restriction is more burdensome when trying to calculate p-values in the three break
case.

A.6. A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion
Consider an economy with N metro areas. The probability of MSA m entering a housing boom
increases if it ‘meets’ other MSAs which already have entered a housing boom. Assume α is the
frequency of such a meeting and that the connection between MSA pairs decays in distance at rate
δ. Following Comin et al. (2012), we can write MSA m’s probability of not entering a housing
boom at time t + h conditional on not having a housing boom in time t as
P
P (0, m, t + h) = P (0, m, t ) 

αh
−δ r mq
P
(0,
q,
t
)e
q6= m

P
−δ r mq
e
q6= m

(A.9)

where r mq denotes the distance between MSA m and MSA q. Taking h → 0, we have
!
!
X
X −δ r
∂ l nP (0, m, t )
−δ r mq
mq
= αl n
P (0, q, t )e
− αl n
e
∂t
q6= m
q6= m

(A.10)

By assumption, P (0, q, t ) = 0, ∀t τ if MSA q enters a housing boom at time τ. As long as some
MSA enters a boom, equation (A.9) implies that

∂ l nP (0,m,t )
∂t

< 0, so that the hazard of entering a

housing boom increases over time. To consider the contagious effect of housing booms, suppose
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MSA q booms at time t . That increases the hazard of MSA m having a boom because
∂ l nP (0, m, t )
αe −δ rmq
=P
>0
−δ r mq
∂ t ∂ P (0, q, t )
P
(0,
q,
t
)e
q6= m

(A.11)

In addition, the contagious effect of a housing boom in MSA q decreases over geographical distance, because
∂ 2 l nP (0, m, t )
∂ t ∂ r mq

αδe −δ rmq
=P
>0
−δ r mq
e
q6
=
m
P (0,q,t )=0

(A.12)

In sum, this framework provides two relevant implications for our purposes:
Implication 1: The fact that MSA q enters a housing boom at time t increases the hazard of MSA
m (mq) having a housing boom at time t + 1.
Implication 2: The contagion effect in Implication 1 becomes larger when MSA q is closer to
MSA m.

A.7. Additional Figures

FIG. A.15.—Histogram of number of quarters between timing of the booms of focal markets and
nearest neighbors. Note: The level of observation is the MSA-quarter.
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FIG. A.16.—Histogram of percentage difference in population of focal markets and nearest neighbors. Note: The level of observation is the MSA-quarter.
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